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ABSTRACT
THE INTERNET VS. THE NATION-STATE: PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION
CHALLENGES ON THE INTERNET IN REPUBLIC OF TURKIYE
Ersin Elibol
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. David Earnest

Social, economic, and technological developments are widely accepted as
powerful forces that affect the role, power, and functions of nation-states. Being one o f
the most influential technological developments in the recent decades, the internet has
come into prominence in this regard.
With the use o f the Internet, the monopoly o f media and information controlled by
official ideologies, capitalist barons, or elites is seriously challenged. Consequently the
power balance between individuals and authorities in the mass media and communication
has been transformed in a significant way. Though their reliability may sometimes be
questionable, the number and type o f information resources has increased dramatically,
and accessing information has become easier substantially. People are more
interconnected today than ever before. They can easily find, join, or construct their
personal, social or political networks. With a number of internet applications and social
media, collective reactions, social movements and activities are more organized and
effective today than ever before. That is why we have seen so much social fluctuation,
unrest, protest, and political activism all over the world in the last few years.
Moreover new terms and phenomena like cyber-crime, cyber warfare, and cyber
attacks have urged nation-states to be more careful about the internet and increase their
efforts to control it. This level of social chaos in different states and increasing cyber
crimes lead us to question the effectiveness of nation-states' controlling measures.

Focusing on one state, the Republic of Tiirkiye, this study analyzes two important
dimensions o f state control efforts, prevention and prosecution. On the prevention side, I
explore the effectiveness o f internet access blocking. On the prosecution side, I analyze
the effectiveness o f prosecution in internet child pornography.
The result of testing to measure the effectiveness of Internet website blocking
reveals that there are significant gaps, complications, and dilemmas in these policies. A
similar situation is also seen in the investigations o f internet child pornography. Analysis
conducted o f the operational investigation files reveals that in most o f the files, suspects
could not be identified, traced or brought before judicial authorities. As seen in these two
fields, state policing efforts o f the Internet in a country are not absolute, and the Internet
can be a vulnerable space in which any local or foreign actor or agents like criminals,
opposition groups, terrorists can create problems for nation-states.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

No other invention seems to have had the same influence within so short a time at
the global level as the Internet. Some anthropologists emphasize that “this capacity-the
Intemet-is the most significant social development since the invention o f writing over
five thousand years ago.” 1 The Internet has become a global communication network, and
it has been rapidly expanding since it was first introduced to the public. While there were
about 16 million worldwide users in 1995, there were 400 million in 2001 and about 2.4
billion users as o f June 2012.2 It is estimated to reach around 3 billion by the end of
2014.3
Today, there is almost no field in our daily lives that the Internet has not
penetrated. It is already one o f the inseparable parts of our daily social and economic
lives. The Internet can enable us to access to our banks, official departments, libraries,
shopping centers, media, and entertainment centers. We can manage our banking
accounts and conveniently carry out many transactions online. We can easily connect
libraries and databases to conduct research. For shopping, we can find many alternative
retailers and sellers, not necessarily near our homes but from anywhere in the world. We
can reach newspapers, TV centers, magazines, and many kinds of media corporations.
Many o f the previous media and communication services and applications have

1 W illiam Van Dusen, "The World Has Entered a N ew Z o n e o f History," Vital S p eech es o f th e D a y 7 3, no.
5 (2007): 219.
2 "World Internet U sage and Population Statistics," Internet W orld U sa g e S ta tistics: M iniw atts M arketing
Group. 2013.
J International T elecom m unication U nion (ITU ), "World Telecom m unication/IC T Indicators D atabase
2014." United N ations, 2014.
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been adapted to the Internet. Although the traditional ways o f providing services like TV
broadcasting, printing newspapers and telephone boxes still exist, the Internet has
combined them all onto a unique platform to be a TV, a digital newspaper or a telephone
(Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls). With smart phones running over 3G or 4G
technology today, these services become mobile for individuals, and ease our lives in a
significant way.
People who have messages, comments, news, ideologies, or any other ideas now
have a convenient tool to amplify and share with anyone in the world. Skillful people can
now use this global platform to present their skills and capabilities that can be digitalized.
The mass media have started to share some of their roles with Internet-based “citizen
journalism.” An individual has unique power on the internet today, what Friedman calls
“uploading.”4 Without convincing any actor of the previous media order, individuals can
upload any record o f any subject to the internet, which can change the public agenda at
the national level, or even the international level, as seen in the case of Julian Assange
and WikiLeaks.
It is “nonhierarchical, interactive, and global. Its usage is also growing
exponentially.”5 Because o f its diffusion power and widespread use, it relatively
empowers individuals more than authorities. For instance, what makes police force
powerful is the use o f radio communication (walky-talky) among each patrol to
coordinate their collective action against criminals or in their daily activities. During the
Gezi protests in Tiirkiye started in the end o f May 2013, protesters used some o f internet

4 Thom as L. Friedman, The W orld Is Flat: A B r ie f H istory o f the Twenty-F irst C en tu ry (N ew York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2005).
5 Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," P o litic a l Science Q u a rterly 113, no. I
(1998).
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applications including a walky-talky program, Zello on their smart phones for instant
communication among each-others.6
The Internet is such a dominant medium that it is open to many new media and
communication technologies. This accessibility encourages developers to make new
technologies Internet compatible. Castells believes that the invention o f the Internet is as
important as the invention o f printing press.7 Referring to McLuhan’s analogy o f the
“Gutenberg Galaxy” for the diffusion of the printing press in the West, he believes that
“we have now entered a new world o f communication: the Internet Galaxy.

Q

The Internet is still quite young. Basic examples o f computer networking go back
to the mid-1970s in the United States. It started to be used publicly in the beginning of
the 1980s and became more widespread by the 1990s . Goldfoot indicates that the word
“Internet” emerged by the mid-1980s.9 Since then, the Internet already connected the
entire world like a digital web. Between the years o f 2000 and 2010, users o f the Internet
have increased about 444.8 % in the world.10
This popularity has also affected academia. Compared to other media and
communication tools like TV, newspapers, and radio, the Internet has often been the
subject o f academic inquiry. Chadwick and Howard analyzed the numbers o f articles
available in Thompson Reuter’s 1SI Web o f Science scholarly article database published

6 Uetin Aydin, "5 M ilyon T w eet’e Organize Incelem esi," H u rriyet, 15 June 2 013. and "Gezi Parki
Eylem cilerinin GOzdesi 'Zello' Nedir?" Aksam , 6 June 2 013.
7 Manuel C astells, The Internet G alaxy: R eflection s on th e Internet, Business, a n d S ociety, (O xford; N e w
York: Oxford U niversity Press, 2001).
8 Ibid., 3.
9 Josh A. G oldfoot, "Antitrust Im plications o f Internet Adm inistration," Virginia L a w R eview 84, no. 5
(1998): 909-53.
10 International Telecom m unication Union, ibid.

between 1995 and 2006.11 A keyword search revealed that there were fewer articles
published in 1995 containing the word, “Internet” than the word, “TV.” That changed in
1999, when the frequency o f articles containing the word “Internet” matched the
frequency o f the keywords “TV,” "newspapers,” and “radio.” By 2001 the number of
articles containing the word “Internet” exceeded the total number articles containing the
words "TV,” “newspaper,” or “radio.” 12

THE PUZZLE AND RESEARCH QUESTION
The spread o f the Internet and its use have introduced new opportunities and
convenience to our daily lives. At the same time Internet use has introduced significant
challenges and complications. Besides complications and possible victimization at the
individual level, the primary addressee and target o f these negative effects is the only
authority within national borders: nation-states. Authorities all over the world are
developing their own national policies to maximize their benefits from the Internet, but at
the same time they are trying to take measures to handle and control the externalities o f
this new medium. It can be expected that non-democratic states tend to take strict policies
and implement harsh legal measures to regulate the Internet, whereas democratic
countries prefer more liberal approaches in their Internet policies. However, strict
policies and practices can also be seen in relatively democratic countries.13

11 Andrew C hadwick and Philip N. Howard, R o u tled g e H andbook o f Internet P o litics, (London; N e w York:
Routledge, 2009).
Ibid.
1’ At different tim es, som e o f the countries known as dem ocratic and liberal are also cla ssified by the RSF,
Reporter Without Borders as enem ies o f the internet or w here the internet is under surveillance including
Australia, Turkiye, South Korea, U SA , UK, France. S ee for instance: Clothilde Le C oz, "Reporters without
Borders Issues ‘Enem ies o f the Internet’ List," M ediashift, 5 April 2 0 1 0 . and Reporters W ithout Borders,
"Internet Enemies," ( 2 0 1 1), and Kieran Doherty, "US, UK 'Enem ies o f the Internet' for First Time," RT, 17
March 2014.
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The challenges and complications o f the Internet can be seen in a variety o f fields
that states have fundamental interests in controlling. This might be a national security
issue, like a cyber-attack to a strategic department, or a terrorist organization use o f the
Internet for different purposes. It could be a taxation issue for a global Internet company,
e.g. Google, earning profits from local advertisement within states without paying taxes
to the local government. It might be ensuring the rule o f law and public order also on the
internet like in preventing any o f undesired idea, ideology or content within national
borders for different reasons.
Today, even highly developed countries, like the United States, have serious
dilemmas regarding the Internet. Although the Internet was bom in the United States, and
there are many well-known US-based companies in information technology, the country
is having legal and technical difficulties regulating the Internet in accordance with the
country's core principles. For instance, obscenity and pornography are strictly regulated
within the country “in all communications technology.” 14 Except its sensitivity against
child sexual abuse, which is regulated in different legislation like the Children’s Internet
Protection Act, similar materials are now very much available and accessible in the
United States because o f these difficulties. The main technical reason is “over-blocking,”
which means that blocking some illegal web contents may result in blocking innocent
web content, since many websites may contain both legal and illegal content. Callanan et
al. stress that “it seems inevitable that legal content will be blocked where blocking is
implemented.” 15 While testing a blocking method, Domain Name System (DNS)

14 A m y E. White, Virtually O bscene: The C a se f o r an U n cen so red In ternet, (Jefferson, N C : M cFarland &
Co.. 2006). 19.
15 Corm ac Callanan, Marco Gercke, Estelle D e M arco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking:
B alancing Cybercrime R esponses in D em ocratic Societies," Open S o ciety Institute, 2 0 0 9 , 12.
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poisoning,16 which prevents access to unwanted websites, Dronseif figured out that
almost all attempts to block websites containing hate speech made mistakes in their
implementation in Germany. While some sites were closed down for hate speech, some
other legal websites were blocked unintentionally.17
Perhaps the most significant challenges that the Internet imposed on nation-states
have been experienced in the socio-political realm. Hills notes that, “History shows that
person to person instantaneous electrical communications have altered the relations of
states to their citizens. Such communications can be used to organize domestic opposition
to governments. They can also cross national borders creating vulnerability and threats to
national security. Point to point electrical communication transfers power away from
states to non-state actors in a way that the top down technology of broadcasting does
not."'8
In recent years, masses who were unpleased with their regime type or with the
policies of their governments have created serious threats and vulnerability for some
states, by also using the Internet. Together with other socio-political dynamics and
reasons, effective use of the Internet has played a significant role in these incidents. The
uprising called the Arab Spring started in Tunisia in the end of 2010, the incidents o f
Occupy Wall Street protests in the USA in the year of 2011, or the riots started in London
and spread throughout England in the same year showed us clearly that the internet was
the kitchen o f the incidents where all the anger, hate and other negative circumstances are

lf> Domain N am e System (D N S ) is a service that translates w ebsite nam es, which usually use alphabetical
letters, into number sequences known as IP addresses.
17 Ian Brown, "Internet Filtering - Be Careful What Y ou A sk For," In Freedom a n d P reju d ice: A p p ro a ch es
to M edia a n d Culture, Edited by S. Kirca and L. Hanson. 2 0 0 8 .
18 Jill Hills, "What's N ew ? War, Censorship and Global Transm ission," International C om m un ication
G azette 68, no. 3 (2006), 195.
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harmonized and given stove though uploading, reporting, jogging, tweeting and where
the sittings around the meal table is organized through communication, information
sharing.
Even we had seen the role o f the internet before, in the case o f Indonesia in 1998
(the fall o f Suharto regime); in the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 2004; during
the Saffron Revolution in Burma, 2007; or in the incidents in Moldova, 2009 that some
call the Twitter Revolution.
Kyj explains the role o f the Internet in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine:
“Despite lacking access to mass media, supporters o f democratic change compensated
through skillful use of the Internet to recruit volunteers, raise funds, organize campaigns,
report breaking news, and gamer the sympathy o f the global democratic community.” 19
Analyzing political protests in Moldova, Mungiu-Pippidi and Igor emphasize how the
Internet-engaged younger generations utilized online tools and features o f the Internet
while organizing their political protests in 2009.20
Although it did not result in a regime change, the governments o f Burma in 2007
and Iran in 2009 had similar challenges when people utilized the internet and internet
applications while they were protesting their authoritarian regimes and were asking
political change as well as freedom.21 During the Saffron Revolution in Burma,
Chowdhury notes that, “Despite efforts by the government to control all media outlets,
this attempted revolution demonstrated that the Internet does not lend itself easily to

19 M yroslaw J. Kyj, "Internet U se in Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Business H o rizo n s 4 9 , no. I (2 0 0 6 ), 71.
20 Alina M ungiu-Pippidi, and Igor Munteanu, "Moldova's "Twitter Revolution"," J o u rn a l o f D em o c ra c y
Jou rn al o f D em ocracy 20. no. 3 (2009): 136-42.
21 Evgeny M orozov, "Iran Elections: A Twitter Revolution?" W ashington Post, 17 June 2 009.
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control."22 Nima believes that an independent information society that can be created by
the use o f Internet features like social media tools and blogging is the only way to bring
political change to Iran in the long run.23
The world also noticed recently how influential the Internet was during the Arab
Spring, particularly in Egypt, Tunis, Libya and Syria. For people on the street, the
Internet is the only effective tool on hand to mobilize disaffected masses, to organize
their reactions, and to amplify their voices to the world.
Analyzing the role of social media in political fluctuations that began in Tunisia
in the beginning o f 2011, John Timpane argues how Internet use has broken the state’s
information monopoly. He cites, “One thing about information: Once it’s out, you can’t
put it back. As Richard, associate professor of communication at La Salle University,
puts it, ‘The sheer multiplicity of venues and sources makes it impossible for would-be
dictators to get the genie back in the bottle. And once info is out at all, it’s easily,
infinitely copiable.’"’24
Even against blocking efforts by these authoritarian governments, or the total
shutdown by these regimes, new Internet technologies were introduced and started to be
utilized in these countries. In order to circumvent government blockage o f Skype calls
made from Syria, an activist used software from Psiphon, Inc. to call outside the country.
The Psiphon technology was developed by a Canadian company, funded by the United
States Department o f State, and was downloaded by thousands of people in Syria during

22 Mridul Chowdhury, The R ole o f th e Internet in B u rm a ’s Saffron R evolution, (T he Berkman Center for
Internet & S ociety at Harvard University: Berkman Center Research Publication, 2 0 0 8 ), 8.
2> Nim a Mina, Blogs, C yber-L iteratu re a n d Virtual C u ltu re in Iran, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: G eorge C.
Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2007.
24 John Timpane, "Arab World Shaken by Pow er o f Tw itter and F acebook,” M cC la tch y - Tribune B usiness
N ew s, 2 0 11.
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a three-week period.2' Likewise, Google and Twitter have developed Internet
technologies for which no internet connection is required. These became a remedy to a
total Internet blackout, allowing "voice to Tweet” (a mobile application known as Voice
for Twitter) capabilities for Egyptians to send short message to Twitter by calling specific
telephone numbers and speaking the messages over the mobile telephone network.26
In the end o f 2010, the world experienced another example o f this debate— the
case o f WikiLeaks. On one side there is one state, a super power—the United States. On
the other side there is the Internet, a website called WikiLeaks, and an Internet activist.
This case also shows how the Internet can be an influential tool in the hands of an
individual, as Friedman claims in his book The World is Flat, even to challenge a state. 27
This dissertation explores the interaction between nation-states and the Internet
and explores the ways in which the Internet affects state power. State power here is
operationalized as "policing.” Policing is one of the essential functions o f state authority,
and it has two important aspects: prevention and prosecution. While state authorities try
to prevent some criminal, social, or political threats before they happen, authorities also
try to trace, identify, prosecute, detain, or arrest those who involved these kinds o f illegal
»

,

activities. This study concentrates on one country, the Republic of Turkiye.

28

For the

preventive policing aspect, the study focuses on blocking measures. For the prosecution
dimension, the study examines a specific crime, child pornography. This study explores
empirical cases, data, and other reliable evidence to understand how the Internet has

25 Ivan W atson, "Cyberwar Explodes in Syria," C N N , 22 N ovem ber 2 011.
26 Charles Arthur, "G oogle and Twitter Launch Service Enabling Egyptians to T w eet by Phone," G uardian,
I February 2011.
27 A dim ension o f this interaction, for instance see the declaration o f Reporters W ithout Borders and how it
condem ns the blocking, cyber-attacks and political pressure against the w ebsite and its founder: Reporters
Without Borders, "Wikileaks Hounded?" 4 D ecem ber 2 010.
28 Turkiye is the Turkish name for the country referred to as Turkey in English.
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complicated traditional policing practices.
In this frame, this study analyzes two issue areas, as an example for each policing
aspect: i) blocking on the Internet (prevention) and ii) prosecution o f child pornography
(prosecution).

OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
States have many mechanisms and tools to regulate and administer this global
medium. Drezner specifies that “the Internet has generated multiple areas o f governance,
including the development of technical protocols, censorship, e-taxation, intellectual
property, and privacy rights.”29 Likewise Denning indicates that “the Internet has raised
numerous policy issues in such areas as privacy, encryption, censorship, electronic,
commerce, international trade, intellectual property protection, taxation, Internet
governance, cyber-crime, and information warfare.”30
Among these policy areas, the interaction between the nation-state and the
Internet is mainly argued around three areas in political science literature: i) censorship,
blocking, and filtering regimes (practices o f states); ii) cyber-crimes, policing,
prosecution, and law enforcement difficulties; and iii) surveillance efforts. This study
concerns the first two but excludes the third policy area, which is a typical state behavior:
surveillance. For states, surveillance efforts are vitally important for their power and
existence. Such is the case with the Internet. Many states today try to maximize their
benefit from the Internet for surveillance and their national interests. Studying these kinds
29 D. W. Drezner, "The Global G overnance o f the Internet: Bringing the State Back In," P o litic a l S cien ce
Q uarterly 119, no. 3 (2 0 0 4 ), 479.
Dorothy E. D enning, "Activism, H acktivism , and Cyberterrorism: T he Internet as a T ool for Influencing
Foreign Policy," In N etw orks a n d N etw ars: The Future o f Terror, C rim e, and M ilitan cy, edited by J.
Arquilla and D. F. Ronfeldt. 2001, 250.
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of efforts o f states would bring a broader perspective for explaining the effects o f the
Internet on state power. However, studying surveillance is always difficult since data and
information in this field are widely confidential and closed to third parties.
Rather, this study focuses on access blocking, filtering practices, and cybercrime,
specifically cybercrime investigations into the exchange o f Internet child pornography,
which are some o f the major problems o f this new medium. Blocking and filtering on the
Internet are very much interrelated with many other debates, such as the Internet and
democracy, and the Internet, social media, social movements, and social mobilization.
Many democratic rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of speech, and privacy
o f communication are extensively related to censorship and filtering regimes. Analyzing
these issues, exploring effectiveness and possible challenges in these regimes, will bring
substantial explanations and contributions to these debates mentioned above. Also,
investigation of aspects o f a cybercrime will present how judicial proceedings against
cybercrime are effective in solving such crimes.

CONTRIBUTION: STATE POWER IN THE INFORMATION AGE
In fact, there is already a debate in the literature about the decline in state power.
Sometimes this decline has been argued within globalization dynamics,

sometimes

within newly emerging actors, like multi-national companies,32 or non-governmental
organizations,33 or sometimes within other powerful forces like technology.34 As stressed

James N . Rosenau, D istan t P roxim ities: D yn am ics B e yo n d G lo b a liza tio n , (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2003). and Jan Aart Schoite. G lo b a liza tio n : A C ritic a l Introduction, (N e w York: St.
Martin's Press, 2000).
’2 Susan Strange, The R etreat o f the S ta te: The D iffusion o f P o w er in th e W orld E co n o m y, (Cam bridge
University Press, 1996).
3’ Thomas Risse-K appen, B ringing T ransnational R elation s Back In: N on-State A ctors, D o m estic
Structures, a n d In ternational Institutions, (Cam bridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge; N ew

12

in The Economist, '‘Almost any discussion o f international relations nowadays seems to
begin and end with the same idea: the state is in retreat.”35 Creveld classifies that states
are weakening in four ways: a) losing warfare capability; b) weakening welfare capacity;
c) changes brought by modem technology and communication tools; and d) difficulties
sustaining public order.36 In the same debate, The Economist refers to two old enemies,
which are stronger now than ever before: technology and ideology.37
Ronald Reagan stated in a speech in London Guildhall in 1989 that, “Technology
will make it increasingly difficult for the state to control the information its people
receive. ..The Goliath o f the totalitarianism will be brought down by the David o f the
-7 0

microchip.”'
Nye perceives this decline as a transformation in state power and describes five
trends in this transformation: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism
in weak states, the spread o f technology, and changing political issues.39 Price also
believes that this is a kind o f transformation in state functions: “Redefined state power
and changes in modes and practices of authority are more likely than what is often called
state decline.”40
Analyzing social networks and Internet applications such as Facebook, MySpace,
and Twitter, The Economist notes that, “Despite its giant population, Facebook is not
York. NY: Cambridge U niversity Press, 1995). and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, A c tivists
B eyon d B orders: A d v o ca c y N etw orks in In ternational P o litics, (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell U niversity Press,
1998).
34Joseph S. N ye, S oft P ow er: The M eans to S u ccess in W o rld P o litics, (N e w York, N Y : Public A ffairs,
2004). and Martin V. Creveld. "The Fate o f the State," P a ra m eters (1 9 9 6 ): 4-18.
35 "The Future o f the State," E conom ist, 18 Septem ber 1997.
6 Martin V. Creveld, "The Fate o f the State," P a ra m eters (1 9 9 6 ): 4 - 18.
'7 "The Future o f the State," ibid.
8 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, O pen N etw orks, C lo s e d R egim es: The Im pact o f the In ternet on
Authoritarian Rule. (W ashington, D.C.: C arnegie Endowm ent for International P eace, 2 0 0 3 ).
3<) N ye, ibid.
40 Monroe E. Price. M edia an d S overeig n ty th e G lo b a l Inform ation Revolution a n d Its C h a llen g e to S ta te
P ow er, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 3.

quite a sovereign state— but it is beginning to look and [to] act like one.”41 The
newspaper implies that, "The future is another country."42 It refers the comments of
David Post, a law professor from Temple University, who specifies some interesting
points: "Facebook has many implications, including commercial, for individuals or
companies. Recently, the website obligated users to utilize its proprietary money system,
which is a typical state feature (printing national money to circulate within national
borders). Just as states tax their citizens, Facebook also taxes its users. Interestingly,
while they are logged in, Facebook users can access some o f different websites outside
without logging in to these sites.” Like using a passport (or required a valid visa) while
travelling between states, The Economist notes.43
The magazine was reporting Facebook as having over 500 million users all over
the world, coming in third after the population o f China and India in 2010. As o f May 1,
2013, registered users of Facebook are reportedly reached 1.11 billion. The number of
existing users o f another internet phenomenon, Twitter was reported as 500 million as of
March 21, 2013.44
Some scholars, on the other hand, do not agree that the Internet threatens nation
states to such an extent.42 While discussing the effects of the Internet on nation-states,
Drezner indicates that "states, particularly the great powers, remain the primary actors for
handling the social and political externalities created by globalization and the Internet.”46

41 "The Future Is Another Country." E conom ist, 2 2 July 2 0 1 0 .
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 For the number o f Facebook m em bers, see for instance: "Number o f A ctive U sers at Facebook over the
Years, ” A sso cia ted P ress, 1 M ay 2013. For the number o f Tw itter users, see for instance: "Twitter in
Numbers," Telegraph, 21 March 2013.
45 Drezner, ibid. and Jack L. G oldsm ith and Tim W u, Who C o n tro ls th e Internet?: Illusions o f a B o rd erless
W orld, (N ew York, NY: O xford U niversity Press, 2006). and Price, ibid.
46 Drezner, ibid., 478.
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Hill notes that, “Although some theorists have argued that the internationalization o f
communications has eroded the power o f the state, he believes that power has shifted
away from domestic and international non-state civic opposition groups to increased state
control.'’47
In the introduction of their book, Morris and Waisbord summarize that,
“Certainly, states currently face changing and challenging conditions. The
remarkable global expansion o f media corporations, facilitated by liberalization
and privatization o f media systems worldwide and the development o f cable and
satellite technologies, has reduced states' ability to exercise power and maintain
information sovereignty. It would be unwarranted, however, to conclude that the
state no longer matters. Reports about the death o f the state may be greatly
exaggerated, as many contributors in this book suggest.’’48
Goldsmith and Wu accept that states face serious problems because o f the
Internet.

49

However, they argue that these challenges are not totally different from those

created by previous media and communication mediums. They also indicate that “every
great technological innovation has the potential to lower the cost o f violating law” and
thus “these points (challenges) are unsurprising.’00
Looking at the situation in a particular country, the Republic o f Turkiye, this
study aims to contribute to the literature by presenting the dimensions o f this interaction
between the state and the Internet. Especially for some countries like China and Iran,
there are quite a number o f academic studies in which the effects o f the Internet were
subjects of inquiries.71 The experience o f Tiirkiye’s internet blocking practices, as well as

47 David T. Hill and Krishna Sen, "The Internet in Indonesia's N ew Democracy," D em o c ra tiza tio n 7, no. 1
(2000): 119-36.
48 Nancy Morris and S ilv io R. W aisbord, M edia a n d G lo b a liza tio n : Why the S ta te M a tters, (Lanham , MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), ix.
49 Goldsmith and Wu, ibid.
50 Ibid, 8 1.
51 For China, see for instance Ho-Chun Li, "Digital D em ocracy in China: Evaluating C hinese C itizen s’
Fight for Rights via the Internet." State U niversity o f N ew York at B uffalo, 2 008. and Z ixiang (A le x ) Tan,
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the effectiveness of prosecution o f online crimes, particularly internet child pornography,
will present to the literature the experience of a developing state and its policing
challenges on the Internet, both in terms of prevention, i.e. Internet blocking, and
prosecution, i.e. child pornography.
This study is not a technical analysis o f circumvention tools and programs in a lab
environment. It is a field study where the results o f blocking measures are established and
where the results o f circumvention tests are directly conducted. While tests and checks
for blocked websites are performed in Turkiye, some sections were written in the United
States.
The following second chapter presents a review o f literature, divided into four
sections. The first review shows how the Internet in general affects nation-states by
focusing on how Internet use and activity complicate basic state functions. Classifying
state functions as ensuring national security, justice and public order, and economic and
social welfare, this section explores how this medium causes significant problems and
challenges in these three basic fields for state authorities.
The second review o f the second chapter looks at access blocking techniques and
the argument about their effectiveness, discussed in more detail in the third section, about
circumvention. These three sections thus explore the prevention dimension o f state
policing on the Internet. Finally, the literature review concludes in the fourth section, an
example o f a child pornography prosecution.
The third chapter includes methodology and research design. This study examines
two policy areas o f policing on the Internet: effectiveness o f access blocking policies on

W illiam Foster, and Seym our E. Goodm an, "China's State-C oordinated Internet Infrastructure,"
Com m unications o f the ACM , June 1999. For Iran see: M ina, ibid.
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the Internet and effectiveness o f prosecution of child pornography. This section also
explains the methodology, how research questions are formulated, how they are
measured, why the Republic of Turkiye is selected, why internet child pornography is
focused on as a cybercrime, and provides some definitions o f terms used in this study.
Chapter four gives introductory’ information for the Republic o f Turkiye, the
media and communication fields in general, and the historical background o f the Internet
in the country.
The fifth chapter presents a general overview o f Internet access blocking policies
in Turkiye and the effectiveness o f these polices. Being one o f the measurement criteria, I
discuss the analysis o f a YouTube case as an example for over-blocking. The chapter
includes essential part of the measurement which is the circumvention tests o f 25 blocked
websites with three popular circumvention methods. The last part o f the chapter
addresses other issues and arguments about the effectiveness of Internet blocking, such as
dilemmas in legal terms, access blocking terror websites, and its results as well as the
circumvention tendency in the country.
In the sixth chapter, prosecution o f child pornography is explored. This chapter
relies on secondary data from a central police department in Turkiye. The department is a
Bureau o f the International Police Organization, INTERPOL, named Interpol Ankara.
The department coordinates cooperation between non-Turkish departments and Turkish
departments in policing and judicial matters. Looking at three years 2005, 2006, and
2007. this section analyzes how7prosecution o f Internet child pornography is effective
both inside and outside o f Turkiye. in terms of identifying criminals and bringing them
before judicial authorities.

The seventh section presents overall analysis of the two aspects explored, policy
implications o f this study and a must “international cooperation”. The final section
includes weakness and limitations of the study as well as some ideas for future studies
and the conclusion.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

STATE POWER AND THE INTERNET
Like many technological innovations, the Internet has brought new challenges and
complications. How the complications caused by the Internet are significantly different
from those caused by previous communication and media technologies is a debate in the
related filed literature. There are numerous scholars who believe that traditional state
mechanisms are ineffective, even useless against the Internet because o f its unique
characteristics and features. Caimcross emphasizes that “government jurisdictions are
geographic. The Internet knows few boundaries. The clash between the two will reduce
what individual countries can do. Government sovereignty, already eroded by forces such
as trade liberalization, will diminish further...One result: no longer will governments be
able to set the tax rates or other standards they want."1 John Perry Barlow believes that,
“By creating a seamless global economic zone, borderless and un-regulatable, the
Internet calls into question the very idea o f the nation-state."2
Price explains that like the Internet, previous media and communication devices
have caused similar problems and challenges for authorities. Border crossing radio waves
including political or other kinds of undesired messages were one o f the first
transnational problems between states, which were later minimized by mutual
negotiations and agreements. When satellites, phones, and televisions were started to be
used, the conflict for national governments was again the transnational nature o f the
1 Frances Cairncross, The D eath o f D istan ce: H ow th e C om m un ication s R evolution Is C h a n g in g O ur L ives,
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2 0 0 1 ).
' D. W. Drezner, "The G lobal G overnance o f the Internet: Bringing the State Back In,” P o litic a l S cien ce
Q u arterly I 19, no. 3 (2004): 477-98.
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technology. Although states are trying to take technical measures and develop counter
technologies to cover up their air boundaries or to stop unwanted broadcasting, we may
still see significant technical problems and disputes between states for these previous
media and communication fields.3
To summarize the debate, Gelbstein and Kurbalija use two frames in question: “Is
the Internet ‘new wine in old bottles’ or is it ‘new wine in new bottles’?”4 The “old-real”
approach - or “new wine in old bottles” - argues that the Internet has not introduced
anything new to the field o f governance. The Internet is just another new device, from the
governance perspective, no different from its predecessors: the telegraph, the telephone,
or radio.
For example, in legal discussions, this approach argues that existing laws can be
applied to the Internet with only minor adjustments. In the economic field, this approach
argues that there is no difference between traditional and “e-commerce.” Consequently
there is no need for special legal treatment o f “e-commerce.”
The “new-cyber” approach— or “new wine in new bottles”— argues that the
Internet is a fundamentally different communication system from all previous ones. The
main premise o f the “cyber” approach is that the Internet managed to de-link our social
and political reality from the (geographically separated) world of sovereign states.
Cyberspace is different from real space and it requires a different form o f governance. In
the legal field, the “cyber” school of thought argues that existing laws on jurisdiction,
cybercrime and contracts cannot be applied to the Internet and that new laws must be

’ M onroe E. Price, M edia an d S o vereig n ty th e G lo b a l Inform ation Revolution a n d Its C h a llen g e to S ta te
P o w er, (Cam bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
4 Jovan Kurbalija and Eduardo G elbstein, Internet G o vern an ce: Issues, A ctors a n d D iv id e s, (M sida, Malta;
Geneva; Kuala Lumpur: DiploFoundation; G lobal K n ow led ge Partnership, 2005).
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created.'
In fact, assertive claims and exaggerated rhetoric about the transformative power
o f the Internet was more visible in the earliest years o f the Internet when officials,
politicians, and technicians faced the first challenges to govern, legalize, and nationalize
this global medium. According to Seth F. Kreimer, “The first wave o f legal thinking
about the Internet saw millennial omens in technology. The reach o f the Internet seemed
to exceed the grasp o f governments, and this structure heralded-—or threatened— the end
o f censorship.’’6 Castells also notes that governments were not effectively able to control
this digital medium in the first years of civilian Internet use. However, government
authorities increased their surveillance capacity and empowered legal mechanisms during
this time.7
The debate has many complex dimensions, and governing the Internet has brought
both new opportunities and also new challenges. What is interesting in this interaction
between the Internet and the nation-state is not observing how states are using traditional
tools such as making laws on the Internet, founding institutions, licensing, and others.
Rather, it is to observe how significant amount o f Internet traffic is out o f states’ control;
the extent to which policies, laws, and other regulations on the Internet are applicable and
effective. Further, it is important to understand why some types of states may perceive
this global medium as a threat for their regime type and prefer strict censorship policies
on the Internet. Likewise it is important to understand why some others are having
serious legal dilemmas to regulate the Internet without damaging basic democratic and

5 Ibid, 17-18.
6 Seth F. Kreimer, "Censorship by Proxy the First Am endm ent, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem o f
the W eakest Link," U niversity o f P en n sylva n ia L aw R eview 1 15, no. 11 (2006).
' Manuel C astells, The Internet G a la x y: R eflection s on th e Internet, Business, a n d S ociety, (O xford; N ew
York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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liberal principles. This study focuses on these kinds of complications and dilemmas for
nation-states raised by the Internet. The following section explores these challenges seen
in three basic functions o f nation-states.

Three Main State Functions and Negative Effects o f the Internet
Jackson and Sorensen classify functions that states are expected to ensure:
o

security, individual freedoms, social order, justice and social welfare. While discussing
the effect o f weak states in transnational terrorism, Patrick also focuses on similar
functions o f nation-states: “physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic
management and social welfare.”9
Analytically, this section explores the effects of the Internet on nation-states based
on these basic state functions: a) security, b) justice and public order, c) economic and
social welfare. This classification is not a clear cut categorization to utilize for explaining
the effects of the Internet on nation-states but this analytic approach is useful to frame
and present this interaction between nation-states and the Internet.

National Security
Security is one o f the primary concerns for nation-states and it determines state
behaviors in a significant way. Being a globally open communication and media network,
the Internet has raised new issue areas which tend to corrode states’ sovereignty and has

8 Robert H. Jackson and G eorg Sorensen, Introduction to In tern ation al R elations: T h eories a n d
A pproach es, (Oxford; N e w York; Oxford U niversity Press, 2 0 0 7 ).
9 Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: A sse ssin g the Evidence o f'S p illo v ers' Center for
Global Developm ent," W orking P a p er 73 (January 2006).
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created new "vulnerabilities and threats” for their national security.10 Castells emphasizes
that we are using and sharing the same network with our adversaries, criminals, and
terrorists.11 Thus, the Internet is structurally open to all nefarious thinking anywhere in
the world.
Security threats through the Internet for states are analyzed in three aspects here
in this section: i) the risk o f being used as cyber-attacks like interstate military clashes; ii)
terrorist use o f the Internet; and iii) use o f the internet to wage political threats against
regime type and territorial integrity.

Cyber-attacks, Cyber-warfare
Cyberspace has already become a place where interstate conflicts and battles take
place in asymmetric ways. The political conflict between Iran and the West, for instance,
is seen to take place in cyberspace. Security experts have discovered that a virus called
“Stuxnet.” which is widely seen in Iran, can show that this virus was especially created to
target Iran and is looking for something special there. According to Symantec (an
American computer security company) records, as the Guardian noted, 60% of
computers in Iran have been affected by this virus. The virus may not spread through the
Internet network but is believed to be diffused in the computers and closed networks
through USB ports and flash drives.12
In 2007 Estonia was targeted for a series o f cyber-attacks. The political disputes
and conflict between Estonia and Russia at that time made some commenters suspect
10 Jill H ills, "What’s N ew ? War, Censorship and Global Transm ission," International C om m un ication
G azette 68. no. 3 (2006): 195-216.
11 Castells, ibid.
'■ Jim G iles, "Are States U nleashing the D ogs o f Cyber War?" N SC I N ew S cien tist 2 0 8 , no. 2791 (2 0 1 0 ):
22-23. and Peter Beaum ont, "Iran N uclear Experts Race to Stop Spread o f Stuxnet C om puter Worm,"
G uardian , 25 Septem ber 2010.
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Russia was behind these attacks. But no direct link to Russia has been detected so far, nor
could perpetrators be traced or prosecuted, except one Estonian student who received a
fine. The computers used for this attack were spread over 100 different countries, which
made prosecution complicated.13 Despite arguments whether to define it as cyber
warfare, Estonia's unique experience affected N ATO's decision to found its cyber center
in Estonia, called NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO
CCDCOE) on 14 May 2008.14
Many of these kinds of cyber-attacks have been seen during an ongoing inter-state
political conflict or a military clash. The Yugoslavian crisis showed a number o f
examples for cyber-attacks. During the war in Kosovo, Albanian hackers attacked and
damaged about 2,000 websites.1:1The Los Angeles Times wrote that the Kosovo conflict
was “turning cyberspace into an ethereal war zone where the battle for the hearts and
minds is being waged through the use o f electronic images, online discussion group
postings, and hacking attacks.” 16 When NATO launched air strikes on Serbian targets in
1999, Serbian hacker groups like the Black Hand and Serbian Angel started to attack
some websites of the United States Government websites, as well as N ATO’s computer
networks.17Also, the accidental bombing o f the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the
same NATO operations in Serbia in 1999 triggered attacks from Chinese hackers on
some United States Government websites.18

Clark B oyd, "Cyber-War a G row ing Threat Warn Experts," B BC W o rld S ervice, 17 June 2 0 1 0 . and
"Estonia Hit by 'M oscow C yber War,"' B B C N ew s, 17 M ay 2007.
14 NA TO Cooperative Cyber D efen ce Centre o f E xcellen ce, w w w .ccd co e.o rg .
15 E. M. Hoctor, "Emerging Virtual Nations: Prom ise and Potential," N ew M edia a n d S o c ie ty 9, no. 4
(2007): 697-706.
16 Dorothy E. Denning, "Activism, H acktivism , and Cyberterrorism: T he Internet as a T ool for Influencing
Foreign Policy," In N etw orks a n d N etw ars: The Future o f Terror, C rim e, and M ilitan cy, edited by J.
Arquilla and D. F. Ronfeldt. 2 3 9-88 , 2001.
17 Ibid.
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The cyber-attacks on the Georgian Internet infrastructure in 2008 were more
organized and more serious than those on Estonia in 2007, according to a security
expert.19 As in the case of Estonia, Russia was considered to be behind the attacks before
its military forces moved into Georgia.20 According to NATO CCDCOE, cyber-attacks
against Georgia included “defacement o f websites,” denial-of-service (DoS) or
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and “distribution of instructions and
malicious software.”21 The targets were governmental departments, financial institutions,
and media outlets.22
Despite its common use, the definition o f “cyber-warfare” is not clear. Security
officer Bruce Schneier believes that: “We don't have good definitions o f what cyber war
is, what it looks like and how to fight it.”23 The OECD report also notes that incidents
experienced so far in cyberspace “do not deserve the name cyber-war.”24 From this
perspective, cyber-warfare is an exaggerated term. However, such attacks may result in
many states and security organizations taking counter measures and developing new
strategies against cyber-warfare. Schneier also believes that the future wars will take
place in cyberspace. Some experts worry that these kinds of cyber-attacks will become a
new arms race between states.25
“The United States officials already consider cyberspace to be a domain for
warfare, similar to air, space, land, and sea.”26 Speaking at a conference in Washington

19 Stefanie Hoffm an, "Russian Cyber Attacks Shut D ow n Georgian Websites," C R N , 12 A ugust 2 0 0 8 .
20 Ibid.
21 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Runnimeri, Mari Kert, Anna-M aria Taliharm, and L iis V ihul, "Cyber
Attacks against Georgia: Legal L essons Identified," N A T O C CD COE Legal Task Team , 2 0 0 8 .
22 Ibid.
2> M aggie Shiels, "Cyber War Threat Exaggerated C laim s Security Expert," BBC N ew s, 16 February 2 0 1 1 .
j4 Ibid.
25 M aggie Shiels, "Cyber-Sabotage and E spionage T op 2011 Security Fears," BB C N ew s, 3 0 D ecem ber

2010 .
26 A lex Hudson, "Is Cyber-Warfare a Genuine Threat?" B B C N ew s, 11 February 2 0 1 1 .
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DC, the United States Secretary o f Defense Robert Gates stressed that the United States
faces a serious cyber threat that the United States Government needs to develop a security
shelter, which should include private military contractors.27
NATO has started to include cyber threats in its strategic documents and develop
certain policies to protect against attacks. Giving a speech to German Deutsche Welle
Radio about NATO’s upcoming summit in Lisbon in 2010, NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen explained that in addition to conventional battles, NATO needs
to be ready for the war o f the future—cyber warfare. Thus, one of the important pillars of
NATO’s new strategy, which he calls version 3.0, will be empowering organizational
capability against all kinds of cyber threats.28

Terrorism and the Internet
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon for nation-states, but the Internet has created
a new matrix for terrorists and other illegal groups to utilize. Terrorists can and are using
the Internet in different ways and for different purposes. They can directly use the
Internet to attack a certain targets online, which is known as “cyber-terrorism.” The term
“cyber-terrorism’’ is the convergence o f two words: cyberspace and terrorism as Denning
notes.29 She defines “cyber-terrorism” as “politically motivated hacking operations
intended to cause grave harm such as loss o f life or severe economic damage. An
example would be penetrating an air traffic control system and causing two planes to
collide.”30

27 "Siber Tehditle Kar$i Kar$iyayiz," H iirriyet, 19 N ovem ber 2010.
28 Basin Yayin ve Enform asyon Genel MUdiirlugu (B Y E G M ), "Intemetin Denetim i Artik Nato'da,"
Timeturk, 22 N ovem ber 2010.
29 Denning, ibid.
Ibid, 241.
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Terrorists can also utilize the Internet for propaganda; data mining; fundraising;
recruitment and mobilization; networking; sharing information; and planning and
coordination.31 They can use the Internet to get knowledge and information in a particular
topic from any page hosted in any country. This may include weapons, explosives,
chemical substances or other kinds o f tactical information. In the planning stage o f any
terrorist attack, they may get important details from the Internet like security points,
critical times, maps, and plans o f an area. Attackers may use the Internet as a propaganda
tool to spread their ideology and to expand their activities. Denning indicates that in
1998, it was reported that 12 of the 30 terrorist organizations listed by the United States
Department o f State has an Internet presence.32 By August 1999, “virtually every terrorist
group” had a web presence, “along with a mishmash of freedom fighters, crusaders,
propagandists, and mercenaries.”33 Internet use is the easiest and cheapest way for groups
to maintain communication with their members, volunteers, or sympathizers.
Terrorists can use the Internet for communication purposes but not necessarily in
a regular and direct way. They are also aware that the web is not totally free o f state
control, but they develop their own techniques to perform their illegal activities. The
terrorists involved in the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 are known to
have utilized the Internet before the attack. Weimann indicates that Mohammed Atta’s
last message to the other terrorists involved in the attacks of 11 September 2001 was:
“The semester begins in three more weeks. W e’ve obtained 19 confirmations for studies
in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty
of engineering.” The reference to the various faculties was apparently code for the
31 Gabriel W eimann, T error on the Internet: The N ew A rena, the N ew C h allen ges, (W ashington, D.C.:
United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2 0 0 6 ).
2 D enning, ibid.
“ Ibid, 2 5 1.
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buildings targeted in the attacks.34 Similarly, terrorists who were involved in the London
bombing in 2005 are said to have communicated with each other by email. Instead of
sending the messages, they saved their messages as drafts in a designated account so that
the messages would be accessible to others with access to that same email account with a
possible common account and/or password.
Weimann indicates the advantages o f the Internet for illegal groups as
“a) easy access; b) little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of
government control; c) potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world; d)
anonymity o f communication; e) fast flow of information; f) inexpensive
development and maintenance o f a web presence; g) a multimedia environment
(the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video and to allow users to
download films, songs, books, posters, and so forth); and h) the ability to shape
coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use the Internet as a
source for stories.”35
Denning believes that it is impossible to free the internet from these terror
websites because o f transnational structure of the Internet. Many websites blocked for
terrorism-related crimes in Tiirkiye originate outside o f the country. The separatist
Liberation Tigers o f Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka has a London-based website that the Sri
Lankan Government has not even attempted to shut off.36
Swartz emphasized another danger on the Internet, that online access to critical
military bases or important buildings through Google Earth “is alarming if not
dangerous.”37A special agent working for Russian Federal Security Service, previously
known as KGB, says “Terrorists don't need to reconnoiter about their target. Now an
American company is working for them.”38 Because o f these concerns, Google, one o f

4 W eimann, ibid.
45 Ibid, 3.
6 D enning, ibid.
57 Nikki Swartz, "G oogle Earth Scares Governments," The Inform ation M anagem ent J o u rn a l 4 0 , no. 2
(2006).
38 Ibid.
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the biggest search engines on the Internet, later decided to shadow some sensitive
buildings and complexes.

Political Effects
Political threats refer to the risks that the Internet can impose on states ranging
from a) the possibility of revolutionary replacement o f the ruling authority; b) forcing
these regimes to accept serious political demands from opposition parties, minority
groups, or to make significant changes in the political system; and c) putting governments
in a difficult position both at home or abroad. Theoretically any state can experience
these kinds o f threats; however, autocratic states and dictatorial regimes are much more
vulnerable to these kinds o f social fluctuations. Since there is more a social consensus in
democratic countries thanks to free political elections, liberal political culture, and
power-sharing institutions, Internet use by the masses would not be much o f a problem
for them. Therefore, this aspect is very much a concern for autocratic states and is also
related to the debate about whether the Internet is a democratizing agent.
“More generally, Samuel Huntington emphasizes the unprecedented importance
o f demonstration effects in the Third Wave o f democratization, made possible by
changes in global communications. Media proprietor Rupert Murdoch has even
proclaimed: ‘Advances in the technology o f telecommunications have proved an
unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere’”39
Today most o f the countries that apply strict censorship and intense surveillance
have sensitive political concerns within their national borders. Reporters Without
Borders, an international NGO that monitors Internet freedom in the world, lists 15
countries as Internet enemies, including Bahrain, Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Iran,

19 Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," P o litic a l Science Q u a rterly 113, no. 1
(1998).
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North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam.40 Most o f these
countries are considered autocratic, have a single political party, dictatorial regimes, or a
weak democratic tradition. They try to control the Internet since they perceive it as a
threat for their ruling authority, regime, and sovereignty. Many of them have laws that
allow for the abrupt disconnection of the Internet. They have strict censorship and
filtering regimes, high-level surveillance efforts, and heavy penalties for bloggers and
online activists. As Reporters Without Borders reports, “The judicial or political
authorities often use anti-terrorism laws to identify and monitor government opponents
and activists expressing themselves online.”41

The Internet and democracy
It is possible to find both pessimistic and optimistic views in the literature about
the effects of the Internet on democracy. Some optimists claim that Internet promotes
democracy since its decentralized structure and characteristics directly or indirectly
enhance most o f democratic values such as public awareness, political participation and
freedom o f expression. Although there are some downsides in each of these advantages,
people can now find more alternative resources to get information and news, conduct
online research easily, find different ways to engage politically depending on personal
interests, or anonymously post ideas, images, or records on the Internet. Ultimately, the
Internet is perceived as “the greatest democratizer the world has ever seen.”42 Castells
notes: “The Internet was expected to be an ideal instrument to further democracy and still

40 Reporters Without Borders, "First O nline Free Expression Day Launched on Reporters without Borders
W ebsite,” 2008.
41 Ibid.
42 Rodan, ibid.

The positive beliefs about the democratic effects o f the Internet emerge from the
rich heritage o f literature about historical dynamics following the creation o f the printing
press, increasing print literacy, Protestant reforms, and the emergence o f constitutional
democracies. “Communication media, literacies, and political governance have
coevolved for millennia...Communication technologies and literacies possess a power
that has, on many occasions, proven mightier than physical weaponry— the potential to
amplify, leverage, transform, and shift political power by enabling people to persuade
and inform the thoughts and beliefs of others.44 Ferrall writes about the belief that the
democratizing power o f the Internet streams from its governing difficulty: “A Declaration
o f the Independence o f Cyberspace, saw electronic communications technology as being
inherently free and ungovernable and likely to catalyze positive social and political
revolutions worldwide.”45
In recent years, however, more scholars have started questioning this belief and
say that “there is more hype than real change.”46 Chowdhury believes that information
abundance and peoples’ awareness does not guarantee political participation 47 It can
even cause more confusion. In a study conducted for Berkman Center in Harvard
University, Chowdhury cites that “although there is a positive correlation between
measures o f democracy and Internet diffusion in most countries, there is still no

4’ C astells, ibid.
44 Howard R heingold, "Mobile M edia and Political C o llectiv e Action," Chap. 17 In H a n dbook o f M o b ile
Com m unication S tudies, edited by Jam es Everett Katz. P olitics and S ocial Change 2 2 5 -3 9 . (Cam bridge,
MA: M assachusetts Institute o f T echnology, 2 0 0 8 ), 225.
45 Kenneth Farrall, "Cascading Networks: Electronic C om m unication and the D iffusion o f Social
Instability,” In International C om m unication A sso cia tio n A n nu al M eetin g , 2007.
45 Mridul Chowdhury, The Role o f th e Internet in B u rm a's S ajfron R evolution, (T he Berkman C enter for
Internet & Society at Harvard University: Berkman Center Research Publication, 2 0 0 8 ), 12.
47 Ibid.
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convincing evidence that there is any causal relation between the two.”48
Pessimists point out two important issues, which they claim limit the
democratizing effects of the Internet. First is the so-called “digital divide.” Second is
states' increasing interest in surveillance and censorship policies on the Internet.
The digital divide refers to the distance between people with and without Internet
access. This distance represents a new divergence both at the global and national level.
The Internet has been rapidly spreading throughout the world, but this spread seems not
to foster democracy as much as they emphasize. Castells notes that global web structure
is significantly related with technological infrastructure, wealth and education.49 While
the internet penetration rate in the continent o f Africa was the lowest, at 15.6%, it was the
highest in North America, at 78.6% in 2013.50 While 78 % o f households has internet
access at home in the developed countries, it is 31 % of households in the developing
world.51
There is also a digital divide within states. Not everyone in any society has equal
opportunity to access the Internet and effectively use it for his own interests. The Internet
penetration rate for China is 40.1% (out of a population o f 1.34 billion, only 538 million
Chinese are Internet users).52 The rate in Russia is 67.9 million Internet users out o f a
population o f 142.5 million. Internet penetration rate for Russia is % 47.7. Internet
penetration rate for Iran is 53.3%— 42 million users out o f a population o f 78.8 million.
In Turkiye, there are 36.4 Internet users out of a population o f 79.7. Internet penetration
48 Ibid., 12.
49 C astells, ibid.
50 "Surfing and Site Guide Internet World Stats," Internet W orld Stats, http://w w w .intem etw orldstats.com
/surfing.htm . The Internet Penetration Rate corresponds to the percentage o f the total population o f a given
country or region that uses the Internet. An Internet user is a person w ho must have available a ccess to an
Internet connection point and a person must have the basic k now ledge required to use Internet techn ology.
51 International Telecom m unication U nion (IT U ), "The W orld in 20 1 4 : ICT Facts and Figures," U nited
N ations, 2014.
52 Ibid.
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is 45.7%.53
This situation creates new inequalities among different demographic, economic,
and socio-political groups within states. Castells specifies that the Internet infrastructure
is more intensive in urban areas and metropolitan regions.54 Hoctor cites that the high
level o f Internet use among intellectual elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina may indicate
that the Internet might be is perceived as elitist. These persistent inequalities and biases
mean that the Internet is far from fulfilling its role as a way to further democracy.55
Moreover, states tend to increase their surv eillance capabilities, censorship
practices and adopt heavy penalties against political activities on and/or through the
Internet. As cited in Ferrall, “a growing area of research, known as surveillance studies,
focuses on the ways in which electronic communication technologies facilitate more
widespread and intense monitoring of individual citizens, limiting social freedoms and
enhancing the power o f oppressive regimes.”56 In Saudi Arabia, intense censorship has
made the Internet more o f an intranet, a limited network in a specific area or region as
Drezner implies.57 Rodan notes that “such technology can also be harnessed by some
states to consolidate a climate o f fear and intimidation and create new opportunities to
co

disseminate propaganda and information in their favor.”-

Different from both optimistic and pessimistic views, some scholars believe that
the debate about the democratizing side o f the Internet is not discussed on the right
ground. In other words, they accept a normative approach and offer that we should have
moderate expectations for the Internet, not to expect a revolution, regime change, or the
iJ Ibid.
54 Castells. ibid.
55 Hoctor, ibid.
56 Farrall. ibid.
57 Drezner, ibid.
58 Rodan, ibid.
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fall o f a dictatorship. We should see how these tools are gradually opening up closed
regimes to the world or how effective use o f these communication devices enhances
transparency, minimizes corruption, and makes the ruling regimes more responsive to
their people and their demands.^9
Along with these democratic dynamics, it is impossible to question the effects o f
the Internet in other political issues, like the Internet use by separatist movements, and
where territorial integrity is a concern for a nation-state. Today, some countries are
having internal conflicts with ethnic, religious, and other minority groups. These groups
demand certain political rights, religious freedom, identity recognition, or regional
autonomy. Among them are the Quebec issue in Canada, the Basque region in Spain,
Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, Kurdish issues in Turkiye, and others. The
virtual space has become another important space and platform for these political groups
to further their political goals.
While focusing on separatist movements in East Timor and Maluku, Hill and Sen
point out that the Internet was a “deciding factor in each conflict”60 Hill argues that “the
net enabled individuals and local groups in East Timor to draw effectively upon skills and
resources from supporters located far away.”61 Like in Indonesia, Hoctor notes that local
opposition groups were not alone thanks to the Internet in the Chiapas conflicts in
Mexico.62
Domain names are another sensitive issue when these separatist minority groups
are considered. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is
59 Marcus Franda, "Book R eview s: R egim es, Cartels, and the R em apping o f Information Space,"
G overnan ce: An International Jou rn a l o f P olicy, A dm inistration, a n d Institutions 17, no. 3 (July 2 0 0 4 ).
60 Hoctor, ibid.
61 David T. Hill, "East Timor and the Internet: Global P olitical Leverage in/on Indonesia," In donesia
Indonesia, no. 73 (2002): 25-51.
62 Hoctor, ibid.

34

the private sector, non-profit United States-based corporation that issues top-level domain
names. While each country has a unique domain name allocated by ICANN, new domain
names for “cultural and linguistic communities” pressing for increased political rights
recognition can raise new problems for some states.
“In 2003, ICANN introduced a new “.cat” domain for the Catalan language.
This is the first domain introduced for a language. This precedent has
triggered new controversies. First, many language and cultural communities
around the world are likely to request the same right. Second,
in some cases language and cultural communities may have aspirations
towards nationhood. This aspect may cause potential controversies and
conflicts with existing states. In the case o f the “.cat” domain, the Spanish
government did not oppose this decision.”63

Justice and Public Order
Public order, public safety, and justice are essential duties that state authorities
need to provide. Through different methods, institutions, and tools, states try to ensure
public safety and public order. Different from previous media and communication
devices, the Internet has created new challenges and dilemmas for states in ensuring these
fundamental duties. As seen in social protests and revolutions in the Arab world, as well
as in previous cases in Ukraine, Moldova, and Iran, the most significant complications of
the Internet are in the socio-political realm.

Social Complications
Group psychology, collective action, and communication are very sensitive fields
that no state can ignore. Hills notes that, “the fear o f person to person communications -

6> Kurbalija and G elbstein, ibid.
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o f the potential for the organization o f opposition - has always been there.”64 History
shows us that technological innovations were very often influential in affecting the
balance between the ruling authority and the ruled people. Before the Iranian Revolution
of 1979. cassette tapes and cassette players played an important role in spreading the
messages of Khomeini in Iran.65 Mobile phone usage and text messaging were the core
instruments that unified the people o f Indonesia around the fall of the Suharto regime.66
With the invention of the Internet this tension between the authority and citizens entered
a new period. Besides interests groups, social unions, institutionalized opposition groups,
NGOs, and unhappy citizens have found an effective means of communication for
collective action.67
Perhaps the most significant case to recognize the effects o f the Internet was first
seen in the case o f the fall o f Suharto Regime in 1998. The Internet was the essential
communication medium for people to unify a mass movement against the regime through
increasing awareness among the public and to organize protests against the regime.68
The Internet was again on the scene when the Ukrainian Orange Revolution was
emerging in the end o f 2004, by ensuring effective means o f communication between the
crowded mass opposition groups and activists.69 “Despite lacking access to mass media,
supporters o f democratic change compensated through skillful use o f the Internet to
recruit volunteers, raise funds, organize campaigns, report breaking news, and gam er the
64 Hills, ibid., 196.
65 Farrall, ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Jessica T. M athews, "Power Shift: The R ise o f Global C iv il Society," Foreign A ffairs 76, no. 1 (19 9 7 ):
50-66.
68 Hill, ibid. and David T. Hill and Krishna Sen, "The Internet in Indonesia's N ew D em ocracy,"
D em ocratization 7, no. 1 (2000): 119-36.
69 Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange R evolution," F oreign A ffairs 8 4, no. 2 (2 0 0 5 ): 3 5 -5 2 . and O lga
Filippova, "Anti-Orange D iscourses in Ukraine's Internet: B efore the Orange Split," J o u rn a l o f C om m un ist
Studies a n d Transition P olitics 23, no. I (2007): 138-51. and Adriana Helbig, "The C yberpolitics o f M usic
in Ukraine's 2 0 0 4 Orange Revolution," C u rrent M u sico lo g y, no. 82 (2006): 81.
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sympathy o f the global democratic community.”70
The tension between the Internet and politics was also high during the Saffron
Revolution in Burma in 2007. In order to cover up violence within the country, the
military junta took some measures to stop online communication. These measures were
partly successful but could not totally stop the leakage o f news and bloody images from
the country. Thus, the government found the ultimate solution to shut down the Internet
completely. The Saffron Revolution in Burma was not successful at that time, but the
Internet played an important role in raising awareness about these orange-dressed monks
in Burma. As Chowdhury notes “Despite efforts by the government to control all media
outlets, this attempted revolution demonstrated that the Internet does not lend itself easily
to control”71
Later, we witnessed the Internet shaking another country, Moldova. Analyzing
political protests in this country in 2009, Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu indicate that the
Internet was an effective tool for young protesters to communicate with each other.72
Thanks to the internet implications like YouTube and Twitter, the young protesters could
sustain protests for several days for a political change that some journalists and scholars
call this political transformation a Twitter revolution.
Both social movements in Ukraine and Moldova achieved some degree o f
success. Authorities revoked controversial national elections and replaced incumbent
governments with new governments. Many in the West expected to see similar ends in
Iran following the controversial national election in 2009; however, the Iranian
70 M yroslaw J. Kyj, "Internet U se in Ukraine's Orange R evolution," Business H o rizo n s 4 9 , no. 1 (2006):
71-80.
71 Chowdhury, ibid., 8.
72 Alina M ungiu-Pippidi and Igor Munteanu, "M oldova's "Twitter R evolution”," J o u rn a l o f D em o c ra c y
Jou rn al o f D em o cra cy 20, no. 3 (2009): 136-42. and David C. Hodge, "Residential R evitalization and
D isplacem ent in a Growth Region," G eo g ra p h ic a l R eview 71, no. 2 (1981): 188-200.
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government suppressed the protests by using excessive power. Although these
movements in Iran could not achieve their political aims, the world witnessed how
protesters utilized the Internet to amplify their voices. Independently from official Iranian
media, they made personal broadcasts with their own pictures, videos, and stories.
The year 2011 became a crucial point from which to observe social booms in the
Arab world, as well as to understand better the meaning o f the Internet in social unrest.
People who are displeased with their governments and regime types in Tunisia, Egypt,
the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, people who do not believe that their
governments represent them or their values found the Internet to be the perfect tool to
amplify their voices, share their views and political news with like minded people, and
upload pictures and videos to certain websites to attract the outside world’s attention.
Digital activists have effectively utilized the Internet. Certain websites like
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Daily Motion and other Internet features have had
considerable success either in achieving regime change, triggering serious political
reforms, or shaking old regimes in a significant way.
Social protests started in Tunis in December 2010, and President Zine El Abidine
left the country in January 2011. Alexa.com is a global service that ranks websites. Some
o f Alexa’s website rankings for Tunis from December 2010 to January 2011 were: 1)
Facebook, 3) YouTube, 6) Blogger, 12) Twitter, 13) Aljazeera.net, and 20) Daily Motion.
On the same dates Egypt also experienced mass protests against President Mubarak. The
incidents in Egypt started in January 2011 and President Mubarak resigned on 11
February 2011. Alexa’s rankings for the country on 04 March 2011 were: 1) Facebook, 3)
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YouTube, and 7) Blogger.73
An Egyptian NGO, “6 April,” was one o f the dynamos in the events that resulted
in the resignation o f the 30-year old reign of the Mubarak regime. Founded in 2008 to
ensure collective action among workers, they named their movement after the date o f a
strike that occurred on 6 April. The movement began on Facebook and later expanded to
other social media like Twitter and Flicker. Declaring a national strike on 25 January
2011, it was one o f the active political groups that mobilized the mass public in Egypt
and was finally able to lead to the resignation o f President Mubarak.74 The founder of
another social media network called RNN, Ahmed Yusuf, stated that young people who
did not dare protest the government before the founding o f such social media networks
found a place to share their opinions with others and to act collectively. Using Facebook
as a platform and volunteer reporters, the number of followers of the RNN network per
day was about 300,000 at the beginning of the protests.75

A brief analysis o f a website actively utilized during mass protests in Egypt in 2011
Below is detailed data about the website o f the 6 April movement
(www.6april.org). The data gives us a useful insight into the intense traffic to and from
the site on critical dates o f the social events in Egypt.76
For the site, alexa.com interprets that, based on data and records, “compared with
the overall Internet population, the site appeals more to college graduates; its visitors also
tend to consist o f both high- and low-income, childless men under the age o f 25 who

7' Both records for Tunis and Egypt are from A iexa.com , retrieved on 4 March 2 0 1 1. A lexa.com ranks the
popularity o f w eb sites based on the number o f visitors w ithin the last three months.
^ BBC, "Misir’da Sokaga Inenler Kimler?” Tim eturk, 2 8 January 2 0 1 1 .
1:> Timu^in M ercanoglu, "Misir Devriminin Arkasindaki G U f ’Sosyal M edya1,” Tim eturk, 4 February 2 0 1 2 .
76 "Alexa A ctionable A nalytics for the Web," A lexa Internet, Inc., A lexa.com .
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browse from home. Visitors to it view 2.1 unique pages each day on average, and roughly
54% o f visitors to 6april.org come from Egypt, where it has attained a traffic rank of
1.772.”77
The popularity of the website increased dramatically by the end o f January
•J O

2011.

Since alexa.com ranks websites based on their performance in the last three

months, this date in fact reflects the real traffic that started by the end o f October 2011.
Reports note that social tension in Egypt has started in the end o f 2010, which
confirms this traffic and digital activity on this website, www.6april.org, by the end o f
2010. The dramatic increase started by January 2011, which implies that online activity
for the site actually started to increase by October 2010. The daily reach as a percentage
increased by 330 % between January' and March 2011.

Upstream sites
Interesting data from alexa.com about 6april.org include upstream and
downstream figures. The majority of the users for 6april.org are visiting this site after or
before visiting Facebook and Twitter.
In fact, the Internet and social media were not the only influential communication
and media tools during Arab Spring events. Many scholars emphasize the importance of
traditional media outlets, including A1 Jazeera and its Middle East-centered broadcasting.
At this point, interesting cooperation and interactions occur between traditional media
and Internet-based social media. While each individual and Internet user is a potential
correspondent or editor on streets from which they can upload news and recordings to a

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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number o f different websites, traditional media can use online news and recordings to
spread and diffuse further to its audience.79 In reverse, individual Internet users can also
take pictures and news from traditional media to post and upload to the Internet
applications that they are using. What is surprising in this interaction is not to see the
influence o f so-called traditional media. Rather, it is more surprising to observe how
Internet use, particularly social media, was so effective in these social upheavals during
the so-called Arab Spring.
Recent revolutions, social fluctuations in the Middle East, other similar cases
mentioned in this study show that the Internet can be one o f the most critical media and
communication platforms to inflame social unrest. The Internet or social media use itself
does not directly lead to revolutions, mass movements, or regime changes. Socio
political, socio-economic reasons are still necessary for these kinds o f occurrences.
Rather than an independent variable, the Internet seems to be an effective communication
and media tool to inflame social unrest. Without social, political, and economic reasons,
the effects o f Internet use alone will be limited in social unrest.

Justice and legal challenges
Like in other areas in which states have interests, authorities tend to regulate the
fields related to the Internet, enforce these regulations so that legalization is ensured, and
finally prosecute any possible illegality. Use of the Internet has brought new questions
and challenges to the fields o f justice and law. These difficulties are especially seen
during the enforcement and prosecution stages.

70 During protests on Tahrir Square in Egypt in 2 0 1 1 , for instance, the AI Jazeera w as using v id eo records
on the Internet but labeling them as “unconfirm ed pictures."
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A famous phrase in this debate belongs to Nicholas Negroponte, the co-founder
and director o f MIT’s Media Lab, in which he asserts that, “the Internet cannot be
regulated. It is not that laws aren’t relevant, it is that the nation-state is not relevant.”80
Likewise, Grossfeld believes that “the explosion o f the Internet presents new challenges
for both state regulators and self-regulatory organizations.”81
According to White, “the anatomy o f the Internet is unique and perhaps,
impossible to regulate effectively.”

Emphasizing the importance o f being connected to

the entire world in a global network, Grossfeld, believes that “the old parameters were
intended for a telephone- and paper- based environment; the Internet challenges these
traditional notions of territoriality and sovereignty.”

From this point, some scholars

utilize the term “cyberspace sovereignty.” Wu, for instance, notes that “Proponents o f
cyberspace sovereignty generally assert that it is impossible or futile” for governments to
regulate the Internet.
Hollis claims that “Law cannot regulate the authors o f cyber-threats because
anonymity is built into the very structure of the Internet.” Hollis considers that “existing
rules on cyber-crime and cyber-war do little to deter.”85 White notes that “the anonymity
o f the Internet is unique and, perhaps, impossible to regulate effectively.”
Legalization anomalies can be seen in Internet blocking measures either

80 Jack L. Goldsm ith and Tim Wu, Who C o n tro ls the Internet?: Illusions o f a B o rd erless W orld, (N e w
York, N Y : O xford University Press, 2006).
81 B. G rossfeld, "Global A ccounting: W here Internet M eets Geography," A m erican J o u rn a l o f C o m p a ra tiv e
L aw 4 8 (2000): 261-306.
82 A m y E. W hite, Virtually O bscene: The C a se f o r an U n cen so red In ternet, (Jefferson, NC: M cFarland &
C o., 2006), 12,
83 Grossfeld, ibid.
84 Tim othy S. Wu, "Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System ," H a rv a rd J o u rn a l
o f Law & Technology 10, no. 3 (1997 ).
85 D. B. H ollis, "An E-SO S for Cyberspace," H a rv a rd In ternational L aw J ou rnal 52, no. 2 (2 0 1 1 ): 3 7 3 432.
86 White, ibid., 12.
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implemented as prevention or for punishment purposes. In order to avoid access to illegal
websites and web contents, different types o f blocking techniques can be implemented.
However, as summarized by Callanan et al., during these implementations it is inevitable
to face some complications like over-blocking and under-blocking. There is no guarantee
o f totally disabling access to these undesired websites because of a variety of
circumvention methods and techniques available online.

87

One o f the basic principles of universal justice is the subjectivity o f criminality
and justice. Because o f a crime or illegality, only the person(s) involved and the illegal
object can be subject to criminal procedure and punishment. However, implementation of
website blocking using different techniques is open to over-blocking, which means some
innocent websites can be blocked along with the targeted ones.

88

This inevitable

complication is one o f the essential reasons for authorities in the United States to
approach Internet blocking cautiously because of its significant risks to damage “freedom
of speech and expression,” which is strongly protected in the “First Amendment o f the
United States Constitution.”89
For instance, in Meghalaya, a state in India, authorities noticed some records and
postings against the local and federal government o f India in a discussion group hosted
by Yahoo! Groups. After the access blocking decision to the discussion group by the
authorities were ordered to more than 400 Indian Internet Service Providers (ISP:
business that offers customers Internet access), the ISPs shut down all Yahoo Domains

87 Cormac Callanan, Marco Gercke, Estelle De M arco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking:
Balancing Cybercrim e R esponses in Dem ocratic Societies," Open S o cie ty Institute, 2 0 0 9 , 20.
88 Ibid.
89 Kreimer, ibid.
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and servers.90 Similarly, because o f specific hate speech on YouTube about founder o f
the Turkish Republic, authorities blocked all YouTube content for a long time in Tiirkiye.
In order to solve this problem, states can prefer a low-level blocking measure, but in this
case they face another dilemma o f “under-blocking,” which ensures partial access to
undesired websites.
In order to present the huge size and numbers o f illegal Internet activities, the
Intel Corporation reports that “every 60 seconds there are an estimated 135 Botnet
infections and 20 new victims o f identity theft” globally on the Internet.91 Intel also
believes that for every 416 attempts at hacking, 12 of those are successful.92 Despite high
numbers o f illegal and criminal activities on the Internet, prosecution efforts and
clearance rates in cybercrimes are relatively low. Kerr cites the following points about the
dark side of the Internet: 1) “Although every computer connected to the Internet is
subject to frequent attack by outsiders, the (United States) central government only brings
criminal charges for computer hacking against about one hundred defendants per year. 2)
About two-thirds of all email is unwanted “spam,” unsolicited commercial email. 3)
Computer viruses and malware make up about one percent o f all email, although criminal
prosecutions for sending out viruses or malware remain extremely rare. 4) Sophisticated
pedophiles can use proxy servers and anonymous chat rooms to share images of child
pornography with little fear of being caught by police. 5) Although Internet gambling is
illegal in every state, millions o f Americans gamble online, generating about $6 billion in
revenues for the approximately two thousand Internet gambling sites. 6) Use o f peer-to-

90 Nishant Shah, "Subject to Technology: Internet Pornography, Cyber-Terrorism and the Indian State,"
Inter-A sia C u ltu ral S tu dies 8, no. 3 (2007): 34 9 -6 6 .
91 Intel Corporation, "What Happens in an Internet Minute?" http://w w w .in tel.com /conten t/w w w /u s/en
/com m unications/intem et-m inute-infographic.htm l.
92 Ibid.
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peer networks remains very high despite the efforts o f copyright owners to shut them
down. 7) It is easy to set up an anonymous blog or email account and send threats or
make false claims that are very difficult to trace.”93
The Internet is open to any person from anywhere in the world and has a global
structure. Thus, illegality and criminality on the Internet very often have transnational
aspects. Legal difficulties seen at the national level become more complicated when the
issue is transnational because of different legal structures, laws, procedures and political
ideology in each state. Downloading a particular kind o f software may violate a copyright
law in country A. But how can authorities prosecute this kind of illegality when the
downloader is from country B, web-servers and web hosting are located in country C, and
the owner o f the website is from country D?
When neo-Nazi propaganda was a judicial and diplomatic problem between
Yahoo and France, Yahoo’s Vice President Heather Killen at that time said, “We have
many countries and many laws and just one Internet.”94 Even today, in some o f judicial
disputes at the international level, we can see that this statement is not outdated and still
utilized by global websites like Yahoo, Google, and YouTube when they are the subject
of judicial proceedings in any state.
Kerr cites the following incidents to emphasize on these kinds o f transnational
legal problems.95
In 2000, Onel de Guzman sent out the “Love Bug” virus from the Philippines;
although the virus caused billions o f dollars in damage worldwide, de Guzman
was never charged because the Philippines did not have a computer crime law that
allowed extradition. (Although the United States and the Philippines have an ex
tradition treaty, Philippine law requires that both countries legally recognize a
9’ Orin S. Kerr. "Review: Enforcing Law Online," The U n iversity o f C h icago L aw R e view 74, no. 2 (Spring
2007).
94 G oldsm ith and Wu, ibid.
95 Kerr, ibid.
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given offense before a suspect can be extradited [and] there is no Philippine law
that prevents release of a virus.)96
Even for ordinary crimes like murder, theft, drug smuggling, and embezzlement,
when a criminal procedure involves multiple states and/or their citizens, it is very often
difficult to identify and prosecute these traditional criminal cases and bring these
criminal(s) before judicial courts. In addition to jurisdiction and citizenship problems, the
Internet’s rapidly changing features complicate the situation further for officials trying to
trace criminality and find and identify perpetrator(s) from each state.
Although there is some degree o f cooperation at the international, regional, or
mutual level, and some collaborative international institutions like Interpol, Europol, each
state’s different ideology, political traditions, national law, and diplomatic and political
barriers significantly hinder criminal procedures and/or extradition o f criminals to the
victim state(s). Beside legal and political differences among states, there are significant
technical barriers and technical capacity gaps among states to achieve such an effective
level of international cooperation against criminality on the Internet. Goldfoot, claims
that “it is unrealistic to believe that a global community consisting o f an estimated ninety
million users o f almost thirty million computers spread over 196 nations and many
divergent legal cultures could reach a consensus on how to govern themselves.”97
Thus, new legal approaches should be developed while regulating the Internet and
online activities. In his speech to the United States Senate Justice Committee, Mike
Godwin, representing the Electronic Frontier Foundation, stated that he believes that it is
wrong to consider the Internet in the same category as existent media and communication
tools. He emphasized that the Internet has created new questions as well as problems for
90 Ibid.
97 Josh A. G oldfoot, "Antitrust Im plications o f Internet Adm inistration," Virginia L a w R eview 8 4, no. 5
(1998): 909-53.
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law makers.98 Likewise, Akdeniz and Altinparmak, believe that thinking o f the Internet
as one o f the previous media and communication devices is not appropriate if lawmaking
is considered on the Internet.99 Policy makers, lawyers, and politicians should understand
the unique structure and characteristics o f the Internet and new legal mentality and
methods should be developed.
Also, an effective means and level o f cooperation among nation-states are vitally
important, as criminality on the Internet is very much transnational. Considering
cooperation as a kind o f concession, Castells believes that “the more a state refuses to
limit its sovereignty...by international cooperation, the more it becomes vulnerable to
cyber-attack.” 100

Economic and social welfare
The effects o f the Internet on the economy are also enormous. Today, the
information technology, computing, and communication sectors can compete with the
prominent sectors o f the previous industry era. Three o f the top ten most valuable global
companies in 2007 were the so-called tech companies Google, Microsoft, and IBM, and
by sector ranking, the IT and technology sector comes second to the finance sector. Retail
is in third place.101 The Internet opens national economies to the global market. Freund
and Weinhold imply that directly or indirectly the Internet has positive effects on

98 W hite, ibid.
99 Yaman A kdeniz and Kerem Altiparmak, internet: G irilm esi T ehlikeli Ve Yasaktir, (Ankara: insan
Haklari Ortak Platformu’nun (iH O P ), 2008).
100 C astells, ibid., 160.
101 M illward Brown, "2014 B randzT op 100," http://w w w .m illw ardbrow n.com /m b-global/brandstrategy/brand-equity/brandz/top-global-brands.
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economic productivity and growth in the United States.102
According to Kellner, the recent tendency to transition market capitalism into a
more technology-driven model with the information superhighway, which is advocated
by “Microsoftcapitalism” proponents, is very challenging.103 However, this new shape of
capitalism will eventually erode the welfare state next to the liberal free market promises
o f more jobs, wealth, prosperity, education, information, and more democracy.
Basic principles o f economy, free market and capitalism are still valid. Still we
have banks, shopping centers, retailers, malls, stocks; and we have money and cheques,
etc. But the World Wide Web has brought different opportunities, options, and
mentalities from marketing to production; from financing to shopping, and advertising.
The two important values o f a free market— competition and reliable “information”— are
very much being promoted and ignited through the platform o f the Web 2.0.
Castells stresses that “the proper usage o f the Internet is a key tool for a better
competition at home and at global level.” 104 The Internet provides easy and fast access
both for consumers and customers to find different markets, to get information about the
details of a product, to compare different retailers’ offers, and make their rational choice.
Brown and Goolsbee note the Internet decreases “search costs by enabling price
comparisons on-line.” 105 Although the Internet has created its new mediators from
producers to consumers, Castells believes that “the Internet reduces transaction costs at

102 Caroline L. Freund and Diana W einhold, "The Internet and International Trade in Services," A m erica n
E conom ic R eview 92, no. 2 (M ay 2002): 2 3 6 -4 0 .
I0, D. Kellner, "New T echnologies, the W elfare State, and the Prospects for D em ocratization," The
Q u arterly Jou rnal o f Econom ics 115, no. 2 (20 0 0 ): 5 6 1 -7 6 .
104 Castells, ibid.
105 Jeffrey R. Brown and Austan G oolsbee, "D oes the Internet Make Markets M ore C om petitive? Evidence
from the Life Insurance Industry," The J o u rn a l o f P o litic a l E conom y 110, no. 3 (2 0 0 2 ): 4 8 1 -5 0 7 .
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least by 50 percent.” 106
In a free market, it is also important both for sellers and buyers to access accurate
information. Restricted flows o f information and asymmetry o f information are
considered as a “market failure” as Adam Smith phrases it. When some relevant
information is known by some but not all the parties involved, it causes inefficiencies in
the market.107 The Internet has many advantages and positive features to minimize these
inefficiencies and market failures. Rhee states that “with the advent of the Internet,
almost gone are the asymmetries of information among firms.” 108 Varieties o f alternative
pages, links, and forums revoke many o f the barriers to the flow of information or the
asymmetry o f information.
Traditionally, states tend to have quotas, customs, and tax regulations to protect
their national economies. The borderless feature o f the Internet has brought different
dimensions and questions to the fields o f economy, market, and commerce. For instance,
how can Internet commerce be taxed or regulated effectively?109 Many o f the leading
global companies directly or indirectly related to the Internet today are United Statesbased companies like Google, Microsoft, IBM, Apple, and Yahoo. Others Intemetphenomena like Facebookand Twitter likewise are United States-based initiatives with
global reach.
In the beginning o f the 1990s, in her book The Retreat o f the State, Susan Strange
claimed that states are losing negotiation power against the growing economic as well as
political influence o f multinational corporations (MNCs) and thus, she believed that
1(16 C astells, ibid.
107 Dipak K. Gupta, A nalyzing P u blic P olicy: C on cepts, Tools, a n d Techniques, (W ashington, D.C.: CQ
Press, 2001).
108 Jay Hyuk Rhee, "The Internet Era and the International Expansion Process: The M oderating R ole o f
A bsorptive Capacity," M anagem ent In ternational R eview 4 5 , no. 3 (20 0 5 ): 277-306.
109 Bill Gates, "Shaping the Internet Age," In ternet Policy’ Institute, 2 000.
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MNCs were gradually eroding the economic and political sovereignty o f nation-states.110
This claim is still apparent today, if not more serious, for the IT sector dominated by the
Internet. It is very challenging for any state to stop, eliminate, or effectively tax Internetbased companies providing services and making profits from their online activities.
For a long time, the Turkish government has had taxation and legal disputes with
Google and Google-owned YouTube. The Turkish Minister in charge o f transportation
and communication strongly criticized Google in the case of YouTube blocking and
stated that, “ It is not an issue o f blocking or censorship on YouTube as Google claims but
it is the issue o f obeying local law, defending themselves in Turkish courts.” The
Minister added, Google “should open a local representative office in Tiirkiye and pay
local tax.” 111 The Turkish government claims Google owes EUR 32 million in taxes.112
Likewise, there is a similar debate between China and the United States about Google
services in China.113
At this point, one o f the important policies that some states prefer to implement is
Internet blocking as a measure. Although there are political, moral, religious or healthrelated reasons behind Internet blocking, sometimes these measures can be considered as
a non-tariff barrier against foreign companies to hinder their services within the borders
of a country. As with these issues, concepts and theories o f economy and marketing
should be re-interpreted and even re-organized for the Internet.
As explained in this part o f the chapter, the use o f internet has significant and

110 Susan Strange, The R etreat o f the State: The D iffusion o f P o w er in th e W orld E co n o m y, (C am bridge
University Press. 1996).
111 "Bakan G oogle V e Youtube Sert Gikti," H aber, II June 2010.
112 Robin Wauters, "Turkish G overnm ent Claim s G oogle O w es € 3 2 M illion in Taxes," C run ch B ase
Inform ation, 3 N ovem ber 2009.
m See for instance, Richard Waters, Joseph M enn, Daniel D om bey, and Kathrin H ille, "US M akes O fficial
Complaint to China over Internet Censorship," F inan cial Tim es, 22 June 2009. and Steven A. C ook and
M ichael A. Levi, "Tangled Web," W all S treet J o u rn al, 23 March 2 0 0 7 .

50

serious effects on the basic functions o f states on ensuring national security, justice and
public order. The following parts explain what internet blocking is, and how it is
implemented.

CENSORSHIP AND BLOCKING ON THE INTERNET
Though sometimes used in a similar context, the terms “censorship” and
“blocking” on the Internet have different meanings in academic and technical terms. The
Oxford online dictionary explains “censor” as “an official who examines books, films,
news, etc. that are about to be published and suppresses any parts that are considered
obscene, politically unacceptable, or a threat to security.” 114 The same dictionary explains
the word “blocking” as “the action o f blocking or obstructing someone or something.” 115
From this definition, it is important to note that “censorship” occurs before an
unfavorable thing is disclosed or about to be disclosed. Censorship is a general term,
which can be used in broadcasting media such as TV, radio programs, or in printed media
like newspapers, magazines, or even in art as well as on the Internet. The term “blocking”
for the Internet is more a technical term that includes many “policies, software, hardware,
and services.” 116 “Internet blocking” is sometimes also called as “Internet filtering.”
Filtering is defined as “[with an object] pass[ing] (a liquid, gas, light, or sound) through a
device to remove unwanted material” in the same dictionary.117 Both “Internet blocking”
and “Internet filtering” are used interchangeably in the literature.

| IQ

Internet blocking can also be implemented in non-technical ways, like shutting
114 O xford O nline D ictionary, Oxford U niversity Press, 2 0 1 0 .
1,5 Ibid.
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down the entire Internet services by powering off routers, central servers, or Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). For example, during the uprising against military junta in
Bruma (Myanmar) in 2007, authorities initially blocked social media like YouTube and
BlogSpot, but later the Internet was totally disconnected.119 Some reports also indicated
similar situations during the Arab Spring, for instance, in Egypt and Libya in 2011. Even
in these situations, there are alternative methods available to access the Internet.120 Rather
than these kinds o f total Internet disconnection though non-technical methods, this study
examines how Internet blocking technology is effective in preventing undesired web
content.
Blocking or filtering measures can be considered for different reasons by
authorities. While some countries have sensitivity against ethnocentrism like in some
Western states, some states prefer blocking for political reasons, religious reasons, or to
minimize hate speech.121 Blocking can also be seen against copyright violations,
pornography, health hazardous contents, and gambling as seen in Turkiye.
While for instance keyword filtering is a case against “Falun Gong” in China, Iran
is known for its extensive internet access blocking against websites for hate speech or
jogging with political and religious leaders, immoral reasons. Some European countries
like Germany, France have some filtering cases against websites which may have
xenophobia, Nazi contents. Many states including Canada, Denmark, the U.K., and
Finland have such practices against child pornography. 12">
“
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Where it can be implemented?
Blocking can be applied at any level, including “an individual's personal
computer, an office local area network (LAN), an Internet cafe, an ISP, a wireless
network, an SMS system, at the backbone or international gateway level, or some
combination o f all of these levels.” 123
The target o f blocking instruments as specified by Callanan et al. are IP addresses;
Domain name and DNS; Uniform Resource Locators (URLs); File content and File
name; Keywords; and Content Signature (hash values).124

How to block? Blocking strategies
Greenfield et al. explain three methods for filtering Internet content: i) Inclusion
filtering (white list), which runs based on the philosophy o f “guilty until proven
innocent.” Thus, it perceives most of the Internet websites as inappropriate except some
well-known acceptable sites. The problem with this method is its allowance for access to
a very small portion o f the Internet, ii) Excluding filtering (black list) runs on the
philosophy o f “innocent until proven guilty.” This method is more common than the
“inclusion” method, iii) The content filtering method dynamically analyzes the web
content received and activates blocking when the content does not comply with the
installed criteria. During the analysis process, the system utilizes certain keywords and/or
checks certain parameters o f the content. The fourth method is the combined filtering
method in which all above techniques are utilized to increase the effectiveness o f

121 Ronald J. Deibert, The G eopolitics o f Internet Control: C ensorship, S o vereign ty a n d C y b ersp a ce ,
R outledge Handbook o f Internet Politics. Edited by A ndrew C hadwick and Philip N . Howard London:
R outledge, 2009, 325.
12,1 Callanan et al., ibid.
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blocking. However this latter method is not free o f complications either.123

Content filtering
Greenfield et al. analyze content filtering methods including source-based
filtering and content-based filtering.126 Similarly, Deibert subdivides content filter
techniques into address blocking techniques and content analysis techniques.127 Sourcebased filtering (address blocking technique) is a method that utilizes IP addresses (Packet
filtering), domain name, DNS, and URLs while filtering objectionable websites.
The following are the details o f these technical terms. Internet Protocol (IP)
address is a unique numeric number given to each computer or web server that is
connected to the Internet. The Internet recognizes IP numbers as the identity and
addresses o f the device for outgoing and incoming requests and data transfers. These
unique numbers are regulated and allocated by an international non-profit agency based
in the United States, The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN).
Today, IP numbers version 4 (IPv4) are widely used. An IP address can be seen as
(x.x.x.x) where x is a number between 0 and 255. ~ However, reports indicate that the
capacity of IPv4 is about to be exceeded, and by the year o f 2010 the next version, IPv6,
was being allocated for each nation.129 While IPv4 is 32-bit, IPv6 is 126-bit, and specific
IP number allocation is more possible with this latest version.

125 G reenfield et al., ibid.
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Greenfield et al. have named IP based filtering packet filtering.130 All data on the
Internet, no matter its type— whether video, audio, image, or text— are transferred from
one receiver to another server as data packets with IP addresses from both parties. When
a packet includes an IP address from an undesired website, the filter blocks the packet at
its final destination. This filtering can be carried out by Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
in their routers.131
The problem with IP-based packet filtering is its over-blocking risk. Since in
general IP addresses are assigned to a computer, and a number of different websites may
use the same computer or the same server, blocking an IP address because o f one website
may block other innocent websites that share the same device with the same IP
address.

It is likely that IP-based filtering may cause under-blocking or even over

blocking and thus this technique is not preferable or popular for those with such
concerns.133
Different from a numeric IP address, which is more appropriate for computers to
communicate, the Domain Name System (DNS) is designed to be convenient to be
Internet users. Rather than remembering all different groups o f numbers for each website,
this system allows individuals to type the name o f the site. For instance, the IP address
and the domain name o f the ICANN website are 192.0.34.163 and www.icann.org
respectively, and both can be used interchangeably to access the same website. However,
instead o f remembering the code numbers for a website, typing its domain name (or its
abbreviation) is more easy and convenient.
A typical domain name follows generic top-level domains like .com, .org, .net,
130 Greenfield et al., ibid.
Ibid.
1,2 Deibert, ibid.
133 Greenfield et al., ibid.
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and may follow country codes like .ba, .ge, .il, or .md. A website may have a number o f
separate websites and blocking based on domain names only and will be insufficient to
cover up the entire website contents, including all other pages served by the same
website. The same is also true when a website like www.terror.com uses different domain
names like ww2.terror.com or ww3.terror.com and uses a number o f different servers. It
is likely that both domain name and DNS blocking to cause under-blocking or over
blocking, and for effective filtering, it is necessary to know and include all possible
domain names as well as their numerical IP addresses in the lists o f filtering.134
Together with domain names, the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) address
shows which website the content is from and exactly on which path it is accessible. URL
filtering is more accurate than IP-based filtering. It can be effective even on a single
specific website and causes relatively fewer complications than IP filtering as Greenfield
et al. explains.135 By this technique, it is possible to block a particular user’s unfavorable
website (like www.facebook.com/users/ahacker) without blocking the entire website
(www.facebook.com). When the entire website is intended to be blocked, specification
for these websites should be encoded in a filtering list like a date period: www.terror.com
/June2011/centerefold.html and www.terror.com/August2011/centerefold.html. While it
is less likely that URL filtering may cause over-blocking, it is very likely that it may
cause under-blocking errors.136

Content-based filtering (content analysis technique)
Rather than looking at the identity and addresses o f the sources or destinations,

154 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
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content-filtering techniques verify the contents o f the Internet traffic and block the ones
that include inappropriate data. Greenfiled et. al. specify four techniques as a contentbased filtering: i) keyword filtering, ii) phrase filtering iii) profile filtering, and iv) image
analysis filtering.137
Keyword filtering is focusing on important words and terms in their black lists. It
is widely utilized for most o f the text-based Internet applications like search engines,
email, URL links, and instant messaging.138 The challenge in this technique is to specify
and include all possible variations o f phrases regarding undesired web content. “Not
every content or type o f a file on the Internet [is] named or seen as what it is or [for] what
it has in [it].”139
Keywords in a blocking list may not cover all alternatives that human cleverness
can invent. To avoid key word filtering, for instance in China, Internet users are trying
other way o f spelling, saying, or symbols like “Tibetan@independence” or “Ti be tan in
dependence “instead o f “Tibetan independence” in their communications on instant
messaging or chat room s.140
Keyword filters are not without problems. For instance, including the word “sex”
in a blacklist may wrongly block an academic article talking about gender, or a place like
Essex in England. Moreover, keyword blocking can be bypassed by encrypting the
content to make it unrecognizable by the filter and thus “a request that is blocked by a
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keyword filter as an HTTP request will not be blocked as an HTTPS request.” 141

Phrase filtering
Keyword filters can confuse and wrongly filter scientific, educational, or daily
context instead o f undesired web content. The word “breast,” for instance, may cause
blocking o f news or an article about “breast cancer” by keyword filters.142 Thus, more
sophisticated phrase filtering has been developed by IT vendors. This technique not only
looks for a specific word but also looks for its context and how it is used. In this way,
phrase filtering makes fewer mistakes than key word filters.
Both key word and phrase filters are text-based filters, and significant challenges
and difficulties may be experienced in its adaptation and operations with different
languages and their unique phonetic structure.143 Further, both of them can only check
text but not images or video. In response, vendors have developed new techniques that
can analyze some characteristics of websites and web content, such as “profile filtering”
and “image analysis filtering.”
Profile filtering checks some technical details o f web content and blocks it when
some similarities with undesired content are being tracked. Greenfield et al. notes one
method, for instance, is looking at “the ratio of pictures to text” of suspected content and
comparing the ration to the profiles of other similar web content before deciding whether
to block.144
Image analysis filtering also aims to close the gaps o f text-based filters. It tries to
capture and read specific features o f unwanted images, for instance “skin tones,” which
141 Roberts et al., ibid.
142 Greenfield et al., ibid.
143 Ibid.
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may imply a naked body. But, this analysis may also wrongfully block an artistic image
presupposing it to be a sexual image.14?

CIRCUMVENTION
Internet blocking methods do not delete or remove the undesired web content at
its source. Instead they just prevent it being accessed by an Internet user. Circumvention
methods try to evade these blocking barriers, commonly by hiding IP address, content
signatures, the destination, or what is inside the trafficking packets.146
Internet search engines, like many other subjects and topics, house thousands o f
different resources, websites, forums, and online “know-how” content available on the
Internet in different formats like a video, images, or slideshows. Not every nation-state
that implements some form of Internet blocking domestically takes measures against
these circumvention tools.147
Circumvention tools basically bypass blocked Internet contents by ensuring the
privacy of the users' Internet traffic. There are a number o f customers or curious actors
that are interested in people’s Internet habits, their preferences, and/or their connections.
These can be governments, secret policing services, commercial companies, or
employers.
Circumvention tools try to ensure privacy generally by utilizing encryption
technology. However, encryption is not a secure enough method against Internet
surveillance, which generally relies on “traffic analysis.” 148 Traffic analysis utilizes
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Internet data packets which have two main parts including a data “payload” for the
Internet content, which can be an email, video, or a website, and the header for routing.
Focusing on the headers o f Internet traffic, surveillance experts can see the parties of
Internet communication and the details of the communication content even though the
content is encrypted. In order to overcome this risk, beside encryption, some
circumvention tools utilize different server nodes in a network between the Internet user
and the resource. Further, Internet traffic is set to follow different paths randomly
between the nodes each tim e.149
There are a number of different techniques for circumvention. Callanan et al.
specify some o f the main methods as: proxy-servers, tunneling, hosting or URL rotation,
botnets, evading DNS-based filters, and other filters.130

Proxy Servers
The most common and widespread circumvention method is using “proxy” and/or
“anonymous” foreign servers, which usually operate outside national borders.151 Proxy
servers play crucial roles in optimizing the Internet performance. In order to maximize
the network capacity, proxies are developed to copy Internet packets during data
trafficking on their records. Later, without collecting the same content from its original
server, proxies use these web contents (cache) when the same content is requested by any
user at future times. Thus, proxies can show which websites are being visited by any
Internet users.
Different from “proxies” set by an Internet Service Provider in Internet
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connection, Internet users can select other proxies available on the Internet for some
reasons, such as to increase performance, to ensure privacy, and especially to circumvent
Internet blocking. In this situation, the proxy becomes as a demand device, generally
outside national borders, and Internet traffic operate through these proxies.152
By using a foreign proxy server, free or paid, many o f which are available on the
Internet, users can select another similar device abroad to fulfill access requests. The
basic difference between proxies available on the Internet is their operating preference for
their servers. While some proxies have their own central hosting servers for providing
such a service, others do not prefer a central server but use “peer hosting servers.” 153
Some proxies can hide IP addresses o f the requesting Internet users from the
destination and/or from the Internet Service Provider through encryption. Using such
proxy servers can circumvent IP address and DNS blockings; however, Roberts et al
stress that public proxies especially may not be secure in terms of privacy since they
rarely use encryption.154
Chowdhury gives the examples o f people in Burma using proxy services in 2007
for circumvention since the military regime there blocked many websites, including
YouTube, BlogSpot, and CNN.155 People use of proxy servers such as Glite.sayni.net,
Your-freedom.net, and Yeehart.com to enable dissidents to break out o f the government’s
strict censorship and feed news and multimedia to the global media from inside the
country. Thousands o f Internet users in Burma reportedly downloaded the circumvention
software o f Glite.sayni.net. Consequently some call the uprising in 2007 the “GLite
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Revolution.” 156

Tunneling
Rather than using a public Internet connection that is open and unscripted, the
Internet protocol named Virtual Private Networks (VPN) was originally developed for
encrypting Internet communication for relatively private issues. Tunneling can be seen in
other protocols, like HTTP tunnels or ssh tunnels, but the most common type o f tunneling
is VPN-based tunnels.157
Dealing with some official tasks or sensitive issues, companies, public
institutions, or some civic associations prefer using the VPN protocol for communicating
among their agencies over the Internet. Thus, without investing and founding a separate
private line, they can use regular Internet infrastructure for such private communication.
“Tunneling works by wrapping the IP packet to be sent inside another IP packet,
giving the wrapper the address of an appropriate gateway computer and sending it
over the Internet. When the wrapped packet reaches the gateway, the inner packet
is extracted and sent on for delivery within a local or private network.” 158
Callanan et al. note that due to extensive lawful usage of tunneling technology in
the business and public sectors, it is not possible for internet service providers to block
these tunneling servers or websites, many available online.139

Hosting or URL rotation
This method is for website owners and content providers to bypass blocking.
Some websites may periodically change their IP addresses, domain names, or URLs for
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providing better service, for increasing their audience numbers, and even for evading
blocking measures against them. A filter, which blocks a website based on its previous IP
address, URL, or domain name, will be ineffective when a website owner changes the
domain name, IP address, or URL.160 This change is relatively easy and inexpensive for
site owners that they may occasionally make these changes when they are blocked.
For instance, a blocking measure may rely only on the IP number to block. The
website owner using this blocked IP number may evade this barrier by only changing the
IP number from the same hosting company or from another. Likewise, in the case o f
Domain Name blocking only, the change is necessary on the website’s domain name.
Website owners can also find other available, unblocked hosting servers,
generally abroad, to utilize for circumvention. There are lots of free or paid hosting
servers and IP numbers available on the Internet.

Botnets
The term “bof ’ is short form of “robot.” Through some malicious programs,
criminals may compromise an innocent computer as a “bot,” which can then be directed
to operate certain processes without the knowledge of the computer’s owner. This
computer is also called as a “zombie computer.” Such a takeover may result in a slowing
down o f the computer function.
Callanan et al. define a “botnet” as “a collection o f computers configured to
transmit messages to other computers on command usually for malicious reasons.” 161
Criminals can use botnets for sending spam, spreading viruses, attacking computers or
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servers; or for fraudulent purposes.
When a botnet takes a computer over, it becomes like a proxy, either as a portal or
a deflector in the data traffic between the requester and the resource server. This will
simply bypass IP-based blocking while ensuring anonymity. Callanan et al claim that
traffic details that may identify the visitors will be hidden during this process, and these
identifying details can easily be manipulated.162 They note that the “bot” would not track
log records o f the visitor.

Evading DNS based filters
It is relatively easy for a user to circumvent a DNS-based filter. In order to
circumvent DNS-based blocked websites, users need to modify their computer settings,
such as changing the identical number o f the DNS that blocks an undesired website with
another configuration of DNS servers, generally outside o f the blocking country. Like
many other circumvention tools, free or paid, individuals can find many alternative DNS
servers and their address details on the Internet and even learn how to make such
modifications in their computers for circumvention.163
Following these tutorials, the steps are performed and show how DNS addresses
are changed. In the last section, the default automatic DNS obtained is deactivated, and
the other option “Use the following DNS server addresses” is selected. DNS change is
okay when new DNS numbers, many which are available online, are encoded both for the
preferred DNS server and an alternative DNS server.
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The use o f “proxy” servers around the globe
Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, and John Palfrey from The Berkman Center for
Internet & Society at Harvard University, tested how some circumvention tools are
effective to evade Internet blocking in some countries.164 They analyzed nine
circumvention tools that use five different methods: HTTP proxy, CGI proxy, IP
tunneling, re-routing, and distributed hosting. They gave the details o f these pages,
methods that they use, functions and other technical details.165
Despite some performance problems and security concerns, the study stresses that
“all o f the circumvention and anonymity tools included in this study succeeded at the
basic task o f retrieving blocked content in a filtering country.” 166
It can be assumed that online circumvention services and/or bypassing websites
are popular in countries where blocking policies are systematic, strict, or widespread.
And the use o f such websites and services are relatively less popular in countries where
Internet blocking is very low or limited. In order to see the situation, this study uses data
available from Alexa, a global web-ranking website for the most popular circumvention
websites around the globe and from which country such websites receive visitors.
Alexa categorizes and ranks global websites based on their area o f activities. For
instance, Alexa places its section on hosted proxy services under the topic titled
“proxying and filtering.” That section is located under the heading “Internet” under the
heading “Computers.” Alexa ranks websites based on their popularity under this
classification.167 Only the five most popular website are taken into consideration based on
their rankings on 01 April 2011. The top five website and their areas o f service are
164 Roberts et al., ibid.
165 Ibid., 22.
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167 A lexa, ibid.
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reported as follows: 1) Anonymouse: Free anonymous surfing, email and usenet posting;
2) Vtunnel: Web proxy supporting SSL via the HTTPS encryption protocol; 3) Ktunnel:
Turkish Cgi Proxy which supports watching YouTube and other video sites; 4) Proxify
anonymous proxy: Proxify is a web-based anonymous proxy service; 5) Proxy.org:
Contains various lists of web based proxies, as well as a forum to discuss topics.168
For the degree o f internet blocking, this study utilizes classifications from an
independent NGO, Reporters without Borders (RSF), which monitors Internet freedom in
the world. It has two lists in which countries are identified as “Internet enemies-strict
censorship” or “countries under surveillance-having some kinds o f blocking and
filtering.” While China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Cuba were reported within the first list;
Australia, Russia and Tiirkiye were in the second list.169 Countries in any o f these two
lists by the RSF are called RSF-classified countries. Countries that are not listed by the
RSF are considered non-RSF countries.
Proxy usage for circumvention and bypassing is not only popular and widespread
in countries where strict internet blocking policies are preferred (countries listed by the
RSF) but also popular among the countries in non-RSF countries, which are known as
relatively liberal and democratic.
Being in the list o f RSF, listed as “country under surveillance,” Tiirkiye is the first
country in terms o f the total percentages o f visitors for the two websites above,
ktunnel.com and vtunnel.com. Not classified by RSF, the percentage o f US visitors are
highest for three o f the other websites, anonymouse.org, proxify.com, proxy.org.
Likewise, the second and third countries are both from RSF or non-RSF countries like
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India and Russia for anonymouse.org; China and India for vtunnel.com; Azerbaijan and
Germany for ktunnel.com; Australia and Canada for proxify.com; India and the United
Kingdom for proxy.org.170

PROSECUTING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Though states have taken so many legal, technical measures and though there is a
wide international consensus against it, child pornography is still a significant problem on
the Internet. An independent organization, Telefono Arcobaleno, which has focused on
the issue of online pedophilia since 1996, issued a report in 2008 that presents the
alarming situation.

17 1

The report claims that pornographic material on European servers

increased 406% since 2003, and there are 20 billion online transactions that include 1.7
million records o f 36,149 child-victims, 42% o f whom are under seven years old and
77% o f whom are under nine years old.
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The report also stresses that either free or with

credit cards, these kinds o f materials are easily accessible and purchasable online.
A special report, issued for the United Nations by Najat Maalla M ’jid ’in in 2009,
notes that the number of child-victims in this crime is between 10,000 and 100,000. Turla
and Ozkanli claim that child-victims under the age o f 16 number between 300,000 and
600,000.173 The number o f websites hosting some form o f child pornography content
increased to 480,000, between the years o f 2001 to 2004.174
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171 "Child Slavery on the Internet Is Still Growing," G o zo N ew s, 2 D ecem ber 2008.
m Ibid.
177 Ahmet Turla and Qaglar O zkanli, "Qocuga YOnelik istism arda Farkli Bir Boyut: C ocuk Pom ografisi,"
P o l is B ilim leri D ergisi, 2006.
174 Najat M’Jid, R eport o f the S p ecia l R a p p o rteu r on the S a le o f C hildren, C hild P ro stitu tio n a n d C h ild
P orn ograph y, Geneva: United N ations Human Rights C ouncil, 2 0 1 1 .
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A specific child pornography site could receive a million hits in a m onth.175 Turla
and Ozkanlt believe that the crime was a USD three million business in 2005.176 They
report that 300,000 credit card transactions conducted for the purchase o f child
pornography in the same year from 66 countries. Beside these numbers it is important to
stress that the total amount o f trade of child pornography on the Internet is unknown.
Prosecution magistrates’ courts have been low— only 113 in 1995 and 235 in
1997 in the UK. Susan S. M. Edwards stresses the difficulties of policing, identifying,
and detecting child pornography access on the Internet.177 Mr. Arena, president and
founder o f Telefono Arcobaleno, states that “less than 1% of victims o f child sexual
abuse images have been detected, therefore it is necessary to divert all available resources
and energies towards identifying, recuperating, curing and socially reintegrating all
abused children.”

178

The United Nations Special Report on the Sale o f Children, Child

Prostitution and Child Pornography from 2004 even stresses that a considerable number
o f countries do not have legislation on this issue.179

Criminality against children
Criminality against children is argued in a broad context in the literature.
Essentially, it is considered in two main dimensions. One track explores how children are
involved, or induced into certain types o f crimes or as subjects of crime. The other track
examines crimes against children, where children are victims, as is the case with child

175 Richard W ortley and Stephen Sm allbone, In ternet C h ild P orn ograph y: Causes, In vestigation, a n d
P revention, (Praeger, 2012).
176 Turla et al., ibid.
177 Susan Edwards, "Prosecuting 'Child Pornography': P ossession and Taking o f Indecent Photographs o f
Children," Jou rnal o f S o cia l W elfare a n d F am ily L aw 22, no. 1 (20 0 0 ): 1-21.
178 "Child Slavery on the Internet Is Still Growing," ibid.
179 International Resource Centre (IRC), w w w.internationalresourcecentre.org/.
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pornography.
As cited in Chase and Statham, the sexual exploitation of children can take many
forms, “including: trafficking, prostitution, sex tourism, mail-order bride trade,
involvement in pornography, stripping, battering, incest, rape and sexual harassment.” 180
And the Internet can facilitate many of these types o f sexual abuse in a significant way
including Internet child pornography.

Ift 1

The 2000 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights o f the Child on
the sale o f children, child prostitution, and child pornography, explains the term “child
pornography” in Article 2(c) as “any representation, by whatever means, o f a child
engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation o f the sexual
parts o f a child, the dominant characteristics of which is depiction for sexual purpose.”

I £2

For analytical purposes, Wortley and Smallbone accept the general definition o f child
1 0*5

pornography as “any record of sexual activity involving a prepubescent person.”

Internet child pornography
In terms o f the Internet, child pornography should be understood as digital forms
o f any pornographic record involving a prepubescent person. These records can be digital
files, photographs, videos, or audio recordings. Legal perceptions may vary, but there are
ten different degrees o f these kinds of records from non-sexualized pictures to sadistic
records as Wortley and Smallbone cite and internet child pornography includes

180 Elaine C hase and June Statham, "Commercial and Sexual Exploitation o f Children and Y ou n g P eop le in
the UK?" C h ild A buse R eview 14, no. I (2005): 4 -2 5 .
181 W ortley and Sm allbone, ibid.
182 "Qocuk Haklari lie ilg ili M evzuat, Protokol V e Raporlar," w w w .cocukhizm etleri.gov.tr/tr/10535
/Cocuk-Haklari-I le-I Igili-M evzuat-Protokol-ve-Raporlar.
181 W ortley and Sm allbone, ibid.
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possession, production and/or distribution of such records.184 Excluding other kinds o f
sex crimes against minors like illegal detention, child marriage, harassment etc. this study
covers any crime against minors committed on or through the internet and internet
applications such as messengers with webcams, file sharing applications, or em ail.185

Possession and production
Many images and records o f child pornography on the Internet are old ones,
generally reproductions o f images from older magazines and films. Relatively new ones
are frequently made in the developing countries. Some individuals may use webcams or
other video hardware for making amateur recordings.'86
Images o f children taken from the Internet can be combined in the form o f a
pornography slideshow.

187

In a judicial case in the United States, Ashcroft v. Free Speech

Coalition, the United States Supreme Court decided that “computer generated child
pornography” is not illegal. It is necessary for law enforcement agencies to demonstrate
that the victim depicted in a digital record is not digital but an actual real child.188
Once these records are created or obtained, digital versions o f such records are
stored in different ways in personal computers, on CDs, on DVDs, and on external drives.
In addition to digital fingerprints o f Internet activities, forensic analysis o f such tools,
when put to use, is very important for judicial investigation. The digital forensic field is a
new area for experts and high tech companies to develop new technological methods to
detect or identify criminal activities, even when evidence is deleted or damaged.

185 This coverage is also com patible for the analysis conducted on Interpol files in this study.
186 Ibid.
187 "C°cuk Pom osuna Kar?i N asil Sava? Verirsiniz?" S D N , 14 April 201 I.
188 International Resource Centre, ibid.
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Distribution
The Internet is a perfect tool for child pomographers to market and disseminate
pornography. The very complicated network structure o f the Internet enables such
perpetrators to utilize the servers or computers o f others from any country. Perpetrators
use websites, chat-rooms, newsgroups,189 email, email groups, instant messages, bulletin
boards,190 and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks for different purposes in this crime. They can
digitally hide themselves from law enforcement agencies for prosecution thanks to their
technical skills.191
The most common application on the Internet is websites with hyperlinks. It is
uncommon for ordinary Internets user to encounter child pornography while surfing the
Internet. Purveyors o f child pornography use temporary websites, servers, links, and
different techniques to avoid police detection. Sometimes they provide passwords for
certain types o f files. These passwords are shared through the other Internet applications
i

such as e-groups and bulletin boards.

Q'y

Webcam compatible instant messaging programs like MSN and Yahoo
Messenger are a significant threat to be used in this crime. Teenagers or children can be
victims o f certain types o f sexual harassment while they are chatting, usually with a
webcam. Their accounts may be hacked, and their peers may be deceived by criminals
into providing photos or other kinds of sexual acts through webcams. Such photos and
activities can be recorded, modified, or shared among networks. They may also be used

189 A newsgroup is the sam e as a forum, an on-line d iscussion group. On the Internet, there are thousands o f
newsgroups covering every conceivable interest. A new s reader program is necessary con n ect users to a
new s server and to view and post m essages to a new sgroup.
190 A bulletin board is an electronic m essage center. Most bulletin boards serve sp ecific interest groups.
Users can review m essages left by others, and leave m essages.
191 Wortley and Sm allbone, ibid.
192 Ibid.
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as blackmail.
Pomographers use email methods, but do not directly post or attach such records
to their messages. Instead they use email for communication or information exchange to
share their interests. Sometimes they can use this method as a means o f blackmailing the
victim. Most o f the time, they use pseudonyms and may use public computers to avoid
police detection.
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) are used for posting information or hyperlinks to
child pornography access resources. Detecting such postings in these bulletin boards can
be problematic and impossible for system administrators. Closed and password-protected
chat rooms and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are the digital platforms on the Internet
where perpetrators share pornography and find victims.193
The recent challenge for law enforcement agencies are e-groups and Internet
search engines. The danger is that the amount of password protected content is
increasingly common in these groups since access to such content is only possible when a
person shares new content with the group.194
Internet newsgroups are a common method that perpetrators in this crime utilize
for distribution. There are some famous newsgroups that both users and officials know,
and authorities sometimes take measures against these groups. However, computer-savvy
perpetrators can use these groups without leaving their identity or IP num ber.195
In addition to the tools mentioned above, pomographers are starting to utilize new
Internet phenomena such as social media. A recent article stresses that social media is
one o f the most critical methods utilized in this crime along with file sharing programs

193 Ibid, 10-11.
194 "Cocuk Pom osuna Kar§i N asil Sava§ Verirsiniz?", ibid.
195 W ortley and Sm allbone, ibid.
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and e-groups for children. The article cites FBI data showing that child-victims are lured
by perpetrators assuming the identities o f celebrities. Perpetrators also bribe child-victims
with money, toys, movie tickets, or other enticements.196
Edwards specifies seven unique challenges that complicate child pornography
investigations for law enforcement: the global structure o f the Internet, uncertainty o f its
political borders, lack o f regulation, legal differences, expertise of offenders,
sophistication and constant change in Internet technology, and the scale, size, volume of
the Internet and Internet activities.197
Wortley and Smallbone have some advice for the police departments on which to
concentrate.198 First o f all is the importance of technical knowledge and experience. Since
the Internet is very much a technical field, law enforcement personnel dealing with these
kinds o f crimes should be well educated and trained about the tricks o f the crime. Beyond
these efforts, police agencies should have good contacts and cooperation with other
related agencies, especially with internet service providers. They also advise that police
units should prioritize their activities considering the size and dimensions o f the crime.
For example, one area of concentration o f police efforts might be known sex offenders
and their involvement in child pornography.'199
In the view o f the literature review above, the following chapter explains how
research questions are formalized, how they are operationalized for analytical purposes,
and how they are measured. As well as definitions of some terms used in this study, the
following chapter also covers explanations o f how specific circumvention tools are
selected, how blocked websites are selected for testing, and significance o f the country
196 "Cocuk Pornosuna Kar$i N asil Sava§ V erirsiniz?”, ibid.
197 Edwards, ibid.
198 W ortley and Sm allbone, ibid.
199 Ibid, 35-36.
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for this research.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN

The effectiveness o f state control on the Internet has been the subject o f a number
o f previous studies.1 While examining Internet policies in Singapore, Rodan finds the
following questions important to explore:
“First, can access to the Internet be effectively controlled, or will it have the sort
o f snowballing political effects predicted by some? Second, to what extent is
control o f the Internet a technical question alone and how important are social and
political structures in shaping the Internet's impact? Do the particular
characteristics o f authoritarianism in Singapore render it more capable than most
authoritarian regimes o f restricting the Internet's liberalizing potential? Third, has
the Internet's potential political significance been over-estimated? Does a plurality
o f individual political and social views on Internet necessarily translate into
organized political and social action?”2
Wu also asks similar questions: “Is it possible for nation-states to regulate the
Internet? Assuming that it is possible; will nation-states regulate the Internet? .. .to what
extent will states choose to regulate cyberspace?”3 While discussing the role of the
Internet on economic growth in China, Tan et al asks: “How can the government use the
Internet to promote economic growth while maintaining its political and economic
control?”4
It is not unusual for scholars, however, to exclude an uncertain area that is
vulnerable to new questions while explaining their positive or negative arguments in this
1 Ian Brown, "Internet Filtering - Be Careful W hat Y ou A sk For," In F reedom a n d P reju d ice: A p p ro a ch es
to M edia a n d Culture, edited by S. Kirca and L. Hanson. 2 0 0 8 . and Tim othy S. Wu, "Cyberspace
Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System ," H a rv a rd J o u rn a l o f L aw & T ech n o lo g y 10, no. 3
(1997). and Jack L. G oldsm ith and Tim Wu, Who C o n tro ls th e In ternet?: Illusions o f a B o rd erless W orld,
(N ew York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 6 ). and D. W. Drezner, "The Global G overnance o f the
Internet: Bringing the State Back In," P o litica l S cien ce Q u a rterly 1 19, no. 3 (2004): 4 7 7 -9 8 .
“ Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," P o litica l Science Q u a rterly 1 13, no. 1
(1998).
J Wu, ibid.
4 Z ixiang (A lex ) Tan, W illiam Foster, and Seym our E. G oodm an, "China's State-Coordinated Internet
Infrastructure," Com m unications o f th e ACM , June 1999.
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debate. For instance, Denning indicates that “Chinese authorities block access to websites
that are considered subversive to government objectives. This has been only partially
effective, however, and Chinese activists have found ways o f slipping information past
the controls.”5 The amount or size o f the term “partly” is not very clear here though.
Likewise, Goldsmith and Wu explain their position by excluding the same point
as “our discussion o f the techniques of government control over the Internet is not meant
to suggest that the techniques always work perfectly. They do not. Nor do we mean to
suggest that government control over Internet activities will always be as successful as
when these activities take place outside the Internet. They will not.”6 While discussing
legal dilemmas on the Internet, White articulates that “it is more difficult, if not
n

impossible, to trace the source of some material for the purpose of regulation.”
This study focuses on this uncertain area. To what extent is the Internet outside of
state control? To what extent are there leaks or failures in state polices? To what extent is
the lack state o f control over the Internet reasonable or acceptable for states? How
effective are these controlling and regulating mechanisms? Do the aspects that states have
difficulty controlling pose a threat for states? To what extent is this gap different from
those caused by previous media and communication tools?

RESEARCH QUESTION FORMALIZATION
Questions in this debate can be formalized as threat/complications emphasis
questions like: Is the Internet a threat to national governments? What kinds o f
5 Dorothy E. D enning, "Activism , H acktivism , and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a T ool for Influencing
Foreign Policy," In N etw orks a n d N etw ars: The Future o f Terror, C rim e, a n d M ilitan cy, edited by J.
Arquilla and D. F. Ronfeldt. 2 3 9-88, 2001.
6 Goldsm ith and Wu, ibid.
7 Am y E. W hite, Virtually O bscene: The C a se f o r an U n c en so red Internet, (Jefferson, NC: M cFarland &
C o., 2006).
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complications might it lead to, and how will these challenges affect nation-states? There
are also authority emphasis questions like: How does the Internet affect authority? Will it
empower or weaken authority? There are control emphasis questions like: To what extent
is the Internet outside of state control? To what extent is the lack state o f control over the
Internet reasonable or acceptable for states? There are also policy/law/ law enforcement
emphasis questions like: How is law applicable in the online world? To what extent and
which o f nation-states’ policies and laws to control and regulate the Internet are
effective?

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MEASUREMENT
For analytical purposes, the study prefers to focus on the “policy, law and law
enforcement” emphasis question, particularly the last group phrased above. Thus, the
main question o f this study is how much policing and law enforcement is effective to
prevent and prosecute crimes committed on/through the Internet?
Prevention and prosecution are the two essential functions o f any state authority.
For any type of criminality, prevention is the priority for authorities. When they fail to
prevent crime, the second state power tool, prosecution, applies. Thus, any inquiry
questioning authority on the Internet should consider these two dimensions— the
effectiveness o f prevention through blocking measures and the effectiveness of
prosecution when prevention fails.
Likewise, policing has two main purposes and aspects: i) prevention (to prevent
crimes from being committed), and ii) investigation (to identify perpetrators, to collect
evidence, and to transfer criminals to judicial authorities).
In terms o f prevention, this study analyzes access blocking efforts and policies on
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the Internet in Turkiye. Although internet access blocking can sometimes also be applied
as a result of a prosecution (punishment), it is widely used as a preventive measure in the
country.
In terms o f prosecution, this study explores how the Turkish police are effective
in identifying, tracing and ensuring the prosecution o f a cybercrime. For the previous
prevention aspect, this study selected websites which have contents like ideology,
political, pornography, gambling and blocked for some legal reasons. In connection with
these tested websites, internet child pornography is the only crime content which there is
a wide range o f international consensus on. There are significant political and legal
approach differences among states for the other crime subject materials mentioned above.
Internet child pornography is also one o f the first crimes that make each country to
consider internet filtering for prevention as well as accept it as a crime to be penalized.
Since the internet is a global network of networks and is transnational due to its
structure, it is important to make analysis to an extent o f covering this transnational
dimension. At this point a national unit o f Interpol Ankara becomes an ideal unit to
conduct this research in. Moreover, file classification on this unit does not have a unique
specific code that covers all kinds o f cybercrimes. Rather each crime committed
on/through the internet are given code as the same given to offline crime, like both fraud
and online fraud cases are given FKA. One exception o f a cybercrime is internet child
pornography which is specifically given the code as KCC. For analytical reasons, thus,
evaluation o f the second research question can be performed based on these specific KCC
files.
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Effectiveness of Internet Blocking (Prevention)
One o f the essential methods o f preventive measures on the Internet is the
blocking technique. Many countries in the world legalize some degree of blocking for
different reasons. Although its use has spread, the effectiveness of this measure is
questionable. In this part, this question is being explored.
Research Question 1: To what extent do blocking measures on the Internet
effectively prevent access to undesired websites and web content?

Measurement discussions in literature
Internet blocking can target either the producers or the consumers but this study is
concerned with consumers and Internet users. Callanan et al laid out perfectly certain
parameters to evaluate the effectiveness of blocking measures and stressed some
important points. “It is not possible to express effectiveness as the amount of content that
is blocked correctly in comparison to the total amount o f available illegal content since
the total volume o f available illegal content is unknown.. .Since it is often unclear where
hits on a website come from, figures quoting volume o f hits on an existing list are a very
crude indicator at best.”8
Excluding limitations noted above, Callanan et al. specified the following levels
o f analysis to approach the question o f effectiveness of blocking measures. This study
makes its evaluations based on these following factors: 1) “Analysis o f over-blocking and
under-blocking potential can be used as indicator of the effectiveness o f Internet blocking
technologies.” 2) “Another indicator for effectiveness is the ease o f circumvention o f a

8 Cormac Callanan, M arco Gercke, Estelle D e M arco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking:
Balancing Cybercrim e R esponses in D em ocratic Societies," Open S o ciety Institute, 2 0 0 9 .
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block. If it is easy to circumvent or disable a block, the availability o f the blocked
material is likely to remain unaffected.’' 3) "'The availability o f alternative methods o f
access to the same content, by whatever means, can be seen as a measure for
effectiveness o f blocking in the absence o f precise data. 4) The availability o f other
enforcement options that offer other more effective methods o f preventing access to the
material can also be assessed - especially if they are less costly, less intrusive or more
effective towards the availability of the material.”9
This study analyzes the effectiveness of blocking based on the first three criteria.
The fourth criterion is a preference of the administrative authority, which needs to be
evaluated based on a broad analysis of price, capacity, speed, complication, and other
technological variables. Since this criterion is not o f direct interest in this study, it was
considered for further analysis. The remaining three criteria and how they are measured
in this study include the first criteria quoted in Callanan et al., analysis o f over-blocking
and under-blocking potential can be used as an indicator o f the effectiveness o f Internet
blocking technologies.10

Measurement developed in this study based on above criteria
This part is measured under the title of “Analysis o f over-blocking and underblocking.” Qualitatively this section explores empirical evidence of such complications
(over-blocking and under-blocking) from independent resources. YouTube, which was
the subject of blocking in the country for about two and a half years, is the focus here as a
case study.

9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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The second and third criteria quoted in Callanan et al are: 2) the ease of
circumvention o f a block. If it is easy to circumvent or disable a block, the availability of
the blocked material is likely to remain unaffected. 3) The availability o f alternative
methods of access to the same content, by whatever means, can be seen as a measure for
effectiveness o f blocking in the absence o f precise data."

Measurement developed in this study based on above criteria
This two criteria “b and c” are combined here as “Ease of circumvention o f a
block and the availability o f alternative methods o f access to the blocked websites.” For
measuring this part, the study utilizes a previous study’s tools, particularly by Roberts et
al.’s 2009 study for the Berkman Center at Harvard University.12 They have tested the
effectiveness o f some types of web-based circumvention tools. Taking examples of
circumvention tools for each method, this study checks whether circumvention tools are
effectively retrieving a sample o f the blocking websites in Tiirkiye. How easy is it to
circumvent websites that are blocked in the country? This section further analyzes and
focuses on a specific issue area, terrorism and blocked terror websites, including
circumvention tendencies in the country and legal dilemmas.

Prosecution o f Internet child pornography
Child pornography is the main undesired content on the Internet that filters target.
However, despite all preventive policies and blocking measures against child
pornography, it is still one o f the primary problems on the Internet. While the previous

Ibid
12 Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, and John Palfrey, "2007 Circum vention Landscape Report: M ethods,
U ses, and T ools," Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 2 0 0 9 .
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research question inquires about the effectiveness oflnternet blocking, this part questions
how effective policing is when such blocking systems fail.
Research Question 2: How effective are the police in identifying, tracing and
bringing criminals involved in child pornography before judicial authorities?

Measurement
The Internet is a global medium, and most o f the complications o f the Internet
stream from its transnational structure. “Cybercrime is very much a transnational crime,”
and so is child pornography.

1T

A study exploring the challenges of investigations about

child pornography should see the subject from international and transnational
perspectives. This study analyzed the issue based on digital files from Interpol Ankara.
INTERPOL is the acronym o f the International Police Organization, headquartered in
Lyon, France. The organization has 190 member states. Staffed by member states’ law
enforcement personnel, each country has an Interpol National Bureau (National Central
Bureau, called as NCB) within their homeland. The study conducted searches for the
years o f 2005, 2006, and 2007. Looking at each o f these cases, this study checked how
police investigations either in Tiirkiye, or investigations abroad are successfully
concluded. How successful are investigations in identifying, tracing, and bringing
suspects before judicial authorities? Considering the fact that investigations take time,
and considering that this part o f the study was conducted in June 2011, the files opened in
2005, 2006, and 2007 were selected. The situation is not promising, as will be described
in the coming sections.

13 "Resources: International Cooperation against Cybercrim e," C ouncil o f Europe, w w w .coe.in t/t/dgh l
/cooperation/econom iccrim e/cybercrim e/D ocum ents/Intem ationalcooperation/defaulten.asp.
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METHODOLOGY

Measuring effectiveness of Internet blocking
Research Question 1: To what extent have blocking measures on the Internet
effectively prevented access to undesired websites and web content?
Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, and John Palfrey from the Berkman Center for
Internet & Society at Harvard University tested how effective some circumvention tools
are for some countries.14 They analyzed nine web-based proxy servers that use five
different methods: HTTP proxy, CGI proxy, IP tunneling, re-routing, and distributed
hosting. Despite some performance problems and security concerns, the study by the
Berkman Center stresses that: “all of the circumvention and anonymity tools included in
this study succeeded at the basic task o f retrieving blocked content in a filtering
country.” 15
In a lab environment, Roberts et al. evaluated above mentioned circumvention
tools based on six criteria: 1) “Utility (Does it retrieve filtered websites? How fast is it
compared to unmediated browsing? How well does/will performance scale?) 2) Usability
(How easy it for novice users to leam? How easy is it to use?) 3) Security (How well
does the tool protect the user from surveillance at various points in the network?) 4)
Promotion and marketing o f the tool (How well is knowledge of the tool pushed out to
users in filtered countries?) 5) Fiscal sustainability o f the project (To what degree is the
project on a path toward fiscal self sustainability?) 6) Openness (Is the code open source?
Are the developers approachable and forthright about their techniques and future

14 Roberts et al., ibid.
15 Ibid.
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plans?)” 16
Using the framework o f the study conducted by the Berkman Center, this study
tested how these circumvention tools are effective in bypassing blocked websites in
Tiirkiye. The center tested the following web services for circumvention: 1) Anonymizer.
www.anonymizer.com/; 2) DynaWeb www.dit-inc.us/about_us; 3) Ultrareach
http://ultrasurf.us/; 4) Circumventor www.circumventor.com/; 5) Pisphon
http://psiphon.ca/?page_id=T96; 6 Jap http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/index_en.html; 7) Tor
https://www.torproject.org/; 8) Hamachi www.hamachi.com/; and 9) Coral
www.coralcdn.org/.

Selection o f circumvention tools
Taking these circumvention tools from this list, this study proposes to test how
these tools are working in Tiirkiye to bypass blocking measures. It is important to check
if these tools are significant for Tiirkiye. Thus, I checked all o f these tools (websites) at
alexa.com and looked for their popularity in Tiirkiye. Checks reveal that only the third
place web tool, Ultrareach, and the seventh place web tool, Tor, have some degree o f
popularity in Tiirkiye.17 Thus I selected Ultrareach and Tor for additional analysis. While
Ultrareach is an HTTP proxy (http://ultrasurf.us/), Tor is a re-routing proxy
(https://www.torproject.org/).
In order to select one example for the other types o f proxy servers (CGI proxy and
IP tunneling), I check the top list of global proxy websites and establish how popular
these proxies are in Tiirkiye. This check reveals that among the five global proxies,
16 Ibid.
17 TUrkiye is the fifth m ost popular country for Ultrareach softw are. Ultrasurf ranked 3 9 ,0 1 2 . and Tiirkiye is
the seventeenth m ost popular country for Tor, ranked 11.181. "A lexa A ctionable A nalytics for the Web,"
A lexa Internet, Inc., A lexa.com .

84

Turkish users make use o f three o f the following. Ktunnel is a Turkish CGI proxy.
Turkish visitors make up the majority o f visitors to the site, ranking at 88.4% o f total
visitors. Anonymouse is a free anonymous surfing, email, and Usenet posting site.18 3.4%
o f visitors came from TUrkiye, coming in at eighth place among visitor source countries.
Vtunnel is a web proxy supporting SSL via the HTTPS encryption protocol. TUrkiye
provided a plurality o f visitors, 21.6%. Because o f its popularity in TUrkiye, both in terms
o f country ranking and percentage o f visitors, I chose Ktunnel as a CGI proxy. The three
circumvention tools selected in this study are: Ultrarech, Ktunnel, and Tor Project.

Selection o f blocked websites
In order to test how circumvention tools are working, the following blocked
websites have been selected from an independent website that monitors blocked websites
in TUrkiye. According to engelliweb.com, which monitors Internet blockings within
TUrkiye, 15,596 websites are blocked for different reasons as of 2 March 2012.19 Among
them, 12,772 websites are reported by the administrative authority called
Telekomunikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi (TIB). 2,326 are by judicial authorities. Among
them, 26 websites are hosted by WordPress, 48 are hosted by Blogger or Blogspot, and
47 are IP addresses. The result of testing and its analysis are further explored in the
following section.

Measuring effectiveness o f prosecution
Research Question 2: How effective are police in identifying, tracing, and
18 Usenet is a w orldw ide bulletin board system that can be a ccessed through the Internet or through many
online services. The U SE N E T contains more than 14,000 new sgroups (see definition in Chapter II). It is
used daily by m illions o f people around the world.
19 "Engelli Web," Engelliw eb.com .
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bringing criminals involved Internet child pornography before judicial authorities?
The following measures are offered by Wortley and Smallbone to measure the
degree o f success for law enforcement agencies while they are policing child
pornography:20 “The followings are potentially useful measures o f the effectiveness o f
responses to Internet child pornography: 1) reduced number o f complaints from the
public about Internet child pornography. Initially, you might want to see an increase in
complaints from the public if you have reason to believe the problem is underreported; 2)
reduced number of child pornography sites and images on the Internet; 3) reduced
number of new child pornography images on the Internet; 4) reduced level o f severity of
the child pornography images on the Internet; 5) reduced number o f images possessed by
offenders who are arrested for downloading child pornography; 6) reduced level o f
severity o f the images possessed by offenders who are arrested for downloading child
pornography; and 7) reduced level o f involvement (possession, distribution, or
production) o f the offenders arrested for Internet child pornography crime.
Other measures are important for tracking official actions taken to address the
problem. Among them are: 1) the number o f offenders arrested for Internet child
pornography crimes; and 2) the number o f victims portrayed in Internet child
pornography who are identified and assisted.”21
Since this study concerns more on the investigation side of the issue rather than
complaints, images, or websites, for analytical purposes, the measurement o f
effectiveness focuses on the offender side. Thus, effectiveness in this section is measured
as the success o f investigations to identify, trace, or arrest the offenders involved in

20 Richard W ortley and Stephen Sm allbone, In ternet C h ild P orn ograph y: Causes, In vestigation , a n d
Prevention, (Praeger, 2012).
21 Ibid., 32-33.
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reported cases. Looking at both incoming and outgoing requests to Interpol Ankara will
give a good insight to evaluate this effectiveness in such a transnational crime.
INTERPOL plays an important role to ensure cooperation among police
organizations o f all countries in the world. With its 190 member states, the organization
and the INTERPOL network o f National Central Bureaus (NCBs) help to communicate
directly with each other, to share information about any transnational crime, and to
submit requests for investigation from each other.
This part o f the study was conducted in The National Central Bureau o f Interpol
Ankara (NCB Ankara) for one week between 27 June 2011 and 1 July 2011 with official
permission dated 21 June 2011. Because o f legal concerns and time limitations, I selected
files from the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. A four to six-year time period is appropriate to
anticipate that a regular police investigation will be concluded. Thus, analysis and
evaluations are not conducted based on new cases that may be ongoing, but rather on
cases considered to be concluded.

How does the NCB o f Interpol Ankara work?
This department operates under the General Directorate of National Police in
Ankara. The department has about 100 personnel, and its working languages are English
and French. It coordinates policing and legal cooperation between national departments
with their foreign counterparts. It receives requests from national police, judicial units,
and other official departments and directs appropriate inquiries to related country’s NCB.
It also receives requests from foreign Interpol departments (NCBs) to convey them to
related national units.
Any criminal or legal issue, either a request from national bodies or from outside
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the country, results in a new file being opened in the department. Depending on the types
o f crimes, these files are assigned reference codes for easy archiving. FKA is the code for
forgery cases. GPE is the code for human smuggling. ST is for drug smuggling. The code
KCC is for cases involving child sexual abuse and child pornography. Among the six
different sections at the Interpol department in Ankara, the Public Safety and Order
Section handles KCC-labeled crime.

File selection and digital archive
Looking at the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, this study checks the new files opened
as KCC. These checks and analyses are conducted in the digital archive but not in regular
files. Paper-based files o f the same digital file would be complementary and would show
other small details of the cases. However, the digital archive includes all the significant
writings and processes o f a case saved and accessible in a closed internal network within
the department. Only insignificant documentation about a case is excluded from the
digital file. It is kept instead in a paper-based physical file. Examples o f such documents
are forms requesting the status o f an investigation, requests to speed up an investigation,
or a negative result from one o f the units that conducted the investigation. In some cases
there is action required for these types o f documents. In other cases, it may not be helpful
to convey these types o f requests to related national or foreign units. Thus, significant
information and data conducted in any case is included in the digital files, and no relevant
information is excluded.

Analysis o f files
For each year, there are digital files named 2005, 2006, and 2007 in the digital
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archive. Cases opened in each year were given a case number with corresponding crime
code such as KCC-356 or KCC-278 and saved as a MS Word documents within the
corresponding year file in the digital archive. Thus, the total number of MS Word
documents in a year file represents the total number of cases subject to investigation by
Interpol investigators.
Checks conducted o f the digital archive files for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007
reveal that there are respectively 35, 35 and 85 new cases subject to investigations by
NCB Ankara. These numbers do not reflect the total documents received by the Bureau
each year. The real number of documents pertaining to the same crime may be higher.
However, this study only concerns the operational side o f police investigation o f the
crime. Thus, the informative and secondary documents held in paper-based files have
little or no value for this analysis.
Interpol investigations can be essentially divided into two main groups, Requests
o f National units from Foreign Interpol Bureaus (outgoing requests) and Requests of
Foreign Interpol Bureaus from national units (incoming requests)
After this classification as outgoing requests and incoming requests, all cases are
opened for content analysis. Each case has been checked based on the following
questions and aspects: From where did the request come? What was the request? To
where was it conveyed? When police investigations are successful in identifying
criminals, are possible perpetrators brought before judicial authorities? What are possible
difficulties and barriers during these police investigations and proceedings?

WHY THE REPUBLIC OF TURKIYE?
While examining the geopolitics of blocking trends in 2009, Deibert stresses that
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although Internet filtering polices are very common around globe, information about each
state’s experience from these policies is limited.22 There are not many reliable resources
available on this complex issue, and the number o f empirical studies is quite limited.
Transparency and accountability for these policies are very low for most o f the countries.
Each state has unique characteristics, with different cultural, historical, and
political heritages and traditions. Studying how Turkish authorities manage to control and
regulate the Internet, particularly its blocking experience, collection o f important cases,
and empirical evidence from the country, will be helpful to enrich the literature in this
field.
Being a democratic, secular and developing country, Tiirkiye has a rich culture
and history. It is situated in a very strategic place between Europe to the West, Russia to
the North, and in the Arabian Peninsula to the Southeast. Many call the country the
bridge between Europe and Asia. It has a growing economy, ranked 17th in the world as
measured in nominal GDP, according to the World Bank. It is the second most populated
country in Europe with a population around 72 million. It has relatively a young
population compared to other European countries. Tiirkiye’s diverse social, political, and
economic characteristics create a rich profile that potentially reflects interesting evidence
about experiences and patterns o f the effects o f the Internet.
Political debates about the Internet discuss widely the blocking policies o f
different states. Tiirkiye’s internet access blocking policy and its implications present
different patterns and empirical evidence worth bringing to the literature. Tiirkiye’s
practices is interesting to explore since it is not as strict as in China, Iran, or Saudi

22 Ronald J. Deibert, The G eopolitics o f Internet Control: C ensorship, S o vereig n ty a n d C y b ers p a ce ,
Routledge Handbook o f Internet Politics. Edited by A ndrew C hadw ick and Philip N . Howard (London:
Routledge, 2009).
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Arabia, nor does it resemble more liberal Internet policies like those in Western Europe.
According to an international non-profit organization. Reporters Without Borders, which
monitors freedom o f the press and the Internet, Tiirkiye is not among the countries that
are “enemies o f the Internet.” However, the organization included Tiirkiye among the
“countries under surveillance.”23
In fact, Turkish authorities did not have many options to consider against
undesired websites and web content that violate national laws. Authorities either close
their eyes to these illegalities and other negative effects or they enforce the law, including
Internet access blocking, despite some o f the complications discussed in this study.
Engelliweb.com, which monitors Internet blocking in Tiirkiye, reported that
access to 7,221 websites was blocked for different reasons on 29 August 2010. On 04
March 2011, about six months later, and the check revealed that 9,151 sites were being
restricted.24 As o f 13 June, 2014, total number o f blocked websites found by the same
resource reached to 48,412 25
Internet access blocking in TUrkiye can be done based on Law No. 5651 regarding
“Regulation o f Publications on the Internet and the Struggle against Crimes Committed
on the Internet”26 or based on related sections o f other laws. Among those which are
restricted based on law no. 5651, the biggest percentage o f blocking, 96.3 %, is done for
obscenity, pornography, and child sexual abuse.

The remaining websites are blocked for

hate speech, gambling, and other health related reasons like encouraging suicide, or the
use of narcotics.

23 Reporters Without Borders, "Internet Enemies," (2 0 1 1 ).
24 "Engelli W eb .”, ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 The law cam e into effect on 2 3 N ovem ber 2 0 0 7 .
27 "Telekomtlnikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi," w w w .ihbarw eb.org.tr.
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Blocking policies in TUrkiye are also open to public denunciation by the Turkish
administrative authority TIB.28 The TIB can directly restrict access to the website once
they find allegations that apparently violate related law. Decisions to block access to any
website can be handed down by the TIB and by judicial authorities, either by prosecutors
or by courts.
Implementation of Internet blocking, however, has raised public questions about
the effectiveness o f these measures since access may still be possible despite being
blocked. For instance, YouTube is restricted based on different court verdicts and was
closed for a long time. However, during the time that the websites was being blocked,
alexa.com reports showed that the website was one of the most popular within TUrkiye.
Access to these websites, blocked for obscenity, social networking, or gambling,
may be a secondary concern, but this gap also seems to be open for websites encouraging
terrorism and violence. TUrkiye has been suffering from terrorism by the MarxistLeninist terrorist organization PKK since the beginning o f the 1980s. TUrkiye’s struggle
against this terrorist organization faced a different challenge when a TV channel, ROJ
TV, propagandizing PKK, started to broadcast from Denmark. Authorities were used to
taking measures against such publications or broadcasting within national borders, but
this transnational broadcasting to the potential audience within the country created a new
challenge for Turkish authorities. TUrkiye urged Danish authorities to close ROJ TV, but
the country faced legal and political barriers in Danish national legislation. Later the
television channel moved its center to other European states and changed the satellite it

28 Turkish acronym o f Telekom unikasyon ileti$im Bajkanligi, the Turkish telecom m unications
headquarters.
29 YouTube w as the sixth m ost popular w ebsite in TUrkiye as o f 21 March 2010, although the w ebsite w as
blocked based on the decision by 1st Peace Crim inal Court in Ankara sin ce 5 M ay 2 0 0 8 . "A lexa A ctionable
A nalytics for the W eb .”, ibid.
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was broadcasting from. It was a significant subject of legal and political dispute between
Danish authorities and Turkiye for a long time.30
Through the Internet and its multimedia features, such kinds o f broadcastings
have become more complicated for Turkish authorities. The Internet has increased the
number o f websites acting as the voices o f the terrorist organization PKK. In the case of
ROJ TV, Turkiye needed to convince one or two states to close off this television
broadcasting. But because o f the Internet, Turkish authorities need to talk— and
negotiate— with a number o f states with different legal, political and economic regimes to
stop these websites from using servers in their country.
Authorities are also taking measures to prevent domestic access to these websites.
However, these websites still receive a significant number o f domestic visitors despite
being blocked domestically by authorities. There are a number of alternative ways people
circumvent Internet blocking. People can use proxy websites, online anonymous services
for circumvention. They can also change their modem or computer settings for the same
purpose.
It is worth noting here that information and websites that provide circumvention
techniques are also open access, and so far, authorities have not taken any measures
against these kinds o f websites. People can easily find these circumvention techniques on
the Internet. For instance, ktunnel.com, a proxy website that circumvents Internet
blocking, is the 60th most popular website in Turkiye according to alexa.com.31 This
shows that people in Turkiye are using these kinds o f tools and services available on the
Internet to access blocked websites.

" r q j y y Davasinda Sona Dogru," Sabah, 7 D ecem b er2 0 1 1.
31 The popularity ranking o f the w ebsite within the country w as 3 3 3 0 on 12 February 2 0 1 4 . "Alexa
Actionable A nalytics for the Web.", ibid.
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In addition to these blocking dilemmas and problems, law enforcement agencies
face different challenges while investigating criminal issues committed on or through the
Internet, as seen in police investigations against child pornography. This crime is one o f
the primary reasons authorities consider Internet blocking. It is such a sensitive issue that
almost in every country, it is admitted as a serious crime. So it is in Turkiye. Authorities
take this crime very seriously and utilize all technical and scientific capabilities to
investigate, identify and prosecute such crime allegations.
This study has a chance to explore digital files of investigation requests of
Interpol Ankara. These investigation requests have two sides. It can be investigation
requests o f foreign Interpol Bureaus from Interpol Ankara (incoming requests) or it can
be investigation requests o f Interpol Ankara from other Interpol Bureaus (outgoing
requests). Looking at investigations for three years, 2005, 2006, and 2007, this study
checked how many cases either outside the country or inside the country successfully
identified criminals involved in this crime and handed over to judicial authorities.

DEFINITIONS
Definitions and terminology matter in any study, especially when it is academic.
It is important to specify what this study means when talking about certain terms, like the
Internet, Internet blocking, effectiveness, and Internet child pornography.
The Internet: In their study DiMaggio et al. define the Internet as “the electronic
network o f networks that links people and information through computers and other
•

*

•

32

digital devices allowing person-to-person communication and information retrieval.’’

32 Paul D iM aggio, Eszter Hargittai, W. Russell Neum an, and John P. Robinson, "Social Im plications o f the
Internet,” Annual R eview o f S o cio lo g y 27 (2 0 0 1 ): 307-36.
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The Internet is both a communication and a mass medium. Previously, media and
communication disciplines used to be studied and taught separately. Now the Internet has
unified these disciplines. Although there are some similarities with older media and
communication devices such as telephones, fax, television, and radio, the Internet has
many distinct characteristics. White indicates that:
“The Internet is not a tangible device, no one entity manufactures or produces
it and it is not allowed or controlled by any government or corporation...The
computers which form the Internet are connected by many different
methods...fiber optic cables, twisted pair copper wire, wireless signals ... The
information travelling on these networks is translated by a computer into a
universal protocol called TCP/IP, which uses a common name and enables
other computers to find and understand the information.... It is these protocols
that really define the network. The machines that talk to one another using IP
and their connections are the Internet.”33
Hick and McNutt describe the Internet as “a global pool of information and
services, accessible locally through individual computer stations, each o f which is part of
global system o f interconnected computer networks.”34 Callanan et al. say: “The Internet
is a vast complex network o f networks with a myriad o f hardware systems, protocols and
services implemented.”35 While studying the effects o f the Internet in social movements,
Huang specifies the use o f Internet technology as the use o f “the World Wide Web,
websites/websites, email, real time chat, blogs, VoIP, and discussion forums.”
The Internet is a global network o f networks that enables users from all over the
world to interact and connect through the Internet applications, devices, and tools of
communication technology. Internet applications implies the use of World Wide Web

>3 W hite, ibid.
34 Steven Hick and John G. McNutt, ed s., A d vo ca cy, A ctivism a n d th e Internet: C om m u n ity O rg a n iza tio n
a n d S o c ia l P o lic y, Com m unities and A dvocacy on the Internet: A C onceptual Fram ework, (C hicago, IL:
Lycecum Books, 2 0 0 2 ), 6.
35 Callanan et al., ibid.
36 Bi Yun Huang, "A nalyzing a Social M ovem ent’s U se o f Internet R esource M obilization, N e w Social
M ovem ent Theories and the C ase o f Falun Gong," Indiana U niversity, 2 0 0 9 .
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(Web 2.0), blogging, social networking sites, any kind o f forums, messengers, instant
chat, email, VoIP, multimedia, peer to peer (P2P) networking, and Usenet Newsgroups.
Devices and tools o f communication technology include all kinds o f equipment necessary
for Internet infrastructure and connection to the Internet, such as computers, modems,
wireless capabilities, cables, mobile phones, and the like.
Blocking policies can target Internet applications such as websites/webpages,
email, Usenet, search, and peer to peer (P2), as Callanan et al. analyzed in their study.
For analytical purposes, this study specifically focuses on one of the important
applications o f the Internet, websites, while examining blocking measures. Callanan et al.
also stress, “Websites are one of the foremost distribution methods o f all types o f content
on the Internet.”38 Moreover “many filtering products are based on lists o f Websites that
are supplied by their vendor[s].”39
Blocking on the Internet: Blocking covers “a broad range o f policies, hardware,
software, and services, and it would be a mistake to think that all types o f Internet
blocking are the same or equally effective, legally equivalent, or even that one system can
easily be used in relation to more than one type o f content.”40 In this study, blocking
essentially refers to authorities’ technical measures to prevent access to undesired
websites and web content. This study is not a lab analysis o f blocking techniques or
circumvention methods. It uses the words “blocking” and “filtering” interchangeably, as
seen in the literature.
Effectiveness: In order to talk about effectiveness in a positive or negative sense,

7 Callanan et al., ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Paul G reenfield, Peter R ickw ood, and Huu C uong Tran, "E ffectiveness o f Internet Filtering Softw are
Products," Sydney: C SIRO, M athematical and Information S cien ces, 2 0 0 1 .
40 Callanan et al., ibid.

there should be an accurate and reliable measure. While this term basically refers to the
level o f success, how it is measured is explained for each research question based on
criteria from the literature.
The next chapter gives information about brief political history of the country,
and some background about media and communication sector. This chapter also includes
historical information about how the internet was first introduced to the country and how
it has been governed by related institutions.
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CHAPTER IV
BRIEF ABOUT TURKIYE

Following the First World War, the six century old Ottoman Empire broke apart.
Founded in 1923, the Republic of Turkiye chose many political, legal, and economic
models from Western states to form a new governmental and institutional structure.
Turkiye kept itself away from involvement in the Second World War and gave priority to
industrialization and developing its economy. Becoming a NATO member in 1952,
Turkiye was one o f the frontlines of the Alliance and played a strategic role during the
Cold War. Geographically, Turkiye is in an important region in the Middle East,
Caucasus, Black Sea, Europe, and the Mediterranean. It has a population o f about 76
million,1 which makes the country the second most populous nation in Europe and among
the most populous in the Middle East. Turkiye is the only pluralist secular democracy in
the Muslim world.
The European Union (EU) has become one o f the successful civilization projects
in the last century. From the very beginning, Turkiye wanted to be a part o f this project.
The relationship between Turkiye and the EU goes back to 1963 when the Association
Agreement signed in Ankara between the two parties (at that time the Union was called
as the EEC). Since then, it has undertaken extensive political and economic reforms and
has become a part o f European institutions, such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Court of Human Rights, and the Council of
Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). Turkiye applied for full membership to the EU

1 A s o f 31 D ecem ber 2 0 1 2 , the population is 7 5 ,6 2 7 ,3 8 4 . Turkish Statistical Institute, "Adrese Dayali
N ilfus Kayit Sistem i Sonuclari, 2012," w w w .tuik.gov.tr/P reH aberB ultenleri.do?id=13425.
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in 1987, and was recognized as a candidate state during the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999.
After a long and hard discussion at the Copenhagen Summit in 2004, the European
Council finally specified a date for accession talks with Turkiye to be held in 2004 but
without guarantee o f a full membership.
Irrespective o f whether full membership is ever granted, Turkiye is advancing its
democratic standards, promoting human rights standards, and improving its economic
development. The end o f Cold War has opened up a wide hinterland for the country to
expand economic relations and diversify its foreign policy in its region. Both for Turkish
people and for politicians, the popularity and credibility o f the European Union seems to
be decreasing. Thus, any response in the future will not be surprising for the country, as it
might have been one or two decades ago.
Liberal policies in the country were intensified in the beginning o f 1980s.
Free and competitive market principles were intensified in economic policies during this
time, and the state’s role and involvement in the economy began to be minimized
afterward. Privatization o f many of the State Economic Enterprises (abbreviated KIT in
Turkish), liberalization of the circulation of foreign currency within the market, and
ensuring convertibility o f the Turkish Lira in the international market are some o f the
important polices o f this term. Although the country has not become a full member o f the
EU, the country signed the Customs Union agreement with the European Union, which
came into force at the beginning of 1996. This liberalization movement is not only seen
in economy. The country has made significant transformations in a variety o f legal and
political areas. The death penalty has been abolished and individual applications to the
European Human Rights Court have been accepted under certain conditions.

Both the media and communication sectors have been very much affected by
these liberalization policies. As seen in most o f issue areas, technology was very much
ahead o f the law. Although there is no legal framework for broadcasting private TV and
radio channels, a number o f private TV and radio channels have emerged and
undermined the monopoly of the state-run, official voice o f Turkish Radio and Television
(abbreviated TRT in Turkish). It was up until 1993 that private TV and radio
broadcasting have been regulated based on an amendment to the constitution. Since then,
private TV and radio channels have been very influential on the country’s progress in
democracy, civil rights, freedom, and institutionalization. The Turkish Radio and
Television High Commission (abbreviated RTUK in Turkish) reports that 249 Territorial
Analog Television stations are licensed by the RTUK. O f those, 24 are national, 15 are
regional, and 210 are local TV channels. RTUK licenses 1,062 FM radio stations. O f
those, 35 are national, 98 are regional, and 929 are local.2
Because o f serious political and legal disputes, privatization o f the state owned .
Postal, Telephone and Telegraph (abbreviated PTT in Turkish) progressed slowly and
was realized only realized after a number o f postponements. For this purpose,
telecommunication services have been separated from the postal service, and Turk
Telekom A.S. was founded in 1994.3 There are 443 licensed companies operating in a
free and competitive Turkish telecommunication market. Using three communication
satellites, one o f which is national GOKTURK, the country allocates a considerable

2 Radio and T elevision Supreme C ouncil, (R adyo T elevizyon Ust Kurulu, RTUK) Annual Report (2 0 0 9 -

2010 )
’ Hasan Serindag, "Turk Telekom inikasyon Sektorunde Liberalizasyon V e Regulasyon Kurumlarinin
Fonksiyonlari,” In 2 0 0 8 Bilisim K onferansi. Ankara, 2008.
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amount o f resources to advance its space and satellite technology.4

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNET IN TURKIYE
Having significant growth, progress, and development, the media and
communication sectors in Turkiye have entered into a new transformation trend that was
essentially shaped and dominated by the Internet. The Internet has changed and
diversified previous communication habits and gained a critical place in transforming this
balance o f the new media order. Increasing popularity, especially among younger
generations in the country, has urged authorities and private endeavors to spread Internet
services and advance infrastructure throughout the entire state.
The first transnational computer network in Turkiye, called TUVAKA (Turkish
Networks o f Universities and Research Institutes), was established in 1986.5 It was a
BITNET connection that first connected the University o f Ege in Izmir, Turkiye to
EARN (European Academic and Research Network) in Italy.6 More universities from
other parts o f the country joined the same network later, but technical and operational
problems within the network made resulted in it being insufficient to respond to
necessary demands at that time.7
In 1991, a well-known national research institute in Turkiye, TUBITAK (The
Scientific and Technical Research Council o f Turkiye) and one of the leading universities

4 "Ministry o f Transportation (TQrkiye Cum huriyeti Ula§tirma)," w w w .ubak.gov.tr/.
5 Turkish A cronym o f “TUrkiye U niversiteler v e Ara§tirma Kurumlari A g i.” M iddle East Technical
U niversity (M E T U ), "TUrkiye'de Internet," w w w.Internetarsivi.m etu.edu.tr/tarihce.php.
6 Peter W olcott and Kursat Cagiitay, "T elecom m unications, Liberalization, and the Growth o f the Internet
in Turkiye," The Inform ation S ociety, no. 17 (2001): 133—41.
7 Yaman A k d en izan d Kerem Altiparmak, in tern et: G irilm esi Tehlikeli Ve Yasaktir, (Ankara: Insan Haklan
Ortak Platformu’nun (iH O P ), 2008).
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of the country, METU (Middle East Technical University)8 initiated a project called TRNET. They were able to test connection with the Netherlands in October 1992.9 On 12
April 1993, the first Internet connection using the TCP/IP protocol10 was made between
METU/TUBITAK and the NSFNet (National Science Foundation Network) in the United
States through a 64-kbps leased line.11
Since then Internet infrastructure and Internet users in the country have increased
noticeably. In 1995, the number of individual Internet connections was about 1,300, and
total daily Internet users numbered between 10,000 and 15,000. In 1997, about 30,000
computers were connected to the Internet. This number was 100,000 in the beginning o f
2000.12 Mestci notes that Internet users numbered about 293,000 in 1998. That increased
to 1.78 million in 2000 and 10 million in 2004.13
The Turkish Statistics Institution (TUIK) began conducting an address-based
survey in 2007. A survey conducted that year reveals that 19.7% of Turkish households
had Internet access. ADSL was the most used connection type by 78.5% .14 In 2009, the
percentage o f Internet-connected households increased to 30% of the total households.
The same year, the total population o f the country was 71,517,100 and average family
size was around four. From these numbers, officials estimated that there were 18 million
households in Turkiye, meaning that approximately 5.4 million households had Internet

8 In Turkish: Orta Dogu Teknik U niversitesi (O D T U ).
9 "Tilrkiye'de Internet.”, ibid.
10 Bill Gates, "Shaping the Internet Age," In ternet Policy’ Institute, 2 0 0 0 .
11 Akdenizli, ibid. and "TUrkiye'de Internet.”, ibid.
12 "Turkish M inistry o f Education (M illi Egitim Bakanhgi)," http://w w w .m eb.gov.tr/.
1’Aytac M est?i, "TUrkiye internet Raporu 2 0 0 5 ,” In A kadem ik Bilisim Konferansi 2 0 0 6 . (D enizli:
Pamukkale U niversitesi, 2006).
14 "Turkish Statistical Institute Database," http://w w w .turkstat.gov.tr/PreTabloA ram a.do?m etod=search
&araType=vt.

102
access in 2009.15 In December 2009, Bulent Hicsonmez, Head of Google Turkiye,
estimated that Turkish Internet users numbered about 28 million.16
In 2010 the percentage o f households with Internet access increased to 41.6% o f
total households— 7.48 million homes.17 That increased to 47.2% in 2012. The rate for
cities is 55.5%, and the rate in rural areas is 27.3% .18
Besides Internet access from individual homes, public Internet use, such as in
Internet cafes, is very common around the country. For example, there are more than 800
internet cafes in Ankara with more than five users per cafe per day and almost 2000
internet cafes in Istanbul with more than six users per cafe per day.19
The “e-state”’ project, a government initiative to combine all official departments
into one main gateway has encouraged officials to develop their own websites and
provide some services on the Internet. The Ministry o f Transportation, which is in charge
o f communication in the country, recently notes that with 40 million Internet users,
Turkiye is 12th in the world and 5th in Europe in terms o f Internet penetration. While the
number o f broadband Internet subscribers exceeds 8 million, the number o f cable Internet
subscribers exceeds 200,000. 3G technology makes mobile Internet access convenient
and popular in the country, and mobile subscribers have reached 16.6 million.
comScore, Inc. (the initial “c” is not capitalized), a global Internet traffic ranking
and measuring website, reports that in April 2009 Turkiye had the 7th largest online
audience among Internet visitors from 17 European states. “Spending an average 32
15 GOvenli W eb, "istatistik Bilgileri," http://w w w .guvenliw eb.org.tr/istatistikler/.
16 "TUrkiye'nin Internet N iifusu 28 M ilyon,” Timeturk, 7 D ecem ber 2 0 0 9 .
17 Giivenli W eb, "internet A bone Sayilari," http://w w w .guvenliw eb.org.tr/istatistikler/content/intem etabone-say% C4% B 1 lar%C4%B 1. O f the 7 1 ,5 1 7 ,1 0 0 inhabitants, 50.2% are male and 49.8% are fem ale.
There are about 18 m illion households in the country.
18 Ibid.
19 “istatistik B ilgileri,” ibid.
20 All data from "Ministry o f Transportation (TUrkiye Cumhuriyeti Ulajtirma)," ibid.
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hours and viewing an average 3,044 pages of content per month” makes Turkiye the most
engaged Internet visitors in Europe and the 5th most engaged in the w orld.21

Institutions and the Internet
The Internet urged politicians and bureaucrats to create a unique and special
institution and law to regulate the Internet. The Presidency o f Telecommunication
Communication (Telekomiinikasyon lleti§im Ba§kanhgi (TIB)) was founded based on
amendment law number 5397, approved by the Turkish Parliament and published in the
Official Gazette on 3 July 2005. The TIB is under the direct supervision o f the President
o f the BTK (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve Ileti§im Kurumu— the Turkish Information and
Communications Technologies Authority) both o f which operate under Ministry o f
Transport Maritime Affairs and Communications.
The law on Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes
Committed by Means o f Such Publications, number 5651 published on 23 May 2007,
directly assigns the TIB to enforce the related provisions o f the law about the Internet.
The Internet Department Directorate is founded under the TIB.
The TIB’s duties and responsibilities are stipulated in law number 5651, Article
10, Paragraph 4. These duties are to ensure coordination between the Ministry, Law
Enforcement Agencies, related Directorates, and NGOs to prevent illegal activities and
publications o f content published on the Internet, as described in the law. Like at home,
the Presidency (TIB) is to facilitate cooperation and coordination with institutions abroad.
Establishing the level, time, and means o f monitoring Internet publications, the TIB is
obligated to monitor Internet publications and take appropriate access-blocking measures
21 com Score, "Press Releases," w w w .com score.com /P ress E v e n ts/P r essR e lea ses.
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against any criminality as described in the law. It establishes systems and procedures for
registration, filters, and other administrative requirements for commercial public Internet
providers.
Law number 5651, article 10, paragraph 5 provides the foundation o f the Internet
Board, made up o f members from the Ministry o f Justice, Ministry o f Interior, Ministry
o f State Responsible for Women, Children and Family, from other related Ministries and
organizations, and members from Internet Service Providers and NGOs. The law calls for
the TIB to ensure cooperation and coordination with this board in designating websites to
block and with collecting suggestions, measures, and decisions from similar situations.
After presenting introductory information about internet access blocking, related
law, blocking examples and concerns, the following chapter includes analysis o f the first
research question which is the effectiveness of internet blocking. As a case study,
YouTube access blocking was explained here as an example for over-blocking. Utilized
some o f the tools tested in the literature, this chapter includes testing circumvention tools
to access some o f blocked websites. This chapter also looks the effects of blocking on
blocked websites, focusing on those with violence, ideology or terror contents.
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CHAPTER V
INTERNET BLOCKING AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKIYE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Technology develops faster than law.1 Law making comes after public use o f
technology. Such is the case with Internet use in Turkiye. During the early years o f
Internet use in Turkiye, there were no specific laws or regulation. Ina short time, legal
disputes and cases involving the Internet started coming before judicial authorities. In this
period, judges and prosecutors utilized previous laws and regimes to solve these legal
problems.2
The first judicial cases can be considered as “the Internet vs. the state.” In these
cases, the Internet was the medium where alleged crimes against the existence and
solidarity o f the state were prosecuted.3 One o f the cases in this regard was the case o f
Emre Ersoz in 1998. Because o f his posting to a forum o f an Internet Service Provider
(ISP), he was sentenced ten months imprisonment for “publicly insulting state security
forces” based on Turkish Penal Code 159/1. He defended himself by explaining that the
forum is not open to the public but only open to its users. His sentence was postponed on
the condition that he not be charged for similar charge in five years.4
In 1999, another similar case arose known as the case of Coskun Ak. As the
administrator o f a forum in an Internet portal belonging to an ISP named Superonline, he

1 Robert J. Klotz, The P olitics o f Internet C o m m u n ication , Lanham, MD: Rowman & L ittlefield Publishers,
2004.
2 SansUre SansUr, "Tiirkiye'de Internet SansuriinUn Kisa T arih L .V e MiimkUn G elecegi!"
http://sansuresansur.blogspot.com /2009/09/turkiyede-internet-sansurunun-ksa.htm l.
3 Yaman A kd en izand Kerem Altiparmak, in tern et: G irilm esi T ehlikeli Ve Yasaktir, (Ankara: insan Haklari
Ortak Platformu’nun (iH O P), 2008).
4 Ibid.
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refused to remove an anonymous comment criticizing human rights in the country after a
user complained and asked for its removal. Since Coskun Ak refused to take down the
comment, the complaining user took the issue to the court. Considering a parallel to the
regulations o f previous media, the prosecutor claimed that as the administrator o f the
forum, Coskun A k’s responsibility was similar to that o f an editor of a published
newspaper. Ak defended himself on the principle o f “nullum crimen nulla poena sine
lege - no crime, no punishment without a previous penal law.” Although he was found
guilty, the decision was overturned by the Supreme Court. The local court upheld its first
decision, but once again it was overturned by the Supreme Court. At the end, Ak was not
sentenced, but only because o f an amendment in the Turkish Penal Code, Article 159 at
that time.5
Akdeniz and Altinparmak notes that some twenty websites, among them
yolsuzluklar.org, soygun.com, turkbet.com, pkk.org, cjb.net, cunta.org, superbahis.com,
bahismerkezi.com, hizb-ut-tahrir.org, al-ummah.org, akademya.org, ucbucuk.com,
akparti.gen.tr, altinrehber.com, otuken.org, soyguncular.com, dindusmanlari.com,
aloihbar.org, were blocked between 2001 and 2004.6
With the legal mentality that considers the Internet analogous to previous media
forms, new regulations were introduced to the public at the beginning o f the 2000s. After
long discussions during the law-making process, the first regulation was prepared as
amendment number 4676,7 which was first overturned by the president. W hen it was for a
second time admitted by the Turkish Parliament, the president was left one choice to

"Co$kun Ak D osyasi: Online Y ayincilikta Ilk Hukuki Olay," http://www.turkintem et.com /dosya/ 0 1 1 2 /yazilar/.
6 A kdeniz et al., ibid.
7 Law on A m endm ent on the Establishment and Broadcasting o f Radio and T elevision, the Press Law,
Incom e Tax Law and the Law A m ending the Law on Corporate Incom e Tax.
5
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ratify and bring it to the Supreme Court. Finally, the Court changed some o f its articles
and the law number 4656 came into force in 2002.8
In the year 2005, blocking was intensely seen as an effort to protect copyrights.
Between 2005 and 2007, based on applications o f the Turkish Phonographic Industry
Society (MUYAP), access to some 1,500 websites was blocked.9 Blocking for copyright
violations even reached well known global websites like myspace.com and bloger.com.
These two sites would not be in service in Turkiye for a while. In 2008 alone, 52
websites, including muzikhaber.bIoggum.com and mp3evin.com were blocked by the
Beyoglu Prosecutor’s Office for violation o f copyrights based on above M UYAP’s
application.10
During this time, increasing crimes committed through the Internet, especially
public sensitivity on child pornography and suicide, mobilized Parliament to make a
specific law about the Internet.11 Although two drafts prepared by NGOs and the Ministry
of Justice could not come to the Assembly’s agenda for voting, a draft prepared by
Ministry o f Transportation came to the Assembly and was admitted after voting.12 Law
number 5651 on Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes
Committed by Means o f Such Publications, approved by Parliament on 4 May 2007, was
published in the Official Gazette number 26030 on 23 May 2007 and came into force on
23 May 2007.13 On 30 November 2007, its ordinance was admitted and came into force.
The law number 5651 provides definitions o f Internet actors, such as Internet

Turkish Journalists A ssociation, "Yerel M edya Egitim Sem inerleri Degerlendirm e T op lan tisi,”
w w w .tgc.org.tr/ybs/28-05.htm .
9 Sansttre Sansiir, ibid.
10 "Savcilik Karari He Hangi Siteler Kapatildi?” C hip O n lin e, 17 Septem ber 2008.
11 A kdeniz et al., ibid.
12 Sansiire SansUr, ibid.
13 TelekomOnikasyon ileti§im Bajkanligi, "Ana Sayfa > T ib Hakkinda > Genel B ilg iler,”
w w w.tib.gov.tr/tr/tr-m enu- 2 -genel bilgiler.htm l.
8
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Service Provider (ISP), Internet Content Provider, Hosting Provider, and Commercial
Internet Public Use Providers in Article 2, as follows:
Access provider: Those operators and real or legal entities providing the
Internet public use providers as well their subscribers with the possibility of
accessing to the Internet, Content provider: Real or legal entities producing,
modifying and providing all kinds o f information or data provided to the users
on the Internet, Hosting provider: Real or legal entities providing and
operating the systems hosting the services and contents on the Internet,
Commercial Internet public use providers: Real or legal entities who provide
the service as an Internet public use in a certain place for a certain time.
Under the obligation of Information, Article 3, the commercial or economic
purpose content providers, hosting providers, and access providers are liable to maintain
and update their identity information accurately and make them completely accessible on
their own Internet services. Responsibilities and obligations of the content providers,
hosting providers, and access providers are further explained in the following articles (4,
5, and 6). Article 4 is called, “Obligations of the content provider.” Clause 1 states, “The
content provider shall be responsible for all and any content it provides for use on the
Internet.” Clause 2 states, “The content provider shall not be responsible for the contents
o f another person for whom it provides a link. However, the content provider shall be
responsible as per the general provisions if it is explicitly understood from the way o f
presentation that it adopts the content for which it provides a link and aim that the users
access such content.”
Article 5 is called “ Obligations o f the hosting provider. Clause 1 states, “The
hosting provider shall not be obliged to control the content for which it hosts or to
investigate whether an unlawful action is realized there or not.” Clause 2 states, “The
hosting provider shall be obliged to remove the unlawful content from publication when
it is notified based on Article 8 and 9 o f this law and to the extent it has the technical
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possibility o f blocking the access, without prejudice to the provisions related to penal
liability for the content it is hosting.”
Article 6 is titled “Obligations o f the access provider.” Clause 1 states, “The
access provider shall be obliged to a) block the access to the unlawful content published
by any o f its users provided that it is notified based on provisions in this law and to the
extent it has the technical possibility o f blocking the access, b) save the traffic
information of the provided service described in the ordinance, maintain the accuracy,
integrity and privacy o f these information for a period in the ordinance, not less than 6
months, not more than two years, c) notify the case to the Authority, content providers
and their customers at least three months before the date when it will stop its operation
and submit to the Authority the records regarding the traffic information based on
provisions and procedures described in the ordinance.” Clause 2 states, “The access
provider shall not be obliged to control whether the content o f the information accessed
through it is unlawful or requires responsibility or not.” Clause 3 states, “Any access
provider which violates any obligations in (b) and (c) o f this paragraph shall be fined
between ten thousand Turkish Liras up to five thousand Turkish Liras.”
Law number 5651, article 8 specifies that “There shall be a decision on blocking
the access regarding the publication on the Internet the content of which poses substantial
cause for suspicion that they constitute the following crimes:” 1) inducement to suicide,
2) sexual abuse o f children, 3) access to narcotics and stimulants, 4) supplying substances
dangerous to health, 5) obscenity, 6) prostitution, 7) supplying place and opportunity for
gambling, and 8) crimes against Ataturk, the founder o f the Republic o f Turkiye. The
crimes specified in this law are called as catalog crimes by the Turkish administrative
organization, the TIB, and blocking measures can be taken against any website content
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that is criminal according to the law.14
According to the law number 5651, blocking decisions during the investigation
stage, can be handed down by judges. During the inquiry stage they can be handed down
by the court. In immediate cases with potential undesired results, public prosecutor can
also adjudicate a blocking decision. In this situation, the prosecutor should present the
decision for the judge’s approval within twenty-four hours. The judges must reach a
verdict twenty-four hours after submission. If it is not approved by the judge, blocking
removal needs to be requested immediately by the prosecutor. Being a measure, the
appeal procedure against the blocking decision is open based on Turkish Penal Code
number 5271 dated 4 December 2004.15
According to a lawyer, Atamer, access blocking is a measure against a site, not a
penalty.16 Access blocking decisions taken based on this law can be taken by judicial
institutions like the Prosecutor’s Office or Criminal Courts but at the same time by an
administrative institution, the TIB. However, the TIB can directly decide blocking
measures only when the alleged crime on the website is one of the crimes specified in the
law, and when the website’s hosting servers or content provider are outside the country.
When they are inside the country, the TIB can directly decide blocking only for crimes of
sexual abuse o f children and obscenity. The TIB later asks a judge for approval o f the
decision. Blocking decisions given based on this law by courts are implemented by the
TIB. 17
The blocking procedure is also open to public denunciation. People can report
Ibid.
Serhat K 0 9 and S elva Kaynak, "Bili§im Sin^lari Baglam inda Yeni M edya Olarak internet V e K ijise!
Glivenlik," In Akadem ik Bili^im K onferansi 2 0 1 0 . (M ugla, 2 0 1 0 ).
16 Ilker Atamer, "5651 Sayili Y asa V e Eri§im E ngellem e Kararlari," In 2 0 0 8 Bilifim K o n fera n si. (Ankara,
2008).
17 Telekom iinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi, ibid.
14
15

Ill

suspicious websites or contents to the TIB. These reports are evaluated based on criteria
specified in law number 5651 and other legal frameworks, technical dimensions, the
degree o f traffic to the website from the country, and ease o f access by children.
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After

evaluation, the TIB decide to block the content directly or refer it to the judicial
authorities.
The appeal procedure is open against the blocking measure. Completing the
judicial and/or administrative procedure, the blocked websites can be reopened for
access. Article 8, paragraph 9, of law number 5652 explains the appeal procedure against
blocking decisions. Once an appeal is admitted by judicial authorities, the decision for
removal o f blocking measures is sent to the TIB. Accordingly the TIB conveys the appeal
decision to all Internet Service Providers in the country. The appeal application against
blocking decisions directly handed down by the TIB can be made to the TIB or to the
judicial authorities.19
According to Akdeniz and Altinparmak, the essential problem with Internet
blockings is not those blocked based on law number 5651 but rather other blocking
examples carried out based on other laws.20 They note that especially these kinds of
blocking occur based on Civic Law (individuals’ rights, insulting etc.) and based on laws
regarding copyrights. The TIB also provides statistics for blocked websites as seven
catalog crimes specified in law number 5651 but not for those blocked based on other
laws, which are more controversial.
The number o f blocked websites in the country has reached about 31,000,
according to independent website engelliweb.com, which monitors blocking measures in
18 Ibid.
J9 Ibid.
20 A kdeniz et al., ibid.
21 Telekom ilnikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi, ibid.
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TQrkiye.22 Among them, 26,877 websites are blocked by the TIB, 1,730 websites are
blocked by the courts and the Prosecutor’s Offices, and 1,274 websites display no
information.23 Further, 158 IP addresses, 69 Wordpress Blogs and 165 Blogger and
Blogspot pages are reported as blocked. For 115 websites, blockings are known that were
later cancelled. The same source, engelliweb.com was reporting 9,115 blocked websites
on 15 March 2011, 39 o f which were Blogger or BlogSpot pages, 20 o f which were
Wordpress pages, and 47 of which were IP addresses.24 In almost two years, between
March 2011 and June 2013, the numbers o f blocked websites increased more than three
times to some 31,000.
Internet access blocking in the country is generally performed through Turk
Telecom which is the biggest ISP in Turkiye, with the method of IP address blocking.25
Included among these blocked websites, there are globally well known websites like
youtube.com, dailymotion.com, ustream.com, blogger.com, blogspot.com, myspace.com,
tagged.com, google.groups.com, myspace.com, wordpress.com, blogger.com that host
thousands o f separate pages, and millions of images, data, and records.26
The symbolic figure o f the blocking policies in the country is the case against
YouTube. The YouTube case contains many empirical parameters to explain the question
o f the state vs. the Internet. Because o f a few specific video records uploaded to the
website, YouTube was blocked different times based on different court decisions.
Blockings were seen between March 2007 and October 2010, and the longest blocking

"Engelli Web," E ngelliw eb.com .
W ebsites that display no information can be considered blocked by courts. Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 5651 Yasasi, "Eri$im Engellem enin Adi: intem ete Sanstlr," h ttp://5651-yasasi.gyazilim .com /htm ldocs
/icerik_goster/240/Intem ete_sansur/251.html.
26 T hese w ebsites have been reported in different resources as being subjects o f b lock in g on different dates
for different periods.
22

23
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was between May 2008 and October 2010. The last YouTube blocking was because of
hate speech and insults against Ataturk, the founder o f the Turkish Republic.
The two parties, representatives from YouTube and from the Ministry tried to
resolve the issue. It is against YouTube policy to remove undesired video records. The
Turkish side claimed that the issue is a judicial matter, and YouTube itself should appeal
the blocking decisions of independent local courts. For some time, both sides maintained
their positions, and YouTube was kept blocked during this period.
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If there is any winner

in the YouTube case is further explained in the coming section as a case study.
In fact, the law no 5651 also confesses this situation in its texture by excluding the
situation o f incapability. While specifying one o f the three responsibilities of Internet
Service Providers in Article 6, the law stipulates: “Shall block access to the contents that
is published in any unlawful way by its users, when it is notified in accordance with the
provisions o f this Act and to the extent that is technically able to block." The Article 5 of
the same law indicates that Hosting Providers are responsible to remove unlawful
contents as technically as possible when it is notified.
Likewise the Article 10/4.g. regulate the duties o f the administrative body, the
TIB, and says:
“The Presidency shall provide all kinds o f assistance and coordination required
within the framework o f its technical possibilities to the competent and assigned
law enforcement officers and investigation authorities in order to prevent the
promotion, entering into the country, maintaining, letting for rent or sale o f all and
any representative images, texts or sounds with the subject o f the crimes provided
for in the first paragraph of article 8 o f the Law.”
These articles are the essential parts o f the Law no. 5651 which regulates access
blocking and investigation aspects which are also the subjects of this study. What is

27

|_jy ,<ye Youtube Sorunu ifin Harekete G e?ildi," A k lif H a b er, 13 A ugust 2010.
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technically possible and what is not is a constantly changing matter. Depending on
human resources, devices, software or hardware, technical capacity o f an access provider
or a hosting provider may be different from the others. This exclusion included in the law
better makes it change its name as: “Law on the Internet to the extent o f technically
possible.”
Increasing numbers o f blockings on the Internet receive many criticisms both at
home and abroad. Analyzing implementation o f blocking policies, Akdeniz and
Altinparmak believe that because the unique nature o f the Internet could not be well
perceived by authorities, a number o f legal anomalies and dilemmas are being
experienced because of blockings.28 Labeling the situation censorship, Tevetoglu
emphasizes that blocking does not remove undesired content from the Internet, and thus
“it looks like an ostrich hiding its head in sand.”29 The following chapter discusses this
essential question in detail.

EFFECTIVENESS AND BLOCKING ON THE INTERNET IN TURKIYE

Analysis o f over-blocking and under-blocking
The Internet is a global borderless network, and it is unrealistic to consider that all
the Internet content is equally acceptable in different parts o f the world. That is why
Internet access or its content can be subject to restrictions for legal, ethical, cultural,
religious, and ideological reasons. These restrictions on the Internet are widely
implemented with filtering technology in the world. However, the size, scope, and nature

28
29

A kdeniz et al., ibid.
Kog et al., ibid.
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o f the Internet create significant challenges for these kinds o f preventive restrictions.
These challenges are especially problematic for countries where liberal and
democratic values are widely accepted and institutionalized. It is almost inevitable to
experience mistakes when this technology is an option for restriction and prevention on
the Internet. As Callanan et al. explain, all blocking systems may be either “negative
errors” (not all undesired Internet content can be blocked, some undesired Internet
content may be outside blocking capabilities), or “positive errors” (some innocuous
Internet content may be unintentionally blocked).30
Callanan et al. tested different blocking techniques for a number o f Internet
applications including websites, email, search engines, UseNet, and p2p.31 They found
that the degree may vary, but these techniques are not free from errors.
Among the seven web blocking techniques, DNS, Domain, URL, IP, Dynamic,
Signature, and Hybrid (IP, Signatures/URL), they found four very likely blocking
complications for DNS, Domain, IP, and Dynamic blocking techniques. It is less likely
that the remaining three blocking techniques overreach.32
There are no results considered “less likely” that cause under-blocking for any
website blocking techniques that Callanan et al. evaluated.33 Thus, the under-blocking
complication is almost inevitable (very likely and likely) when the web blocking
techniques here are implemented. Over-blocking complications, on the other hand, can be
minimized to the degree o f less likely only when URL, Signature, and Hybrid (IP,
Signatures/URL) Web blocking techniques are implemented. As for circumvention, all
Web blocking techniques present medium-level difficulties except one. DNS blocking is
j0
31
32
33

Callanan et al., ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid, 20.
Ibid.

116

considered as easy to circumvent.
Akdeniz, a professor at the University o f Leeds, Faculty of Law, stated in a TV
program that Internet blocking implementation methods cause disproportional results, as
seen in the case o f YouTube and Geocities. These disproportional results are
unacceptable in a democratic country.34 He stresses that blocking in the country is
implemented either at the level o f ISPs or at the Internet gateway o f the country. The TIB
reports that access blocking is implemented on domain name servers (DNS) through
domain names or IP addresses (based on submitted “access list’' to the routers). Stressing
the implementation of IP blocking can be problematic since this blocks all other, possibly
innocent domain names using the same IP address. The Director of the TIB stated that the
department pays attention to these kinds o f risks in their direct blocking decisions,
especially when some other domain names are known using the same IP, or when the
situation is unknown.35
It is very unfortunate that a measure that can cause such serious complications is
used at the discretion o f an administrative agency, even though conditions are limited.36
According to Atamer, in their blocking decisions courts should also need to specify how
blocking is implemented.37 Akdeniz and Altiparmak believe that “technical infrastructure
for Internet access in the country is not appropriate for blocking or censorship.”38 They
further stress that no other system is perfect. Even expensive methods currently in use for
blocking are not free from risks and complications.
Over-blocking has side effects beyond making innocent websites are inaccessible.
"Herkes Kendi G iivenligini Kendi Saglam ah!" NTVM SNBC, 24 June 2 008.
Telekom unikasyon iletijim Ba§kanligi, ibid.
’6 The TIB can directly block w eb sites when w eb sites’ servers are outside o f the country and w hen their
content is pornographic.
37 Atamer, ibid.
38 A kdeniz et al., ibid, 62.
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It also blocks innocent web content and pages hosted within the undesired and blocked
website. Many critics in the country emphasize this situation in blocking cases on the
Internet. Akdeniz and Altiparmak note that, among the many cases checked, they found
blockings are enforced based on only a single file, a single website, a single blog posting,
or a 30-second video record, like in the cases o f YouTube, Geocities, WordPress,
Blogger, and Blogspot.39 The YouTube case is a wonderful example to explain these
kinds o f anomalies in practice. Because of a few undesired and/or illegal video records,
the entire website hosting millions of records is vulnerable to blocking.

An over-blocking issue: case study o f YouTube blocking
YouTube is one o f the most popular video sharing websites on the Internet. It
hosts millions o f videos recorded and uploaded by millions o f Internet users. Although
the website and video records were initially used for entertainment purposes, today it can
be utilized for a variety o f reasons ranging from education to health and business to
advertisement.
YouTube is also very popular in Tiirkiye. As o f March 2012, it was the third most
popular website in the country according to Alexa.com.40 According to a statistical
analysis on 12 March 2007, Tiirkiye ranks fourth for video uploading at 3.4 %, after the
United States at 34.5%, the UK at 6.9%, and the Philippines at 3.9%.41 Looking at the
size, capacity, and spread o f use, blocking the entire website for one or a few video
records was very controversial in the country in that it contradicts the basic principles of
universal law and the subjectivity o f crime.
A kdeniz et at., ibid, 62.
"Alexa A ctionable A nalytics for the Web," A lexa Internet, Inc., A lexa.com .
41 "YouTube Statistics," D igital Ethnography @ K SU , http://ksudigg.w etpaint.com /page/Y ouT ube
+Statistics.
39

40
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The YouTube ban became the symbol o f blocking policies. Many public
arguments centered on this subject. It also has symbolic importance for foreign media and
NGOs. For instance, although the Annual Report o f RSF for 200742 does not mention any
Internet issues for Tiirkiye, the 2009 Report mentions the YouTube blocking issue.43 This
is evidence that the YouTube case attracts foreign attention to the country, and blocking
practices in the country has become more internationalized with this policy.
Turan Mentes, chair o f the NGO Informatics Association o f Tiirkiye, thinks that
blocking YouTube is like banning the entire library because of a few books 44 This
anomaly also shows how a state is incapable of implementing a law precisely when
authorities find a specific crime agent on the Internet. Such is a video record among the
many in YouTube case.
Since state authorities cannot punish the person(s) who uploaded such criminal
record(s), or take the criminal record(s) out of the website’s servers, authorities prefer to
block access to the entire website within the borders of the country, for Turkish Internet
users, even though it is globally accessible beyond Turkish borders.
These kinds o f challenges and anomalies remind us o f the famous comments o f
Nicholas Negroponte in his discussion about the law and the Internet: “the Internet
cannot be regulated. It’s not that laws aren’t relevant, it’s that the nation-state is not
relevant.”45 The YouTube case in the country shows this dilemma in an apparent way.
Tevetoglu states that “it is not the perpetrators, who uploaded the criminal video records
to the website, [who] are punished; the Turkish Internet users are punished in this case
Reporters Without Borders, "2007 Annual Report," 2 0 0 8 .
Reporters Without Borders, "Wars and Disputed Elections: The M ost Dangerous Stories for Journalists,"
2009.
44 K. 0 9 et al., ibid.
45 D. W. Drezner, "The Global G overnance o f the Internet: Bringing the State Back In," P o litic a l S cien ce
Q u arterly 1 19, no. 3 (2004): 477-98 .
42
43
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through blocking access to the website.”46
The first blocking decision against YouTube was because o f a video consisting of
hate speech against the founder of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk, in March 2007. When
the video was reported in Turkish media and newspapers, the public prosecutor’s office
in Istanbul requested legal action from the court to prevent access to this particular video,
which is claimed to violate law number 5816 (Law on Crimes Against Ataturk, the
founder o f Turkish Republic), and law number 5237, article 300 (Turkish Penal Code/
Crimes against Turkish Flag).47 Based on this application, the First Peace Criminal Court
in Istanbul decided to block access to this video record and sent the decision to the TIB.
Since the TIB could not remove the video record or block access to this particular record,
it had to block the entire website by blocking domain address of the website.49 YouTube
made a press release that such videos are also a violation of their policy, and they
removed the video. YouTube expected that Turkish authorities would lift their decision to
block all o f YouTube.^0 In March 2007 access to YouTube was restored by the TIB after
they received a new judicial decision.
This first YouTube blocking was not conducted based on law number 5651
“Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed by Means
o f Such Publications” since this law did not exist at the time. In the second instance,
YouTube was blocked based on law number 5651 by the Twelfth Peace Criminal Court
in Ankara, decision number 2008/55 dated 17 January 2008, again for hate speech against

46
47
48
49
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Ko? et al., ibid.
Akdeniz, ibid.
"Hakaret V ideosu Kalkarsa, Yasak Biter," CAW, 7 March 2 007.
Akdeniz, ibid.
"Youtube'a Eri$im Y asagi Getirildi," CAW, 7 March 2 0 0 7 .
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Ataturk and the Turkish Flag.51 Just after this blocking decision was revoked, another
blocking decision was enforced against YouTube by the Second Peace Criminal Court in
Sivas, decision number 2008/11 dated 16 January 2008.52
In January 2008, the Second Criminal Court in Erzurum decided to block the
website forever for propagandizing terrorist organization PKK based on decision number
2008/192.:’3 In March 2008, it was reported to be blocked by the First Peace Criminal
Court in Ankara. Both IP and DNS blocking methods are implemented to prevent access
to the website by the TIB.54 Between March 2007 to June 2008, Akdeniz and
Altinparmak note 17 different blocking decisions against YouTube by different courts in
Tiirkiye.55 The longest period in which the website was inaccessible started 5 May 2008
based on a decision by the First Peace Court in Ankara for about two and a half years.
In June 2010, the YouTube blocking case had gained a new alarming dimension.
Critics about the effectiveness o f blocking o f YouTube, as presented in this study, urged
authorities to revise blocking measures against YouTube and realized that the website
uses other IP numbers. They decided to block 44 new IP addresses to cover up critics o f
the media about the effectiveness of YouTube blocking. However, the result reached to a
point o f blocking the world's most popular search engine Google. Because some o f
Google services were using the same IP addresses as YouTube, Internet users in Tiirkiye
started having problems accessing Google websites, including Google Analytics, Google
Maps, Google Docs, Google Translate, and Google Earth. Users also had problems with
speed o f access to Google services such as using Google tool bar and the Google search
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"Youtube'a Eri$im Engellendi," H urriyet, 19 January 2 0 0 8 .
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engine.56
These over-blocking problems further disturbed Internet users and online activists
in the country. Both Akdeniz and Altinparmak applied to the BTK with a petition that the
process o f the TIB, which negatively affected some of Google websites and services, was
unlawful and violated freedom o f speech, freedom of access to knowledge, and freedom
o f communication protected by the constitution and international law.57 Gulin
Yildmmkaya, editor o f Internet news website haberturk.com, believes that it is shame
that while initially the issue was limited to the problem o f YouTube blocking, is created
another problem o f Google.58 Aylin Duruoglu, director o f Vatan Internet News Website,
stated that the TIB act as if it is an institution which is in an open a war against the
Internet.59
The Institution o f Information and Communication Technology (Bilgi
Teknolojileri ve ileti§im Kurumu, BTK), which is the governing institution o f the TIB,
defended itself by claiming that the process was just updating IP addresses o f the blocked
website, YouTube, and that the situation was not their fault but rather the preference and
responsibility o f the company (YouTube and Google) for sharing the same IP with a
website subject to blocking measures by the judicial authorities.60
An NGO, the Association o f Internet Technology (internet Teknolojileri Demegi,
INETD) claimed that the over-blocking problem stemmed from the decision o f the TIB to
update IP numbers for YouTube without asking judicial authorities. According to the

"Bu Gidi$le Youtube Bize Haram!" B ianet B agim siz Ileti^im A gi, 5 June 2008. and "M ahkem e Youtube'u
SansQrlemekte Israrli," B ianet B agim siz l/eti$im A g i, 4 July 2 010. and "Youtube Y asagm in U cu G oogle'a
Dokundu," Ak$am, 5 June 2010.
57 "G oogle SansflrUne Itiraz," K an a l D H a b er, 8 June 2 010.
58 "Youtube Yasaginm U cu G oogle'a Dokundu.", ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
56
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INETD. the TIB did not have authority to interpret the two-year-old court decision. The
TIB had to get a new decision from the court if a new implementation or change on the
previous blocking decision was necessary. The TIB later said it applied for a court
decision for the additional 44 blocked IP address seems after they faced the over
blocking problem. Akdeniz believes that this situation is best be explained by a Turkish
saying: “He who steals a minaret (tower) from a mosque before knowing how to conceal
the stolen object.”61
For a long time, there were no representatives in the country to defend YouTube
in Turkish courts. During this time, authorities called on YouTube, and later its owner
Google, to open a representative office in the country. The international company was not
able to respond for a long time.62
In the end o f October 2010, the Germany-based International Licensing Service
announced that it revoked the disputed videos against Ataturk on YouTube, by
purchasing the copyrights. Following this news on Turkish media, the prosecutor’ office
asked the police to confirm if these illegal records were removed. Later, the office asked
the TIB to revoke all blocking measures against YouTube since 5 May 2008. Binali
Yildirim, Minister of Transportation, stated that this case showed how authorities were
right to call for obedience o f the law and how Tiirkiye is a country with rule o f law.
Yildirim also added that the administrators of the company finally decided to act, and
once everyone obeys the rules there is no problem at all.
However, a press release by Google stated that the last YouTube situation in
Tiirkiye was not related to them but a third company, which removed the disputed video
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N oyan Ayan, "Youtube'a Ge?it Yok!" N TV M SN B C , 17 June 2010.
"Ula§tirma Bakam'ndan Sert G oogle A ?iklam asi,” C hip O nline, 8 June 2010.
"Darisi Digerlerinin Ba§ina!" NTVM SNBC, 3 0 O ctober 2 0 1 0 .
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records based on automatic copyrights complaints, and they were examining how this
was appropriate to their policy.64
It is not clear who was the winner in this case. As cited in Akdeniz and
Altiparmak, the TIB statistics dated 26 May 2008 show that YouTube revoked 67 video
records among the disputed 111 records. This shows that to some degree, Internet
companies can cooperate with states, but under what conditions is a subject for another
study. In a workshop in Abant, Tiirkiye, Nadi Turkaslan, a press prosecutor from the
Prosecutor’s Office in Ankara, stated that in some disputed cases, YouTube may only
prevent accesses to a disputed video from the country, i.e. Tiirkiye, but it does not
completely remove it from its global servers.65
Despite blocking measures, it is difficult to claim that the popularity o f YouTube
in the country declined during the term in which access was blocked. The longest
YouTube was closed to access within the country was between May 2008 to October
2010. Interestingly, alexa.com, which ranks websites' popularity, reported YouTube as
the sixth most popular website within Tiirkiye on 21 March 2010 and as third most
popular on 22 September 2010.66

Ease o f circumvention and the availability o f alternative methods
As explained in Chapter III, three circumvention tools are included in the 2009
study by the Berkman Center: 1) Ultrareach (ultrasurf.us); 2) Ktunnel (ktunnel.com); and
3) Tor (torproject.org).671 have chosen them for this study to test whether circumvention
is possible to access blocked websites in Tiirkiye.
64
65
66
67

"Youtube’dan §a?irtan AQiklama," B ilisim L ive, 31 O ctober 2 010.
"Youtube’u Kapattiran Savci Konu§tu," H iirriyet, 18 June 2 008.
"Alexa A ctionable A nalytics for the W eb.", ibid.
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In order to see how web content matters in this test, the selection is made based
on web contents including political and hate speech, terror, sex and pornographic, game
and gambling, and other (health, copyrights, hackers).

zo

Checks were conducted in Sanhurfa, Tiirkiye in April and May 2013. The test
was conducted with a personal laptop running Intel Pentium CPU, 2.13GHz, 2GB RAM,
and Windows 7 (32-bit) Ultimate operating system. The web browser was Internet
Explorer 8 (Version 8.0.7600.16385) with 256-bit encryption. The security level o f
Internet options was set for medium-high, and the privacy settings were also set as
medium. Flash player is version 11.4.402.265. Java version is 6 Update 30, and Scripting
o f java applets is enabled, as is the default for medium-high security level.
Initially, I tried to access each blocked website without using circumvention tools.
I checked all websites and confirmed that they are blocked on the date o f testing. Each
blocked website and its contents are different, so I checked the following criteria during
the circumvention tool test to access the blocked website. Is the first page accessible
(links, images, or texts are broken or clear)? Are links on the first page are working (i.e.
opens the linked page)? Is video available and accessible? Are images on the first page
available and visible? Is audio available and accessible (voice records, radio, songs)? Is
downloading available and possible (PDF, video, zip)? Is membership required for any of
above requested access?
Possible outcomes are: the answer is positive (access is possible, links are
working, etc.); the answer is sometimes positive, sometimes negative, which means the
tool is partly working for the criteria in question; the answer is negative; encountered
some errors (including servers, computer or network connection), including the tool itself
68"Engelli Web.", ibid.
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gives error; and the criteria in question are not available or are irrelevant for accessing the
blocked website.
Overall, if most criteria during the test are positive, the outcome is considered
positive, which means access to the blocked website is possible. If some criteria are
positive but not others, access to the blocked website is partly possible. When most
criteria are negative during the test, access to the blocked website is not possible through
the used circumvention tool.
However, there needs to be exception in this measurement since being able to
playing a game in a gaming website is more important than some broken pictures or
audio file errors. Likewise, being able to shopping is important than audio or video
playing on the same website. In this situation, the measurement is made based on the
importance o f the criteria for the website itself.
It is important to note that no game is tried for testing in gambling websites. Nor,
an actual order is performed for shopping in any websites. For gambling websites, the test
is conducted up until trying to download software but noting further. For shopping
websites (tobacco, cigarettes marketing), the test is performed up until checking out, but
not confirming payment.
During testing, it has seen that some websites are just for directing visitors to
other classified websites and/or domains. Directed website can be an alternative domain
o f the same website or a totally different website. In this situation, testing criteria
becomes misleading since the domain address is changed. Furthermore, the directed
website can be found not blocked within the country when checked. Thus, these websites
are excluded from the evaluation and marked as “Excluded”.
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Testing circumvention o f block with Ultrasurf
Ultrasurf is a product of Ultrareach Internet Corporation. It claims to be one o f the
world’s most popular anti-censorship, pro-privacy software, with millions o f people using
it to bypass Internet censorship and protect their online privacy. It is for anonymous
surfing and browsing. Ultrasurf hides IP address, clears browser history, cookies, and
more. It uses industry standard, strong end-to-end encryption to protect data transfer from
being seen by third parties. It allows users to Bypass Internet censorship to browse the
Internet freely. It is portable and does not require installation. It can be run over a USB
drive or SD card for cameras in an Internet cafe, for instance.69
Ultrasurf is selected as an example o f an HTTP proxy circumvention tool. It
requires software download and install. It is compatible with Internet Explorer, and while
Internet surfing, a yellow image o f a lock is visible on the bottom right o f the page. The
version o f the software tested in this study is U13.01.
By clicking the Ultrasurf Icon on the desktop, which I created during software
installation, an Ultrasurf Key and the Ultrasurf homepage open with Internet Explorer.
For each access— or lack o f access— to the blocked websites using the circumvention
tool, the study uses screen captures taken during the test. Screen captures sometimes are
also taken for illustrating that downloading is possible, videos are playing, or p d f files are
accessible. The evaluation o f Ultrasurf during the test to access blocked websites reveals
the following results.
Among the 23 blocked websites, the two o f which are excluded here, the test with
Ultrasurf reveals that sixteen websites and their contents are almost entirely accessible.
These accesses are satisfactory to an extent that almost the entire content o f the website
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can be accessible with some missing content or services. Two of them, hizb-ut-tahrir.org
and hpg.kk5.org give audio and video errors, i.e. audio and video on these websites could
not be played during the test. However, the test results for these two sites are considered
positive, since there is not much video or audio content on the websites.
Although access and checking content from the two websites ioyun.com and
cigarexport.com are possible, playing games at ioyun.com and pre-ordering steps for
online purchasing tobacco at cigarexport.com are not possible through the use of
Ultrasurf. Since these are the essential services o f the websites, circumvention is
evaluated as negative for these two websites. Ultrasurf is seen as not supporting
pornographic websites, as seen for five websites.
The two websites, 777-online-gambling.net and cyberturk.net are excluded from the
evaluation o f this method since these domains directs to other websites which are
different from the tested one.
Categorically, more than at least one website from all four categories, including
hate speech and politics, terror, games and gambling, and the others like hacking,
copyrights, etc. are accessible. No site from the category o f sexual and pornographic is
accessible through Ultrasurf since it does not support such websites.

Testing circumvention of block with Ktunnel
The second tool Ktunnel is selected as an example o f a CGI Proxy. The website
explains itself thus: “I run a website-based proxy on my server, and you connect to it to
retrieve websites, generally blocked by schools, corporations, or governments.” This
website, ktunnel.com, is a mediator between the visitor’s computer and the target web
server. The website also claims to protect anonymity and privacy o f users. Downloads are
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possible, the site claims, unless abuse is a problem. Its owner is reported to be running a
computer repair shop in Fairbanks, Alaska in the United States.70
Ktunnel requires no software, installation or special browser configurations. It
runs on Internet Explorer. The website provides an address bar embedded on its home
page. The target website, which may be blocked, is accessed by typing the website’s
domain name on this embedded address bar within ktunnel.com. For each access to the
blocked websites through ktunnel.com, this study produces screen captures. The
evaluation ofktunnel.com during the test to access blocked websites reveals the
following results.
Among the 22 blocked websites, the three o f which are excluded here, the test with
ktunnel.com reveals that nine websites and their contents can be accessed almost entirely.
While seven o f them can partly be accessed, six websites and their contents cannot
properly be accessed. Three websites are excluded from evaluation.
Among the ones for which circumvention is possible, sosyalistforum.org displays a
video error and pkkonline.com displays an audio error. In other words, on these sites
video and audio records on these websites could not be played during the test. The study
ignores these, since video or audio content for these websites is not very significant
within the entire message of the websites.
As for the seven websites evaluated as partly working, they sometimes give video
and audio errors, some hyperlinks may not work, or some images are missing. The
remaining six o f the websites and their contents could not properly be accessed and
evaluated as negative for circumvention through ktunnel.
Categorically, at least one website from all five categories including hate and
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political, terror, game and gambling, sexual and pornographic, and the others like hacking
and copyrights can be accessed through ktunnel.com.

Testing circumvention o f block with Tor
The third tool Tor is selected as a re-routing proxy. It is a network o f virtual
tunnels that allows people and groups to improve their privacy and security on the
Internet. It hides browsing habits as well as the location o f the clients through random
communication paths in its anonymous network. In order to use Tor, it is necessary for
clients to download Tor software and install it on their computers. Tor has its own
browser, which comes with software installation. This study worked with Tor browser
2.3.25-5_en-US_2.71
The evaluation o f Tor during the test to access blocked websites reveals the
following results. Among the 22 blocked websites, the three o f which are excluded here,
the test with the Tor test reveals that fifteen websites and their contents can be accessed
almost entirely through the use o f Tor. Three websites and their contents cannot properly
be accessed and they are evaluated as being partly accessible. Access test for one website
gives the error message: “unable to connect.” Three websites are excluded from the
evaluation here: www.red-movies.com (redirects to other websites); www.777-onlinegambling.net (redirects to other gambling website); and http://cyberturk.net (redirects to
another domain: www.masterhack.org which is not blocked yet in the country on testing
date).
Among the ones for which circumvention is evaluated as possible through the use

71 For a detailed description o f how Tor works, see "Tor: O verview ," https://ww w .torproject.org
/about/overview .htm l.en.
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of Tor, hizb-ut-tahrir.org displays an audio error and hpg.kk5.org displays a video error.
The study ignores these errors because o f the insignificance o f audio and video for the
website itself.
The same video error is considered as significant for three pornographic websites,
and the three websites in which videos are not working are evaluated as partly working
through the use of Tor.
Since audio is important for music website stereomood.com, audio error is
evaluated as circumvention not being possible, although the first page is accessible,
photographs are visible, and links function. The other two websites which are evaluated
as “access not possible” are the two game websites ioyun.com and cigarexport.com.
At least one website from all five categories, including hate and political, terror,
game and gambling, sexual and pornographic, and the others like hacking and copyrights
can be accessed through Tor. Although one shopping website cigarexport.com does not
work through the use o f Tor, gerard-pere-et-fils.com works for ordering tobacco.

Overall analysis o f three circumvention tools
As indicated in the above evaluations, blocking measures against undesired
websites are not effective to an extent that most o f the blocked websites can be accessed
through circumvention methods. Access tests to the undesired blocked websites can reach
up to 71 % through the circumvention tool Tor (15 websites could be accessed among the
21 blocked websites excluding the one with technical error and the three specified as
“Excluded”). If the ones which are evaluated as “partly possible” are also considered
satisfactory, this percentage reaches 85%. In other words, among the 21 blocked
websites, 18 of them can be accessed by Internet users with the use o f Tor.
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Access tests through the circumvention tool Ultrasurf gives similar performance.
The percentage o f access through the use o f this tool is about 69%. (16 websites could be
accessed among the 23 blocked websites, excluding the two ones). In fact, if the five
websites for which the tool does not support are also excluded from the sample size, the
percentage of access for this tool reaches 88%. In other words, among the 18 blocked
websites, 16 o f them can be accessed with the use of Ultrasurf.
Access tests with the use of Ktunnel reveals the lowest possible access to 9
blocked websites which constitute about 40% of all the tested sites excluding the three
excluded. The test with Ktunnel also reveals the highest score of partly accessed websites
which is seven. If the ones which are evaluated as “access partly possible” are also
considered satisfactory, this percentage reaches 72%.
While there is no website which is evaluated as partly accessible with the use o f
Ultrasurf, the result with the use of Tor is seven. As for the results for inaccessibility with
the tested tools, Ktunnel has the highest 6 websites which cannot be accessible, it is three
for Tor and two for Ultrasurf.
This test also showed that circumvention tools are especially unsuccessful in
playing multimedia content. Although circumvention tools can make it possible to access
a website, to surf with hyperlinks, and to download, they can very often give multimedia
failures and/or errors. Blocking is especially ineffective in terms of circumvention for
text and document-intense websites, such as ideological, hate speech, pro-terrorism, and
pro-racist websites.
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FURTHER ISSUES REGARDING THE SIDE EFFECTS OF INTERNET BLOCKING

A specific issue area: terror websites and wide-effects o f Internet blocking
This section explores how blocking policies in Tiirkiye affect the websites o f the
pro-terrorist organization PKK and/or its sympathizers.

77

How effective are blocking

policies in preventing access to these websites from the country? How have these
websites, their popularity, and audience have been affected after blocking measures?
What does the current picture o f the interaction between a state and the Internet look like
in terms o f blocking terrorist websites?
This section utilizes data and information from open sources, well known global
websites like alexa.com, websitetrafficspy.com (which provides traffic rates o f websites
from different sources like alexa.com, compete.com, and Google Trends,), and
ipaddress.com (which gives available information about hosting, ownership, and
addresses as well as other hostnames for the same IP number that a website is using).
For blocked pages in Tiirkiye, the study uses a Turkish website, engelliweb.com,
which monitors blocked websites in the country. This analysis was conducted both in
Tiirkiye and in the United States. The blocked websites, their blocking details as well as
some methods to circumvent blocking, were checked and tested in Ankara, Tiirkiye.
Other analysis about these websites was checked and concluded in the United States.
Testing dates for each check are mentioned in the foot notes.
Sample size and selecting a representative sample are vitally important for any
academic study, which is also the case for this section. In order to establish which

72 N ot all the w ebsites here have direct and organic links with the organization. S o m e w eb sites here are
even registered and giv in g service w ithin TUrkiye and m ay be blocked because o f a few sp ecific illegal
contents.
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websites support, encourage, or sympathize with the Marxist-Leninist separatist terrorist
organization PKK, this part o f the study utilizes Alexa records. A search for the name of
terrorist organizations within Alexa found the website pkk-online.net, which was ranked
by Alexa. Using the features of alexa.com (related links, click stream, and sites link in)
reveals a network o f websites, shown below. Since Alexa ranks websites from most
popular (a combination o f average daily visitors and page views on a particular website)
to least popular, this network o f websites does/should significantly represent all active
and popular websites within the context explored here.
Later, the study checked if access to each o f these websites was being blocked in
Tiirkiye, and if so, when and by whom they were being blocked. All o f the websites
specified above were found blocked by different courts in Tiirkiye at different times.
Blocking details below are noted from the first page of these websites when access
-j-s

attempts were made in Tiirkiye.

The rankings o f the each website within Tiirkiye and

the percentage o f visitors for each page from within Tiirkiye have been taken from
alexa.com.
In order to see how blocking affects these websites over time, the study conducts
a longitudinal analysis. Ranking of the specified websites, particularly for Tiirkiye, have
been taken on three different dates: February 2010, September 2010, and March 2011.
This approximate one-year time frame is assumed to minimize possible data fluctuations
in alexa.com and can give more reliable results. During this time, it was also possible to
observe and analyze which websites were closed, which domain names have changed,
7j Although there are som e exceptions, the blocked authority, date, and reference num ber appear on the
page at the tim e o f access to the blocked site in Tiirkiye. This information appears on the screen also g iv e s
tw o references: Telekom iinikasyon lleti§im Ba§kanligi, w w w .tib .gov.tr/. and Turkish Information and
Comm unication T echnologies Authority, T elecom m unications Presidency, Internet R egulations
Department, "ihbar Web: Telecom m unications Presidency Internet Hotline," T elekom iinikasyon ileti§im
Ba$kanligi, ww w.ihbarweb.org.tr.
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and how blocking measures by Turkish authorities have shaped these kinds o f websites.
In this way, the following 11 popular but blocked websites in Tiirkiye have been
specified. They are: gerila.tv, rojaciwan.com, roj.tv, ygk-info.com,
yeniozgurpolitika.com, pkk-online.net, hpg-online.net, atilim.org, firatnews.com,
gunlukgazetesi.com, and pdk-xoybun.com.

Gerila.tv
The decision number 2008/5517 dated 07 October 2008, handed down for
gerila.tv within the context of protection measure o f Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi
was implemented by Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanhgi.
At the time o f the first check on 28 February 2010, Gerila.tv was ranked 18,734 in
Tiirkiye.74 62.4% o f users visiting Gerila.tv came from Tiirkiye.
No rank data or visitors profile is available on alexa.com for the Gerila.tv check
on 01 September 2010. However, the study found that with its original address name, an
error message appears in Tiirkiye (Domain name is not active anymore).
The Gerila.tv check on 01 September 2010 revealed that no rank data or visitors
profile was available on Alexa.com. The domain name was not active anymore.
Rojaciwan.com
Testing for Rojaciwan.com showed that the blocking date and authority were
unknown.75 The following message appears: “Access to this website is restricted based

74 Ranking o f a w ebsite in a country is a com bination o f average daily visitors and page v iew s on a
particular w ebsite for the past three months. "Alexa A ctionable A nalytics for the W eb.", ibid.
5 Percentage o f visitors from Tiirkiye to the w ebsite decreased to som e degree from 34.8% to 31.1% . This
may suggest that regular Internet users from the country co u ld not a ccess the w eb site and percentage o f
visitors from Tiirkiye gradually declined. H ow ever popularity ranking (com bination o f average daily
visitors and page view s) in Tiirkiye increased som e from 13,642 to 13,208 (lower is better popularity than
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on a court decision.”
At the check on 28 February 2010, Rojaciwan.com was ranked 8,074
in Switzerland, 13,642 in Tiirkiye, 54,692 in Germany, 114,977 in France, and 247,926
in United Kingdom. Rojaciwan.com users came from these countries: 34.8% from
Tiirkiye, 25.4% from Germany, 25.1% from Switzerland, 3.9% from France, 3.3% from
the United Kingdom, and 7.5% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010, Rojaciwan.com was ranked 5,422 in
Switzerland, 9,767 in Tiirkiye, 11,201 in Finland, 14,780 in Denmark, 28,953 in
Germany, 108,806 in the United Kingdom. Rojaciwan.com users come from these
countries: 26.3% from Germany, 25.3% from Tiirkiye, 21.7% from Switzerland, 7.5%
from Finland, 5.6% from Denmark, 5.1% from the United Kingdom, and 8.5% from
other countries.
At the test on 25 March 2011, popularity ofRojaciwan.com was tabulated as
6,303 in Finland, 12,601 in Belgium, 13,208 in Tiirkiye, and 150,829 in Germany.
Visitors by country for Rojaciwan.com as a percent of site traffic included Tiirkiye
(31.1%), Finland (25.7%), Belgium (16.1%), Germany (13.3%), and other countries
(13.8%).

Roj.tv
Access to this website was blocked based on the decision number 2008/4687
dated 21 August 2008, which was handed down for roj.tv within the context o f the
protection measure o f Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by

higher). This may su ggest that persons able to a ccess to the blocked w eb site increased their visits to the
w ebsite and visited more w ebpages w ithin the w ebsite.
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“Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanhgt.”76
At the test on 28 February 2010, Roj.tv’s popularity rankings were 22,414
in Tiirkiye, 27,412 in Switzerland, 31,525 in the United Kingdom, 38,389 in Germany,
65,164 in France, 89,466 in China, and 89,842 in the Netherlands. Roj.tv users come
from these countries: 31% from Germany, 22.8% from the United Kingdom, 16.1% from
China, 22.4% from Tiirkiye, 3.8% from France, 3.6% from Switzerland, 2.4% from the
Netherlands, and 7.2% from other states.
At the test on 1 September 2010, Roj.tv was ranked 20,980 in Tiirkiye, 74,249 in
Germany, 117,399 in France, and 203,617 from the United Kingdom. Roj.tv users come
from these countries: Germany (40.2%), Tiirkiye (27.1%), the United Kingdom (8.7%),
France (7.2%), and other countries 16.7%
At the test on 25 March 2011 Roj.tv’s popularity ranking were given as 3,366 in
Finland, 10,686 in Belgium, 28,668 in Tiirkiye, 51,034 in Germany, and 63,980 in the
United Kingdom. The percentage of visitors by country for Roj.tv include Finland at
27.5%, Germany at 19.2%, the United Kingdom at 12.7%, Belgium at 9.3%, Tiirkiye at
6.3%, and other countries at 24.8%.

Ygk-info.com
The block was based on the decision number 2008/531 dated 2 April 2008, which
was handed down for ygk-info.com within the context o f protection measure o f Eskisehir
3. Sulh Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi.”
At the test on 28 February 2010, Ygk-info.com ranked 104,124 in Tiirkiye, with

76 D ecline is seen in popularity ranking in Tiirkiye (from 2 2 ,4 1 4 to 2 8 ,6 6 8 ) and percentage o f visitors from
the country (13.1% to 6.3% ).
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100% o f users coming from Tiirkiye.
At the test on 1 September 2010, only a global ranking was available which was
7,327,170, but there was no regional ranking or visitors profile available.
The study accessed the website through a proxy (ktunnel.com) in Tiirkiye, on 1
September 2010. The domain name was active.
At the test on 25 March 2011 Alexa ranked Ygk-info.com globally at 17,500,453. There
was no regional rank or visitors profile available. The domain name was still active.

Yeniozgurpolitika.com
Blocked based on decision number 2008/2815 dated 9 May 2008, which was
handed down for yeniozgurpolitika.com within the context o f the protection measure of
Ankara l l . 77 Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im
Ba§kanligi.”
At the test on 28 February 2010, Yeniozgurpolitika.com ranked 31,340
in Tiirkiye, 39,517 in Switzerland, 51,107 in Sweden, 67,963 in Germany, and 74,858
in France. Yeniozgurpolitika.com users come from Germany (42.8%), Tiirkiye (29.6%),
France (10.8%), Switzerland (8.1%), Sweden (7.0%), and 1.8% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010 Yeniozgurpolitika.com ranked 3,874 in Sweden,
8,520 in Switzerland, and 111,556 in Tiirkiye. Yeniozgurpolitika.com users come from
Sweden (57.8%), Switzerland (33.2%), Tiirkiye (4.7%), and other countries (4.2%).
At the test on 25 March 2011, Yeniozgurpolitika.com’s Regional Traffic Rank
was 101,432 for Tiirkiye. 10.8% o f visitors to Yeniozgurpolitika.com were from Tiirkiye

77 D eclin e is seen in popularity ranking in Tiirkiye (from 3 1 ,3 4 0 to 111,556) and percentage o f visitors
from the country (29.6% to 10.8%).
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and 88.9% were from other countries.

Pkk-online.net
This site was blocked based on two court decisions. One decision was number
2009/6163-1 dated 19 October 2009, handed down for pkk-online.net within the context
o f the protection measure of Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by
“Telekomiinikasyon lleti§im Ba§kanligi.” The other was decision number 2009/7088
dated 04 November 2009, handed down for pkk-online.net within the context o f the
protection measure o f Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by
“Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi.”
At the test on 28 February 2010, Pkk-online.net ranked 22,536 in Tiirkiye. Pkkonline.net users come from Tiirkiye (76.3%) and 23.3% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010, only a global rank was available. The Alexa
Traffic Rank was 11,694,421. There was no regional rank or visitors profile is available.
The test on 25 March 2011 indicated that there was not enough data to display the
traffic metrics for pkk-online.net. With its original address name, the “Domain name is
not active anymore” message appears in the United States.

Hpg-online.net
The blocking date and authority are unknown. The following message appears:
Access to this website is restricted based on a court decision.
The test on 28 February 2010 showed that Hpg-online.net ranked 9,321
in Tiirkiye, 308,486 in the United Kingdom, and 337,111 in Germany. Hpg-online.net
users come from Tiirkiye (84.5%), Germany (7.5%), and the United Kingdom (4.2%).
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The test on 1 September 2010 revealed a global Alexa Traffic Rank of 1,567,794.
There was no regional rank or visitors profile available.
At the test on 25 March 2011, Hpg-online.net’s three-month global Alexa traffic
rank is 4,215,954. The site is located in Germany. With its original address name the
“Domain name is not active anymore message” appears in the United States.

Atilim.org
The blocked is based on decision number 2009/632 dated 04 April 2009, handed
down for atilim.org within the context o f the protection measure o f Istanbul 9. Agir Ceza
Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im Ba§kanligi.”78
At the test on 28 February 2010, Atilim.org ranked 3,404 in Tiirkiye, 54,895
in Belgium, and 292,212 in France. Atilim.org users came from Tiirkiye (94%), Belgium
(1.4%), France (0.8%), and 3.8% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010, the Alexa Traffic Rank was 354,930.
Atilim.org’s worldwide traffic ranked 5,151 for Tiirkiye and 350,160 for Germany.
Visitors for Atilim.org include 85.9% from Tiirkiye, 5.4% from Germany, and 8.6% from
other countries.
At the test on 25 March 2011, Atilim.org’s Regional Traffic Rank was 10,914 for
Tiirkiye. Visitors by country for Atilim.org include 81.9% for Tiirkiye and 8.1% from
other countries.

78 D ecline is seen in popularity ranking in Tiirkiye (from 3 ,4 0 4 to 10,914) and percentage o f visitors from
the country (94% to 81.9% ).
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Firatnews.com
This site was blocked based on decision number 2008/2815 dated 9 May 2008,
handed down to firatnews.com within the context of the protection measure o f Ankara
11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im
Ba§kanligi.”79
At the test on 28 February 2010, Firatnews.com was ranked 1,070 in Tiirkiye,
3,878 in Tunisia, 10,225 in Switzerland, 10,478 in Sweden, 28,785 in the United
Kingdom, 34,301 in China, 34,403 in Germany, 50,551 in Russia, 71,737 in France, and
594,465 in the United States. Firatnews.com users come from Tiirkiye (60.6%), China
(10.7%), Germany (8.7%), the United Kingdom (5.3%), Sweden (3.2%), Russia (2.6%),
Switzerland (2.1%), the United States (1.0%), France (1.0%), Tunisia (1.0%), and 3.6%
from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010, the Firatnews.com’s Worldwide Traffic Rank
was 1,048 from Azerbaijan, 1,214 from Albania, 1,254 from Tiirkiye, 2,508 from Iraq,
2,825 from Sweden, 3,687 from Switzerland, 4,256 from Austria, 13,722 from Germany,
32,136 from France, 55,065 from Canada, 174,467 from the United Kingdom,
and 483,168 from the United States. Visitors by Country for Firatnews.com as a percent
o f site traffic were Tiirkiye (41.1%), Azerbaijan (13.9%), Germany (12.8%), Sweden
(9.8%), Switzerland (5.3%), Austria (5.3%), France (2.9%), Iraq (2.7%), Albania (1.3%),
Canada (1.1%), Austria (5.3%), France (2.9%), Iraq (2.7%), Albania (1.3%), Canada
(1.1%), the United States (1.1%), the United Kingdom (0.9%), and other countries
( 1.8%).

79 D ecline is seen in popularity ranking in Tiirkiye (1 ,0 7 0 to 1,705) and percentage o f visitors form the
country (6 0 .6 % to 38.3% ).
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For the test on 25 March 2011, Firatnews.com's Regional Traffic Ranks
are Tiirkiye at 1,705, Belgium at 2,213, Sweden at 3,403, Germany at 12,982, the
Netherlands at 26,600, France at 29,466, Greece at 32,440, and the United Kingdom at
187,374. Visitors by country for Firatnews.com were 38.3% from Tiirkiye, 23.9% from
Germany, 11.4% from Sweden, 10.1% from Belgium, 5.7% from France, 2.8% from the
Netherlands, 1.1% from the United Kingdom, 0.9% from Greece, and 5.8% from other
countries.

Gunlukgazetesi.com
The block is based on decision number 2009/7088 dated 4 November 2009,
handed down to gunlukgazetesi.com within the context o f the protection measure o f
Ankara 11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomiinikasyon ileti§im
Ba§kanhgi.”
At the test on 28 February 2010, Gunlukgazetesi.com was ranked 12,318
in Tiirkiye, 67,068 in France, 85,672 in China, and 234,780 in Germany.
Gunlukgazetesi.com users came from Tiirkiye (49.1%), China (29.0%), France (8.6%),
Germany (8.3%), and 4.9% from other countries.
At the test on 1 September 2010 no regional or other data was available.
At the test on 25 March 2011 Gunlukgazetesi.corn’s three-month global Alexa
traffic rank was 18,088,952. No regional or other data was available. With its original
address name, the “Domain name is not active anymore” page appears when accessed in
the United States.
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Pdk-xoybun.com
The block was based on decision number 2008/6731 dated 28 November 2008,
handed down to pdk-xoybun.com within the context o f the protection measure o f Ankara
11. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi was implemented by “Telekomunikasyon lleti§im Ba§kanligi.”
In the test on 28 February 2010, pdk-xoybun.com ranked 74,643 in Turkiye.
42.5% o f visitors to the site came from Turkiye, and 57.5% came from other countries.
In the test on 1 September 2010, no regional or other data was available.
In the test on 25 March 2011, pdk-xoybun.com’s three-month global Alexa traffic
rank was 3,585,233. This site’s content placed it in the “Parti” category o f websites. The
site has been online for at least eight years. The domain name is active.

Overall analysis of the websites
The six websites experienced dramatic decline in their popularity rankings, which
is a combination o f average daily visitors and page views on a particular website for the
past three months (Gerila.tv; Ygk-info.com; Pkk-online.net; Hpg-online.net;
Gunlukgazetesi.com; and Pdk-xoybun.com). Five websites were suffering some kind of
decline both in their popularity ranking and percentage o f visitors from the country.
(Rojaciwan.com; Roj.tv; Yeniozgurpolitika.com; Atilim.org; and Firatnews.com;
although popularity ranking o f the second website, rojaciwan.com was seen as some
increase in the country, this website is also considered as suffering some decline since the
percentage o f visitors from the country declined slightly).
The test also checked on its final check in March 2011, whether the domain
addresses were affected from these access-blocking measures. It showed that despite
some decline in their popularity, the domain addresses o f five websites were still active
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(Rojaciwan.com; Roj.tv; Yeniozgurpolitika.com; Atilim.org; and Firatnews.com).
Among the six websites which were having dramatic declines in their popularity, four
domain addresses were seen as deactivated (Gerila.tv; Pkk-online.net; Hpg-online.net;
and Gunlukgazetesi.com). Despite dramatic declines in their popularity, the domain
addresses o f two websites were still active on the date o f final check (Ygk-info.com and
Pdk-xoybun.com).
These checks however, do not provide the entire picture about the results o f
blocking access to these websites. Further checks reveal that these websites have other
alternative domain addresses attached their IP number(s). The following part o f this
dissertation explores this issue in detail.

Blocked websites and alternative domain addresses
This section is an analysis of alternative domain names for the same websites. For
this analysis, ipaddress.com was utilized as a source that gives all technical, registration,
and administrative details. Ipaddress.com also gives other hostnames for a website by
looking at the registered IP addresses of the same website. Checks on ipaddress.com
reveal that most o f these websites analyzed above have other (alternative) sub-domain
names and addresses. During this analysis, five websites were found using only one
domain name, but the other seven websites have at least one other alternative domain
name. Rankings and percentage of visitors for each domain name are checked again three
different times on alexa.com. Gerila.tv was blocked on 7 October 2008. Gerillatv.com
was blocked on 3 April 2008.
Verification revealed that in addition to gerila.tv, the website had two other
domain addresses, gerillatv.com and gerillatv.net. Also, it was established that both
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domain names, gerila.tv and gerillatv.com, are not active anymore but the (same) site was
still online under a third domain name, gerillatv.net on the final check in March 2011.
No court decision was known against this domain name at that time, and the
website was accessible from Turkiye. The website was still online at that time although
two o f its domains were blocked and not active anymore.
Verification revealed that beside rojaciwan.com, there was another domain
address o f the same website, hezaciwanan.com (blocked on 28 January 2009). The
website rojaciwan.com is blocked in Turkiye, but this domain address was still active and
online outside Turkiye. Blocking details were unknown.
The same website also uses the domain name hezaciwanan.com, which seems to
be blocked as o f 28 January 2009 within the country. Overall, the website was still active
in March 2011.
Despite some decline in terms o f popularity and ranking within Turkiye, the
website Roj.tv was still active with this domain (blocked 21 August 2008) and had no
alternative domain addresses on the date of the final verification.
Despite dramatic decrease in terms o f popularity and ranking within Turkiye, the
website Ygk-info.com was still active with this domain and had no alternative domain
addresses at that time (blocked on 2 April 2008.
The website with yeniozgurpolitika.com had another domain extension with (.org)
in March 2011. Although both domains were blocked on 9 May 2008, the website was
still online at that time.
Pkk-online.net was blocked in Turkiye (19 October 2009 to 4 November 2009)
and this domain address was not active anymore in March 2011. Alternative domain
addresses (pkkonline.net, blocked on 18 June 2010 and pkkonline.com, details are not
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known) were also blocked within the country. The website was still online then with
these two alternative domain addresses.
In addition to Hpg-online.net (blocked but details are not known), an alternative
domain hpg-online.com (blocked but details are not known) was inactive in March 2011.
However, the same website was still online with a third domain address hpg.kk5.org at
that time (blocked 28 November 2008).
Despite some decline in its ranking within Turkiye, the website Atilim.org
(blocked 4 April 2009) was still active with this domain and had no alternative domain
addresses on the date o f verification.
It was established that besides firatnews.com (blocked 9 May 2008), the website
was using Firatnews.eu (blocked 10 January 2008) as another domain address. Access to
either domain address was blocked in Turkiye but both domains were active and the
website was online on the date o f verification.
Blocked on 4 November 2009, the domain gunlukgazetesi.com was inactive on
the date o f verification. The website has another domain name gunlukgazetesi.net. No
court decision blocking this site was known to be in effect against this domain name and
the website was accessible from Turkiye. The website was still online at that time.
Despite a dramatic decrease in terms of popularity and ranking within Turkiye,
the website Pdk-xoybun.com was still active with this domain despite being blocked on
28 November 2008 and had no alternative domain addresses at that time.

Evaluation o f data
All of the terror websites specified in this study are experiencing decrease in their
rankings and popularity according to alexa.com. Decreases for six o f them are dramatic
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enough that alexa.com does not provide regional rankings or global rankings.80 Ranking
and popularity decreases for the other five websites are not as dramatic, but there is
nonetheless some degree o f decrease in popularity and ranking between February 2010
and March 2011.
Among 11 websites, only four of them had declines in popularity enough to
deactivate their domain names. The other seven sites (among them 2 sites experiencing
severe decline, five experiencing some decline) have not yet deactivated their domain
names as of March 2011. The four which deactivated their domain names have at least
one alternative domain name, according to ipaddress.com. However, none o f the websites
checked here have shut down their servers.
Either making changes in their domain addresses, servers, or IP numbers, these
websites were able to pursue a range o f technological alternatives to remain accessible.
Access blocking measures against the websites date back to 2008 and 2009. Despite these
measures, however, the sites continued to receive some o f its audience and remained
online at least for the period between February 2010 and March 2011.

Circumvention tendency, particularly in Turkiye
As explored in already in this study, for each blocking technique, there are
bypassing methods which allow users to access blocked websites and web content. The
Internet provides access to information about these circumvention methods and
instructions for how to use them. Ordinary Internet users familiar with search engines can
find information about these methods and access these resources.
For instance, a Google search revealed 94,600 results in 0.17 seconds for how to
80 "Aiexa A ctionable A nalytics for the Web.", ibid.
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circumvent blocked websites (without quotation marks). Google Turkish (Google.tr)
revealed 16,400 results in .22 seconds for a similar search in Turkish (Intemette sansur
nasil a§ihr). Yahoo found 1,330,000 resources for the same English phrase and 53 results
for the same Turkish phrase. A Turkish search engine, Arabul, found 210 results with the
English language search string how to circumvent blocked websites and 570 results for
Q I

the Turkish search string Intemette sansur nasil a§ihr (without quotation marks).
These results provide hundreds or thousands o f different resources for Internet
users. These resources sometimes include video, photos or step-by-step instructions for
how to circumvent Internet blocking. Because of this, some countries also try to prevent
access to these kinds o f online resources, either by blocking them directly or using key
word search blocking at search engines. So far, these measures against circumvention
websites or online resources are unknown in Turkiye.
The most widespread method for circumvention seems to be using online proxy
servers, which can also be located through search engines. Google.com found 126 million
results in 0.12 seconds for the term proxy. Google.com.tr suggested ten alternative search
phrases as the user typed the word proxy (in English): proxy, proxy list, proxygizlen
(proxyhide), proxy nedir (what is proxy?), proxy server, proxy ayarlari (proxy settings),
proxy switcher, proxy site, proxy sites, and proxyhideout.com. While google.com.tr
found 124 million results in 0.05 seconds for proxy (in English), it found 361 thousand
results in 0.34 seconds for proksi (In Turkish).

O'}

As seen in Appendix-2, Turkish visitors were accustomed to using three o f the top
five proxy servers, ktunnel, vtunnel, and anonymous. The proxy server ktunnel received

81 I checked the sites in the United States on 4 April 2 0 1 1 w ithout quotation marks.
821 conducted the searches in the United States on 1 April 2011 without using quotation marks in the search
string.
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88.4 % o f its visitors from Turkiye. This is also observable in alexa.com website rankings
for each country. While ktunnel is one o f the top 100 most popular websites, vtunnel.com
ranked 294th in popularity in Turkiye.
The effects in the case of YouTube cannot be ignored when considering the
spread of proxy usage in Turkiye. The YouTube case, which became a symbol o f
blockings in Turkiye, was often a subject o f discussion and news in the media as well as
on the Internet in blogs, forums, and other Internet sites. Most of these resources
discussed the dilemmas in YouTube’s blocking as explained in this study and provided
alternative ways to access the website.

g-j

While some o f them suggest proxy servers for

circumvention, others explain methods like changing DNS settings and adjusting
computer settings. These resources are also available for pro-terrorism websites.
As explained in this chapter access blocking to undesired websites are not
effective to an extent that many o f the blocked websites can be accessible through
different tools and technics. Access blocking to undesired websites within a national
border do not necessarily lead the website to totally shut down their services and servers.
It is not effective to use access blocking as a measure since it is open to possible errors
like over-blocking or under-blocking. If it does not cause an error, access blocking can be
un-proportional and unacceptable since it seriously violates fundamental rights and
freedom as explained in the case o f YouTube blocking. Thus, the effectiveness o f
prevention aspects o f internet policing is open to significant questions and doubts.
The following chapter examines how much prosecution is effective in identifying,

8j "Youtube Yasak A m a...” A ktifhaber, 17 June 2008. In addition, there are six m ethods to a ccess blocked
YouTube, "Ankara Kaldirdi, Sivas Yasakladi!" M illiyet H a b e r, 22 January 2008. and "853 S itey e Yasakla
Ligim iz Belli: QIN, (R A N , A R A B lST A N !" Turktime, 2 2 A ugust 2 0 0 8 . and "Yasakli Y outube N asil
Girilir?" Internethaber, 7 March 2007. and Engin Ardi9 , "Y asakfiligin Sonu N ec ilik ? ” S abah , 3 N ovem ber
2010. and "internet SanstlrfinU A jm a Kilavuzu," B ianet (B agim siz Heti$im Agi), 7 March 2 011.
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tracing or detaining suspects/perpetrators of a cybercrime, particularly internet child
pornography. After giving introductive information about the crime, legal framework,
national institutions and international regimes this part o f the study explores how much
policing is successful in child pornography investigations.
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CHAPTER VI
POLICING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN TURKIYE

INTRODUCTION
Compared to most of the EU member countries, Turkiye has a young population.
O f the 75.6 million inhabitants in 2012, 18.8 million were under 14 years old, about 25%
o f the population.1
Culturally, family is very important in Turkish society, and families give much
importance to their children and their children’s health, wellbeing, and upbringing in
accordance with socio-cultural values. The Ministry o f Families and Social Policies is the
highest bureaucratic institution in the country that deals with policies regarding the
family, children, the disabled, and the aged.2
Occasionally there are news stories involving child victims. These stories rarely
involve child sexual abuse. For instance, in connection with investigations conducted by
German Interpol, a suspect downloading child pornography from the Internet was
identified based on IP numbers and found to be located in Turkiye. Police investigation
o f the address found files containing child pornography. A 65-year old man was
imprisoned after prosecution in Trabzon in 2012.3
According to news reports, a 31-year old man identified him self as a child in chat
rooms where he engaged with children and obtained recordings from them containing
images o f the children undressing. The man used MSN and Facebook to access files o f

1 "Turkiye istatistik Kurumu Web. Tem el istatistikler," w w w .tuik .gov.tr/U stM enu.do?m etod=tem elist.
2 "Aile V e Sosyal Politikalar Bakanligi," w w w .aile.gov.tr/tr.
3 Osman §i$ko, "Docente P om o C ezasi,” G a ze te Vatan, 17 February 2 0 1 2 .
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children undressing. He was transferred to judicial authorities for prosecution in Bursa.4
Recently an adult using the pseudonym “Begum 10” identified him self as a 10year old girl in a chat room and received approximately a hundred messages in half an
hour, some o f which included sexuality.5

Related departments and NGOs
Children’s rights and protection from victimization should not be solely the
responsibility o f authorities, and solutions should include society and civic actors. In
recent years, universities, civil-society organizations, and non-governmental
organizations have started to play roles in this sensitive issue.
The Bar Associations o f Istanbul and Ankara have founded the Center o f Children
Rights.6 Other groups include the Organization o f Child Abuse and Neglect;7 the
Organization o f Children and Information Security;8 and the Organization o f Protecting
Children from Abuse and Rehabilitation (0K O R E D ).
Operating since 2001 under a different name, the Research, Practice and
Protection Center for Children was officially opened in 2006 at the University o f Gazi in
Ankara.9 Likewise, the Ankara Children Protection Institution (A£OK) was founded in
2005 at the University of Ankara. It deals with children, who are subjects o f abuse in
different ways. Unveren cites that the center received 164 victims between 2005 and May

4 Budakoglu, Selahattin, and Bursa - D ogan Haber Ajansi (D ogan N ew s A gency), "Bilgi I§lem
Sorumlusundan Cocuklara Tuzak," M illiyet, 4 February 2 0 1 1 .
5 "10 Ya§indaki £ o c u g a Seks T ek lif Edenler..." h a b er3 6 5 .co m , 28 March 2011.
6 "Istanbul Barosu £ o c u k H aklan Merkezi," http://w w w .istanbulbarosu.org.tr/D ocum ent.asp?K onu=404
& Docum entlndex=m erkez!er/chm .htm .
7 "Qocuk istismarini V e ihm alini O nlem e D em egi," http://w w w .cocukistism ari.org/.
8 "Qocuk V e B ilgi GUvenligi D em egi," cbgd.org.
9 Gazi Hastanesi, "(^ocuk Koruma Arajtirma V e U ygulam a M erkezi,”
http://hastane.gazi.edu.tr/posts/view /title/cocuk-korum a-arastirm a-ve-uygulam a-m erkezi-8970.
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2009.10 Among them, 53% were male and 46% were female. Ages vary from infant to 16
years old, while the average age was seven. Among the victims, 33% o f them were
sexually abused, 33% were physically abused, 3% were mentally abused, and 30% of
cases featured other kinds o f abuse.11
The University of Erciyes founded the Prevention o f Children Neglect and Abuse,
Research and Practice Center ((^ITEM) in 2009. The center hires specialists and
experts.12

National legal framework
Turkish Criminal Code, No.5237 dated 26 September 2004, Official Gazette
No.25611 dated 12 October 2004 defines child as a person under the age o f eighteen in
Article 6 and regulates criminality specifically in terms o f child involvement in different
articles. The term child pornography is not used by the code. Instead the code uses the
term child sexual abuse as penalized in Article 103. The code also uses the term
indecency, which includes production, advertisement, selling, storing, or broadcasting o f
obscene materials of children in Article 226: Obscenity ARTICLE 226-(l) Any person
who involves in an unlawful act; a) By allowing a child to watch an indecent scene or a
product, or to or hear shameful words, b) By displaying these products in places easy to
reach by children, or reading the contents o f these products, or letting other to speak
about them, c) By selling or leasing these product in such a way open for public review,
d) By selling, offering, or leasing these products at places other than the markets
nominated for sale o f these product, e) By gratuitously supplying or distributing these
10 Unal Onveren, "Turkiye’de Cocuk P om ografisi Sorunu V e QOziim Yollari," P olis A kadem isi, 2 0 1 0 .

'! ,bid-

12 "Erciyes U niversitesi Cocuk ihmali V e Istismarini E ngellem e U ygulam a Ve Ara§tirma M erkezi
Y onetm eligi,” http://bilgiedinm e.erciyes.edu.tr/cocuk_ihm al_istism ari_engellem e m erkezi.asp.
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products along with other goods or services, f) By making advertisement o f these
products, is punished with imprisonment from six months to two years.
Section two states: The persons who publicize indecent scenes, words, or articles
through press and broadcast organs or act as intermediary in publication o f the same is
punished with imprisonment from six months to three years. Section three states: Any
person who uses children in production o f indecent scenes, words or articles is punished
with imprisonment from five years to ten years, and also imposed punitive fine up to five
thousand days. Any person who engage in import, duplication, transportation, storage,
export o f these products, or presents the same to other’s use, is punished with
imprisonment from two years to five years, and also imposed punitive fine up to five
thousand days.
Section four states: Any person who produces products containing audio-visual or
written material demonstrating abnormal sexual intercourse by using sex, or with
animals, or body o f a death person , and engages in import sale, transportation storage of
the same and presents such material to other’s use, is punished with imprisonment from
one year to four years. Section five states: Any person who publicizes the contents o f the
products mentioned in third and fourth subsections through press and broadcast organs,
or acts as intermediary in publication o f the same, or lets children to read, hear, or see this
material is punished with imprisonment from six months to ten years, and also imposed
punitive fine up to five thousand days.
Neither Turkish law no. 5651 on Regulation o f Publications on the Internet nor
the law on Combating Crimes Committed by Means o f Such Publications dated 23 May
2007 specifically define child pornography. Both laws refer to the Turkish Criminal
Code, No.5237, which penalizes child sexual abuse in Article 103 and obscenity in
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Article 226 as shown above.
Law no. 5651 regarding the Internet regulates access blocking measures on some
conditions, such as specific crimes committed or whether addresses o f content and
hosting servers are within Turkiye or located outside o f the country. Under limited
conditions, this measure can directly and immediately be implemented by the
administrative institution, the TIB, and later the issue details are submitted to the judicial
authorities for further investigation and a verdict. Tracing a record o f child pornography
on the Internet is among the conditions under which the TIB can immediately block a
website, irrespective o f whether its content provider or hosting server is within Turkiye or
abroad. TIB detections o f these types o f web contents are performed through routine
checks and on the basis o f tips submitted by individuals.

National police institutions
Judicial authorities may receive reports o f cases including child pornography from
individuals, victims, through administrative departments, or police or gendarmerie units
for prosecution. The Department o f Interpol Ankara is the gateway in Turkiye for such
judicial investigations when the alleged crime has transnational aspects, for example
when IP numbers, victims, suspects, email addresses, or servers originate outside of
Turkiye. The Department o f Interpol Ankara operates under the General Headquarter o f
Turkish National Police. The official name is “Interpol Europol Sirene Department
Directorate.” These cases are dealt with by the Section o f Public Security.13
Recent developments in information and telecommunication technologies and the
concomitant shift in criminality toward cyberspace resulted in the Turkish National
13 "Tttrkiye-Europol ili§kileri Birim lerim iz," w w w .interpol.pol.tr/Sayfalar/birim leriiriiz.aspx.

155

Police establishing the Department of Struggling against Information System Crimes in
2011. It was renamed the Department o f Struggling against Cybercrimes in 2013. The
department has a center under the MHQ o f Turkish National Police in Ankara and has
established sections in 82 Turkish cities as City Police Directorates.14
In the past, operational child pornography investigation requests in Turkiye by
foreign Interpol departments tended to be directed toward the Department o f Public
Security, and in urgent cases, to the Police Directorates in cities as well. The reverse for
operational investigation requests from foreign Interpol departments were received by
Interpol Ankara from the Department o f Public Security, Police Directorates in cities, and
the prosecutor’s office.15 Currently, this process includes the new Department o f
Struggling against Cyber-crimes and its subsections in cities.

International regimes and Turkiye’s participation
The Council o f Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, CETS No. 201, opened for signatures on 25 October
2007 in Lanzarote and came into force in Turkiye on 1 April 2012, after ratification on 7
December 2011. The convention advises signatory countries to develop preventive
policies and programs and criminal and legal frameworks against various forms of
children sexual abuse, children prostitution, and pornography.
Instead o f limiting scope to the Internet, the Convention extends to information
and communication technologies writ large. Article 20 o f the Convention, under the title
“Offences concerning child pornography’’ advises parties to “take the necessary

14 "Siber Su^larla MQcadele Daire B ajkanligi Hakkimizda," w w w .siber.pol.tr/Sayfalar/hakkim izda.aspx.
15 Unveren, ibid.
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legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conduct, when
committed without right, is criminalised: a) producing child pornography; b) offering or
making available child pornography; c) distributing or transmitting child pornography; d)
procuring child pornography for oneself or for another person; e) possessing child
pornography; [and] f) knowingly obtaining access, through information and
communication technologies, to child pornography.” The same article also has an
exemption for the final paragraph (f) that “Each Party may reserve the right not to apply,
in whole or in part, paragraph 1.f.” 16
On 10 November 2010, Turkiye signed the Council o f Europe Convention o f
Cyber Crimes, CETS No. 185, and opened for signatures in Budapest on 23 November
2001 but has not yet ratified the Convention as of 17 July 2013. The convention is
considered to be the first international treaty regarding crimes committed through the
Internet and other computer networks and focuses on violations of copyrights, computerrelated fraud and forgery, child pornography, and interception of computer networks and
information systems. Convention CETS No. 185 also specifies criminalized actions for
the above crimes in Convention CETS No. 201, except paragraph f (further are
exceptions stipulated in Article 9/4).
The term child pornography, the Convention notes, shall include pornographic
material that visually depicts a) a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; b) a person
appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; or c) realistic images
representing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. According to the Convention,
minor means all persons less than 18 years o f age (or less than 16 years old, if a signatory

16 "Council o f Europe C onvention on the Protection o f Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual
A buse C ets N o.: 2 0 1 http://conventions.coe.int/T reaty/C om m un/Q ueV oulezV ous.asp?N T =201& C M =8
& D F = 17 /0 7 /2 0 1&CL=ENG.
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party requires a lower age limit).17
Turkiye is also a signatory o f United Nations Convention on the Rights Children
20 November 1989. Turkiye signed the convention on 14 September 1990 and ratified it
on 4 April 1995 with reservations.

1fi

Formerly known as SHCEK, CHGM is the

coordinating department in Turkiye assigned to follow up on issues relevant to the
Convention. Together with other related departments and institutes, the first report issued
by the department was submitted to the UN Children’s Rights Committee in 1999, and
the Committee issued its evaluations o f the report based on Article 44 o f the
Convention.19
Turkiye is also a signatory o f the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights o f the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography
dated 25 May 2000 and ratified on 19 August 2002.20 Turkiye submitted a report based
on this Optional Protocol to the Committee on 17 May 2006 in Geneva.
In their evaluation based on the submitted report, the Committee expresses its
contentment with the amendments in the Turkish Criminal Code in terms o f new
effective provisions that specify child trade, prostitution, and pornography. But the
Committee emphasizes some missing items and gaps in the national legal framework
regarding Internet child pornography, and suggests new legal provisions that specify the
crime in order to empower the legal system in combating these crimes. It also stresses the
importance o f Tiirkiye's submitting to the Council o f Europe Convention o f Cyber
17 "Convention on Cybercrim e Cets N o.: 185." http://conventions.coe.int/T reaty/C om m un
/Q u eV ou lezV ous.asp ?N T = 185& C M =8& D F =19 /0 7 /2 0 1 3& C L =EN G .
18 United N ations Treaty C ollection, "Chapter IV. Human R ights, 11. C onvention on the R ights o f the
Child," http://treaties.un.org/P ages/V iew D etails.aspx?src=T R E A T Y & m tdsg_no=IV -1 l& chapter=4
& lang=en. For country reservations in signature, also see Selahattin G iiven, "Medyada Ku^iiklerin
Korunmasina fli§kin DUzenlemeler,” U niversiteler M ahallesi, 2011.
19 £ o cu k H izm etleri G enel MudOrliigii, "Cocuk Haklari He ilg ili M evzuat, Protokol V e Raporlar,"
w w w .cocukhizm etleri.gov.tr/tr/10535/C ocuk-H aklari-H e-Ilgili-M evzuat-Protokol-ve-R aporIar.
20 United N ations Treaty C ollection, ibid.
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Crimes, which opened for signatures in Budapest on 23 November 2001 and the Council
o f Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, which opened for
signature in Warsaw on 16 May 2005,21 Turkiye signed both Conventions; however, as o f
17 July 2013 neither have been ratified.

EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Beside the complications involved with blocking Internet content, which is
essentially a preventive measure o f policing, Internet content presents significant
challenges to prosecution efforts. Rather than looking at all kinds o f crimes and their
prosecution, this study focuses on child pornography on the Internet and its prosecution.
Different from most of the other types o f crimes and their punishment, there is a
broad international consensus on defining child pornography as a crime and having legal
punishment against offenders. This study has analyzed digital files, each o f which is
opened as a specific file for different child pornography cases in Interpol Ankara.
Interpol is the second biggest international organization after the United Nations
in terms o f members. Each country has its own National Central Bureau or NCB to
coordinate cooperation between national units with foreign units in criminal and policing
issues.
Unveren conducted a descriptive study about child pornography in his M aster’s
dissertation. Based on records from the Interpol Department in Ankara, Unveren notes
that there are a total o f 136 cases between 1999 and 2006 and 85 files in 2007,22 128 files
in 2008, 51 files in 2009, and 5 files in 2010 (up until January 22, 2010). The average

21 Unveren, ibid.
22 Ibid., 31. (This study has found tw o duplicate files that m eans totally 83 new file s o p en ed in the year
2007)
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number o f cases opened in each year for the past ten years (between 1999 and 2009) is
about 40 files.
According to Aydin, the first known arrest resulting from an Interpol request was
conducted in Konya, Turkiye in 2000, but the suspect was released on bail.23 Unveren’s
study was important to understand the transnational aspects of the crime. However,
Unveren did not go in depth to explore the details of the investigations, their results,
problems, or other barriers in these files. Focusing on the files of specific cases initiated
in 2005, 2006 and 2007, this study presents readers with more details o f these
investigations. Rather than looking at specific successful cases, it analyzes all cases to see
the overall picture regarding these investigations.
Internet child pornography here covers any crime against minors committed on or
through the internet and internet applications such as messengers with webcams, file
sharing applications, or email. The study excludes files that include other kinds o f sex
crimes against minors such as illegal detention, child marriage, rape, harassment, or
peeping. These non-Internet crimes are specified below for each year. This study likewise
does not include non-operational messages sent only for information, fingerprint or
criminal record checks, or address or language errors.

Analysis o f 2005
Records in the digital archive show that 31 new Internet-based child pornography
files were opened in 2005. Not all these cases are operational, i.e. resulting in a request of
police and legal action. This study excludes those cases which are non-operational and
thus irrelevant for this study. In 2005, 13 cases were considered non-operational since
23 Ibid.
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these files may include criminal background check for a person, general information
inquiries from Interpol departments, or wrong addresses.
As for operational cases, among the 31 case files, five cases were the result o f
requests for police and legal action from foreign Interpol Bureaus (outgoing requests).
Thirteen cases were incoming requests from different national Interpol Bureaus for police
and legal action.
Most o f the requests, both outgoing and incoming, involve websites established to
host child pornography on their servers, or have links to pornographic images. Each case
may concern a single website or more. Besides police departments, these requests may
came from the legal units o f any Interpol member country. Interpol uses its secure
communication system for transmitting these kinds o f messages. Requests include all
available details from the websites, their domain names, web address, IP numbers, crimerelated photos, videos, and other technical details about the servers. Investigation requests
for legal or police action may only be addressed to one or more NCB as well as to the
General Secretariat in Lyon, France.

Outgoing requests
Outgoing requests have been addressed to a number o f NCBs, including
Germany, Australia, the United States (three times), Russia (twice), Portugal, France, and
in one case to all Interpol NCBs. These requests include some web pages determined to
be hosting or distributing child pornography and have servers registered abroad, such as
in the country where the NCB is located. Cases were initiated by two units in Turkiye, the
local police o f Ankara, and the Police Department o f Public Order. Checks made o f text
documents reveal that no results could be achieved in five cases.
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A complicated procedure o f “rogatory commission”
In one case, Interpol Washington requested a rogatory commission (a detailed
judicial file and documents about the case and requests sent through a diplomatic
channel) for the investigation in Turkiye. Preparing a rogatory commission for a
transnational case is a complex task that is both a time- and resource-consuming
procedure. Political and diplomatic tensions among countries involved in such cases may
prevent these procedures from proceeding further. Time is very much a concern for any
judicial investigation, but more so for crimes committed on and through the Internet. By
the time the judicial file is prepared and translated into the language o f the address
country, the subject website or records could be deleted, moved, or changed.
Different legal systems among the countries are another barrier for initiating such
a procedure. Even when a judicial file is prepared and translated into the language of the
target country, it is not always guaranteed that all requests in these files will be admitted
by the judicial authorities o f the addressed country.
In some cases, a rogatory commission is requested after the first immediate police
action is conducted, but it is not a prerequisite for police or legal action. In such a
situation, as seen in successful cases from 2005, suspects may be identified and evidence
could be collected before they disappear or are deleted.
While in some cases, investigations were about a single website, in some others a
number o f websites were subject to inquiry. For instance in one case, investigations for
five websites were addressed to three Interpol NCBs (Portugal, Russia, and the United
States). Another case regarded a website sent only to Interpol United States.
Unfortunately, there were no results established in digital files for these cases. Paperbased files o f these digital files may include insignificant replies from Interpol NCBs. But
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the absence o f these writings in the digital archive implies no legal or police action could
be achieved based on the requests of Interpol Ankara.

Incoming requests
There were 13 operational incoming requests (cases) received in 2005. That year
incoming requests exceeded outgoing. Among them, only three of the investigations
conducted in Turkiye resulted suspects being identified and transferred to the judicial
authorities.
For the other ten cases, no results could be achieved. In four o f them, the
information submitted was insufficient to conduct investigations in Turkiye. In this
situation, further information was requested back from the original Interpol Bureaus.
However, no messages were recorded back from these countries to further the
investigation in the country. The other six files were notified related units. Non
availability o f further information in these ten files imply no significant result could be
achieved in none o f them.

Successful cases
Three cases in 2005 were investigated successfully, and suspects involved in these
reported cases were identified or brought before judicial authorities. The first case
regarded a message from Interpol Madrid about a suspicious IP address distributing child
pornography. This request was sent to local police in Izmir, Turkiye, and all details and
investigations conducted in Izmir established the user and owner o f the IP number. After
receiving court permission, local police in Izmir conducted a search o f the suspect’s

163

home and computer. He was transferred to court but released afterwards when no
evidence found.
In the second case, the initiator of the investigation was in the UK and concerned
emails sent to an underage adolescent from an email address in Turkiye. One or more
individuals was suspected o f sending explicit sexual images and photos to teenagers in
the UK. The request from Interpol London was sent to local police o f Zonguldak, Turkiye
with copies of images from emails and the details of IP numbers and emails attached.
Local police identified two suspects and transferred them to the Prosecutor’s Office in
Zonguldak, Turkiye. The file shows that the Prosecutor’s Office requested a rogatory
commission from competent authorities o f the UK for the case.
The third case was from German Interpol and involved two teenagers aged 14 and
15. Some pornographic images and photos were sent to these teenagers from a person
they while they were chatting on the Internet. Based on available email addresses and IP
numbers submitted to Interpol Ankara by German Interpol, local police in Aksaray were
notified, and the suspect was identified. The file shows that the Prosecutor’s Office
requested further details o f the investigation with a rogatory commission from German
authorities through diplomatic channels.

Unsuccessful cases
All o f these ten cases concerned websites containing photos and videos o f child
pornography or have links to other websites with similar content. These requests were
from Ireland, Germany (five cases), Spain, Finland (two cases), and Portugal. These
requests received from outside Interpol Bureaus were sent to competent bodies in Turkiye
along with images and records o f the crime with other technical details.
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Many IP numbers from different countries involved
In one case, Finland Interpol had a request in which 78 different countries were
involved. Based on an investigation conducted for child pornography in this country,
about 2,200 IP numbers were established to have some kind of connections with a
suspect being prosecuted in that country. Since some IP numbers notified by Finland
Interpol were from Ankara, Turkiye, local police in Ankara were provided with all the
details o f the case accordingly. So far the result is unknown. Likewise the result for
Finland is not in its file.

Lack o f necessary information, date and time problems, internet cafe involvement
Among the ten cases in this situation, it is apparent that for some cases,
ambiguities about the time and date o f the investigation conducted by the initiator o f the
investigation abroad was the main reason to launch further investigations in Turkiye
because Internet cafes were involved in the commission o f the alleged crime. For four
cases o f the ten, competent bodies in Turkiye informed the Interpol Bureau in Ankara
that further information was needed to conduct investigations in Turkiye. In these four
cases, Interpol Ankara requested additional information (IP numbers, further crime
details, and available material) from the Interpol office originating the investigation. No
response from foreign Interpol departments is available for these four cases, nor is a
result known in their file.
For the remaining six operational cases, no necessity or reason is reported and
available in their files. Overall, no positive results could be achieved for ten operational
cases.
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Analysis o f 2006
The number o f cases in 2006 was 33. Among the cases in that year, five were
initiated from Interpol Bureaus outside o f Turkiye (outgoing requests) for police and
legal action. Incoming requests, on the other hand, were 28— more than in the previous
year. Among them, 21 cases were operational, resulting in a request for police and legal
action. The other seven include non-operational files and other kinds o f sexual crimes
against minors, as explained above.
As with cases in the previous year, most o f the requests (both outgoing and
incoming) in 2006 concerned websites determined to be hosting pornographic records,
images, or photos involving children, or have links to such websites. Cases may concern
one or more websites. Requests may come from legal units, courts or prosecutor’s office
in any Interpol country, as well as police departments.

Outgoing requests
Outgoing requests in 2006 were addressed to Interpol Bureaus o f the United
States (three), Germany, Canada, the UK, Slovakia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland,
Australia, Sweden, Denmark, Uruguay, Russia, and Czech Republic in five different
cases. All the cases requested to be investigated in these countries concerned websites
registered in or connected to servers located in these countries. Sometimes servers,
registration, or other contact details o f a website may refer to one country or more
countries. Cases from 2006 were initiated by two local police departments, in Ankara
(four) and in Istanbul (one).
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Many countries involvement
Like cases in the previous year 2005 for outgoing requests, no significant results
could be achieved in these cases either. Among them, one case was interesting to note
here since twelve different countries were involved. The case was about a web-site which
was hosting child pornography on two domain addresses registered or has servers abroad.
The request was to conduct simultaneous police operations against the registered
addresses o f these websites in different states. Based on legal and technical reasons, no
country responded to Interpol Ankara expressing willingness to join a police operation.
While US Interpol responded that material submitted to them was not enough to initiate
such an action, Polish Interpol mentioned technical barriers for such an operation.
Uruguay Interpol responded that they will join such an operation after their initial
investigations. Digital files of this case also show that language barriers (especially in the
attached documents which include technical, registration, and log details), time zone and
date differences, as well as address errors, were the subject o f message trafficking in the
case. Only UK Interpol responded, stating that based on a request from Interpol Ankara,
they had conducted investigations in the UK of related IP numbers but could not find
individuals who accessed or downloaded records from the websites in question.
For the other four outgoing cases, a number of websites have been reported to the
related Interpol Bureaus by Interpol Ankara. However, no success could be achieved in
these cases.

Incoming requests
There were 21 operational requests (cases) received in 2006. In six o f them,
investigations conducted in Turkiye were successful in identifying suspects or in bringing
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them before the judicial authorities. However, for fifteen cases, no significant result could
be achieved according to the digital archive.

Lack o f necessary information
Out o f fifteen cases, four contained files that seemed to hinder further
investigations in Turkiye. In three of those four cases, crime subject records such as
videos, photos, and chat and email records were missing. For one case, technical and
registration details o f the website and IP number were missing. In all four cases,
requesting NCBs were notified by Interpol Ankara requesting further documents and
necessary information. In some cases, related NCBs responded back to Interpol Ankara
that they had no further information or records. In others, no response was provided for
the requests for additional information.
For the other eleven operational cases, information as well as all available records
and documents were sent to competent bodies and local police in Turkiye. However, no
replies in these files show significant results. Regardless o f whether there were reported
reasons or no replies available, no significant results could be achieved in these cases
according to their files.

Successful cases
H alf o f the six successful cases in 2007 were related to investigations in the
Netherlands. On behalf o f Interpol The Hague, Interpol General Secretariat (IP SG) in
Lyon, France notified all NCBs in a diffusion message to all member countries that
monitoring o f some websites hosting child pornography revealed that approximately
2,800 IP numbers were detected accessing these sites and downloading child
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pornographic records from these sites. IP SG requested all related NCBs to make
appropriate investigations of these Internet users from several countries. The operation
was called Operation Balendo.
Interpol Ankara checked the IP numbers and found that 387 IP numbers came
from Turkiye. Interpol Ankara informed the Department o f Public Peace and Order, the
competent body in Turkiye, about the case and submitted to them all available
documents, a CD, passwords, and details of IP numbers received. Following
investigations in Turkiye, users and owners of eight IP numbers were identified and
transferred to the judicial authorities in Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya.
In an operation called Operation Lancer, investigators revealed that the case
prosecuted in the Netherlands had connections to Turkiye. Interpol The Hague informed
Interpol Ankara about these suspicious IP addresses and submitted all available
documents for appropriate legal action. Based on this request, competent bodies in
Turkiye conducted investigations in seven different cities. In the end, four persons were
arrested in four different cities, Hatay, Burdur, Mugla, and Canakkale. Some evidence
was detected in the computers of the other persons in Istanbul, Kriklareli and Mersin, but
they were released on bail.
Again in another operation in the Netherlands, IP addresses and copied records
and images submitted by Interpol The Hague were checked and investigations initiated in
Turkiye. At the end o f the investigations, the users and registered owners o f the IP
numbers were identified in Usak and Denizli in Turkiye. While no evidence could be
detected in the investigations in Denizli, the perpetrator was identified in Usak and he or
she was arrested by judicial authorities.
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In another case, Interpol Vienna informed Interpol Ankara that 22 IP numbers
from Turkiye were detected while they were purchasing pornographic records from a
website. Since some information and documents were missing, Interpol Ankara requested
additional documents and information from Interpol Vienna. Later Interpol Ankara
received all available information to initiate an investigation in Turkiye. The case was
called Operation Flo, and it was transferred to the Department of Public Peace and Order
for investigation and action. For eleven IP users, no evidence could be found to charge
them before court. For the other eleven IP numbers, investigations revealed some child
pornographic images and other kinds o f evidence to bring them before judicial
authorities. Although the prosecutions regarding the case were reported to be ongoing,
the suspects were released on bail.
In an operation called Smasher, Interpol Wiesbaden requested appropriate
investigations against some IP numbers from Interpol Ankara that were suspected of
dealing in child pornography. The Department o f Public Peace and Order received the
case with all CD and documents from Interpol Ankara, and they identified 53 Internet
users o f the IP numbers in 21 different cities in Turkiye. For 25 users, no evidence could
be detected to bring charges against them. Sixteen other users from different cities were
arrested. In computers o f ten of the users, illegal content was detected. The accused were
released on bail by judicial authorities. Because two IP addresses were used in internet
cafes, users o f these two IPs could not be identified.
Interpol Canberra informed Interpol Ankara that while using a chat program, a
minor female received inappropriate sexual images from a person whose email address
and IP numbers were originating from Turkiye. The case was transferred to competent
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bodies in Turkiye. The perpetrator was identified in Denizli, and a judicial proceeding
was initiated against the person, who was arrested.

Unsuccessful cases
These cases were basically about websites hosting photos, videos o f child
pornography, or have links to other websites with similar content. While German Interpol
had four investigation requests, Spanish Interpol had three requests from Interpol Ankara.
All o f these investigations concerned websites and IP numbers linked to marketing,
distributing, or otherwise involved in downloading child pornography. Italy sent a
message about a website registered in Turkiye. Likewise Swiss, Dutch, and Polish
Interpol Bureaus sent requests about IP numbers in Turkiye to be investigated. In only
one case, which was from Germany, the investigation was concerned with the use o f a
chat program. Checks on these files found no significant information, which implies
negative results for these cases.

Analysis of 2007
The highest number o f cases opened was 83 in 2007— more than in 2005 and in
2006. Among the 83 documents from 2007, fifteen cases were operational requests from
foreign Interpol Bureaus (Outgoing requests) for police and legal action.
Incoming Requests totaled 69. Among these incoming requests, 52 cases were
operational, involving requests for police and legal action. Among the incoming cases,
eight cases were considered non-operational, and nine cases concern other kinds o f
sexual crimes against minors.
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Outgoing requests
Total outgoing requests in 2007 numbered 14. These file requests were sent to
Interpol Bureaus in the United States (five times), Germany (three times), Panama (three
times), Russia (two times), the UK, Holland, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam, and
copied to the Interpol headquarters in Geneva (seven times only for information). Most of
these requests called for investigation o f websites determined to be hosting child
pornography. In addition, two cases involved a video sharing web application,
rapidshare.com, through which child pornography was claimed to be uploaded or
downloaded. In one case, an email account was used for the same crime. Cases in 2007
were initiated by local police in Ankara (four cases), and Istanbul (six cases), by the
Department o f Public Peace and Order (two cases), and by judicial authorities in Ttirkiye
(two cases). In two cases, Interpol Ankara received responses requesting that
investigations not continue. National units dealing with these two cases were notified
about these messages and any additional details requested by foreign Interpol Bureaus. In
the other twelve files there are no responses.

Time and date barrier
One o f the cases concerns a file-sharing website. The Prosecutor’s Office in
Ankara established that a link for a child pornography file was uploaded and shared on
this file-sharing website. The administration of the website had noticed the file and
removed it from their servers. Submitting all available information including date and
time o f the uploaded file, Interpol Ankara requested that German Interpol identify the
user who uploaded the file by submitting all technical details of the uploading including
IP number, user name, and sign-up email address. However, since the file was removed
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and deleted by the website administration, Interpol Wiesbaden informed Interpol Ankara
that it was not possible to have the file again.

Transnational involvement and rogatory commission
The other unsuccessful case involved marketing a sex video o f a child victim on
the Internet. Based on inquiry by judicial authorities in Turkiye, Interpol Ankara
requested from a number o f NCBs and IP SG to assist in identifying the victim in the
photo. Interpol Ankara also requested that Interpol France identify the IP number of a
suspect whose email address was known. German and Dutch Interpol Bureaus and IP SG
were not able to identify the child in the photo. Canadian and US Interpol replied they
could not compare and check the video in their records. Interpol France responded that
the IP number belongs to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) in their country, and a
rogatory commission about the request for the case was necessary to further
investigations in France.
In the other twelve cases, a number o f websites were subject to inquiries from
foreign Interpol Bureaus. All of these cases were reported to the related foreign Interpol
Bureaus with all available information and documents, including recorded photos, videos,
or other kinds o f digital files on CD or DVD, domain addresses, IP numbers, the original
Internet Service Provider (ISP), and other contact information (postal addresses, phone
numbers, and email addresses). These Interpol Bureaus were asked to make appropriate
investigations and notify Interpol Ankara o f their results. However, no significant
response or result has been received or achieved so far in these cases.
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Incoming Requests
Total incoming requests in 2007 were 69. Among them, 52 cases concerning child
pornography on the Internet were operational and resulted in requests for appropriate
police or judicial action. While eight cases were non-operational requests, nine cases in
2007 involved other kinds o f sexual crimes against children.
Among the 52 operational cases, only nine cases resulted in significant success in
identifying suspects and transferring them to judicial authorities. For the remaining 43
operational cases, no significant results could be achieved. Among the 43 cases, in six
cases, there were reasons and barriers mentioned in the digital archive that investigations
could not be furthered. For the remaining 37 cases, no result or a reason was recorded in
the files.

Successful cases
Interpol London notified Interpol Ankara that an email address and phone number
from Turkiye were found to be related to an investigation against child pornography in
the UK and submitted eight pages of details of the investigation to Interpol Ankara. It
was easy to identify the subscriber of the phone number in a province o f Turkiye, but the
person was not the user o f the email. Based on information supplied by the subscriber o f
the phone number, the user o f the email account was identified. Checks by local police
revealed such photos and records in the person’s computer. He was transferred to the
public prosecutor’s office, and released afterwards.
A nine page message attached with a CD sent by German Interpol stated that one
IP number from Turkiye was downloading crime related records from the video sharing
websites FrostWire and BearShare. The department o f Interpol Ankara conveyed the
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message to the related department and local police. The user of the IP number was
identified and traced to Karabuk. The person was interrogated by the police and stated
that he was just storing these records but not distributing them. He was transferred to the
public prosecutor’s office and released afterwards.
In a message from Interpol Canada, it was stated that an 11-year-old child was
chatting with a person from Nevsehir, Turkiye. The person gave the victim his phone
number and wanted to take a photo and recording o f her while chatting. Local police in
Nevsehir established that the phone number belonged to another person who denied
knowing either the perpetrator or the incident. No judicial action is known in this case,
although the alleged persons were identified.
Another criminal investigation o f a chat program was reported by Interpol
London to Interpol Ankara. Identifying himself as the teenaged victim’s cousin, an
individual requested photos from the victim. Later the individual began blackmailing the
victim and requested more naked photos. Interpol London submitted all available
information about the case, the blackmailer’s IP number and other available details. The
offender involved in this case was identified and traced to Kocaeli, Turkiye. Checks o f
the person’s computer found inappropriate photos and recordings. For further judicial
proceedings against the person, Interpol Ankara requested judicial documents from
Interpol London through diplomatic channels.
Providing a CD, protected with a password, Interpol London identified criminal
proceedings in their country to Interpol Ankara against child pornography. Based on
information and records submitted by Interpol London, Ankara police investigated and
identified seven persons. They were transferred to judicial authorities and released
afterwards.
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In a similar case, reported by German Interpol, a person was arrested by judicial
authorities but released afterwards.
Another similar case was reported by Interpol Austria. Investigations were
conducted based on submitted IP numbers, CD, and other available information in
Turkiye. Thirteen suspects were identified and transferred to judicial authorities. While
two o f them were arrested, the others were released.
In a message from Interpol London, it was reported that on a website, a person
whose nickname and email account is known was trying to incite underage girls to pose
on a webcam and provide their email addresses. Interpol London submitted all available
records, dates, and times o f the incidents, as well as the IP numbers o f the user. Interpol
Ankara conveyed this information to related departments. The user was later identified,
and a lawsuit was initiated against the person. He was released, but prosecution was
ongoing without arrest.
Interpol Canada notified Turkish authorities that from an email account, naked
photos and video recordings o f an underage girl o f 15 were sent to an individual’s email
address in Canada. After the given information was submitted to competent bodies in
Turkiye by Interpol Ankara, the user o f the email account was identified. He was
transferred to the prosecutor’s office. He was released, but the prosecution against him
was on-going at the time.

No results cases
As stated above, except from nine cases (out o f total 52), in 43 operational cases,
no significant result could be achieved. Among these 43 cases, in six cases, some reasons
are reported and known which may hinder investigations. For the other 37 operational
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cases, investigations by competent bodies in the country revealed no significant result. If
we look at negative cases resulted because of some barriers, we see the following cases:

Problem o f Internet cafe and date-time o f the crime
Interpol Hong Kong reported to Interpol Ankara that a person on a web-cam
showed some sexual behaviors to a girl and sent some sexual pictures to her email
account. Based on given IP number by Interpol Hong Kong, investigations conducted in
Turkiye established that the IP number belongs to an internet cafe. Since the date and
time of the crime is not clear it was impossible to check all the visitors o f the internet cafe
and establish the perpetrators) in this case.

Corporation barriers (email account)
According to information received from Interpol London, a person showed some
inappropriate sexual behaviors on MSN while chatting with a teenager, aged 12.
Investigations in Ttirkiye checked the person’s email account and IP number but no
useful information could be received from Microsoft Corporation. Because o f that, no
further proceedings could be carried out by authorities.

Problem o f dynamic IP numbers and date-time o f the crime
Interpol Poland submitted a DVD and all available information in their hand
regarding an investigation in their country against child pornography on the web. They
submitted a number o f IP numbers as well as all documents o f all technical details o f web
pages. Investigations by competent bodies in Turkiye found that submitted IP numbers
are dynamic which can be used by different persons on different date and time. Thus,
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missing information such as the accurate connection time period o f IP numbers,
connection date and time details hindered investigations to proceed in TUrkiye.
Moreover, the attached document’s language received from Interpol Poland was another
problem since they were in the Polish language.24
Likewise, Interpol Belgium sent an investigation request to Interpol Ankara about
an email that included child pornography. Because of lack o f information about date and
time o f the crime reported, no investigations could be carried out in Turkiye.

Lack o f information
Canadian Interpol notified a number of other Interpol National Bureaus that
investigations in their country established that one person was distributing and sharing
images o f child pom with 56 users within Canada and 576 other user/person(s) from 42
different countries. It was reported that three were from Turkiye. Investigations could not
be furthered because o f lack o f information such as IP numbers, online time(s), and the
number o f downloaded files.

The complicated procedure of rogatory commission
Interpol London notified a criminal investigation in their country about hacking
email accounts o f nineteen females, some of whom were teenagers. Attracting them on
MSN, an unidentified person insisted victims visit a web-site of his where he hacks MSN
user names and passwords. He was blackmailing them to make a 20-minutes show before
a web-cam. Otherwise, he would give these accounts to terrorists or other sexual

24 Each Interpol member declares which official language o f the G eneral Secretariat is/are accepted in its
national bureau. Interpol Ankara accepts English and French.
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criminals. Some o f victims accepted the person's demands. In this way, the person could
also access other friends o f victims as if he is her and asked similar demands from them.
Interpol London also submitted two pages o f IP numbers and log details o f these
connections. Because this case was very broad and required an extensive investigation,
Interpol Ankara requested from Interpol London to send a rogatory commission through
diplomatic channels. The result o f investigation is unknown (not reported) in its digital
file.

Analysis of cases between 2005-2007
As seen in content analysis of digital files o f 2005, 2006 and 2007 opened in
Interpol Ankara, investigations o f internet child pornography are significantly
problematic for law enforcement agencies. Among the operational incoming messages of
86 cases in these years, only 18 of them could be considered as successfully solved, i.e.
suspects are identified and/or brought before judicial authorities in Turkiye. This is about
20% o f all the operational incoming messages.
In about 80% o f all operational incoming messages, which is 14+54=68,
investigations could not reach a significant end. While in fourteen files there were some
kinds o f technical, legal reasons known for not furthering investigations, 54 files are seen
not be able to reach a significant end with no known reason given in the files.
As for outgoing investigations, among the 24 operational investigation requests
from foreign Interpol departments, none o f them shows that investigations abroad reveal
a significant end, i.e. suspects are identified and/or are brought before judicial authorities.
While four cases among them have some reasons for not being able to conduct

investigation in related countries, the other 20 files do not contain any information about
the conclusion or progress in the countries requested.
This unpleasant situation for outgoing investigation request is also seen in
Unveren’s study. Although he gives examples of some successful cases and
investigations in Ttirkiye based on requests received from foreign Interpol Bureaus, no
successful investigation is known abroad based on information and request by Interpol
Ankara. Thus, prosecution efforts o f authorities particularly in internet child pornography
are not promising either as seen in this chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
RESULTS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND WEAKNESSES

RESULT OF EACH ANALYSIS
Research Question 1: To what extent do blocking measures on the Internet
effectively prevent access to undesired websites and web content? As seen in previous
sections, internet access blocking efforts by authorities are not very effective at
preventing people access to undesired websites or web contents in Turkiye. The first
pages o f the all tested blocked websites are accessed by using one o f three circumvention
technics tested in this study, i.e. Tor, Ultrasurf and Ktunnel.1 Most o f the blocked
websites can be accessible through the circumvention methods tested here. The
percentage o f successful access to the blocked websites with the use o f Tor is some 71%
and this can reach up to 85%, if the results with “partly possible” are also considered as
successful access. The percentage with the use of Ultrasurf is 69%. If the five websites
for which the tool does not support are also excluded from the sample size for Ultrasurf,
the percentage o f successful access for this tool reaches 88%. The percentage o f possible
access with the use o f Ktunnel is the lowest as 40%. If the ones which are evaluated as
“access partly possible” are also considered satisfactory, this percentage reaches 72%.
The numbers o f websites which could not be accessed through each method are 2 sites
for Ultrasurf, 6 webs for Ktunnel, and 3 for Ktunnel.
Second, there is always a risk of over blocking or under blocking error as
explained in related sections. YouTube case shows both examples o f over blocking as

1 If one circum vention tool tested in this study is not su ccessful, any o f the other is able to a ccess for all
blocked w eb sites except from the three on es w hich are sp ecified as excluded in the text.
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seen in the errors o f access blocking to some Google services like Google Translate,
Google Analytic. This case also shows how this measure can be un-proportional by
blocking access to the entire website because o f a few undesired records although the
website is hosting millions of video records and has millions of users for different
purposes all over the world.
Finally, access blocking is not effective because o f the fact that it does not remove
the undesired website or web content from the internet. Blocked websites which have
audience within the borders of blocking country can still be online outside national
borders by changing their domain addresses with different extensions, suffixes, and/or by
using different servers abroad.
Research Question 2: How effective are the police in identifying, tracing and
bringing criminals involved in child pornography before judicial authorities? Like
complications and gaps seen in blocking measures, significant problems are seen in
investigations o f child pornography on the Internet. Since Internet child pornography is
very much a transnational crime,2 analyzing investigation files opened in an Interpol
department, i.e. Interpol Ankara presents a good picture o f transnational aspect o f
investigations regarding child pornography. The analysis o f these files presents a clear
picture about the research question since just focusing on data of a national unit for any
cybercrime will give only one dimension o f such a research question regarding
prosecution. Analysis o f transnational data as utilized in this study however covers both
the efforts o f national units in prosecution as well as those o f foreign units. This coverage
should be an ideal analysis since the internet is global and transnational in structure.

2 European C om m ission, International cooperation against cybercrim e Council o f Europe. "Resources:
International Cooperation against Cybercrime," w w w .coe.in t/t/dgh l/cooperation /econom iccrim e/cyb ercrim e
/D ocum ents/Intem ationalcooperation/defaulten.asp.

182

From this view, this study is unique to analyze a cybercrime like internet child
pornography based on data o f Interpol Ankara.
A number o f international conventions by the United Nations and European
Commission condemn different forms o f child abuse along with child pornography, and
recognize them as crime to be punished.3 Moreover, people’s awareness and sensitivity
on crimes against children is very high all over the world and authorities give special
importance when a minor is the victim o f such a crime. Thus, to enlighten this nasty
crime and identify perpetrator, it is expected that each policing unit dealing with such
kinds o f investigations is more elaborative and cooperative with the investigating units,
either at home or abroad.
However, as seen in section VI.B, most o f the operational investigation requests
about child pornography on the Internet end up without a significant result. Among the
86 operational incoming investigation requests came to Interpol Ankara in-between years
o f 2005 and 2007, in only 18 cases perpetrators are identified and/or transferred to the
judicial authorities. In 68 cases, investigations reach no significant ends. This implies that
among the reported operational incoming cases about child pornography, only 20% o f
them could be solved, whereas in 80% o f the cases investigations reach no result.
Worse is seen for outgoing requests. Interpol Ankara conveyed 24 operational
investigation requests to foreign Interpol Bureaus between 2005 and 2007. However,
significant result could be achieved in none of them. Although in four cases, there are
some extra message traffics between Interpol Ankara and other related Bureaus, these
cases could not be solved either.
One of the important contributions o f this study is the access and the analysis o f
’ EuroISPA, "Faq Internet Blocking," w w w .eu roispa.org/n ew s/70-faq-In tem et-b lock in g.
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the files in Interpol Ankara. Examining the crime based on data of such an institution
presents a broader perspective and covers all possible failures or incapability either at
home or abroad. The result of this analysis confirms that the structure and characteristics
of the internet complicates criminality in a significant way.

OVERALL ANALYSIS AND CONTRIBUTION
These findings, at least observed in two issue area are in parallel to the supporters
o f the independence claims o f cyberspace, i.e. the internet is a new wine in a new bottle.
Thus, traditional legal approaches and measures can become ineffective, and sometimes
meaningless as seen in this study for Turkiye. There are a number o f reasons which
support such assumptions including the size and types o f internet use and internet
applications, the unique structure of the internet, the anonymity o f the actor acting within
the virtual platform and availability o f variety methods to protect anonymity thorough
covering, changing or manipulating.
The volume o f the internet, the size and types o f internet applications and internet
activities cannot be compared with those of the previous media and communication
devices. According to netcraft.com, the registered web-sites numbers in the most popular
servers like Apache, Microsoft is 312,693,296 between August 1995- April 2011; and
among them about 110,000,000 are considered active.4 Web-page numbers are more than
billions. According to worldwidewebsize.com, at least 14.42 billion pages are known by
The Indexed Web. While Google has indexed about 35 billion pages, 10.7 billion pages

4 Netcraft, "April 2 0 1 1 Web Server Survey," http://new s.netcraft.com /archives/20l l/0 4 /0 6 /a p ril-2 0 1 1 -w eb server-survey.htm l#m ore-4l 87.
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are indexed by Yahoo.5 In some open resources, the number of webpages is estimated to
exceed exceeds 600 billion.6
In their diagram, The Intel Corporation shows that while 30 hours of video
uploaded on YouTube, 1,3 million videos are being viewed in one minute on the same
site. Over two million of search performed on Google and 204 million e-mails sent on the
internet in sixty seconds. While 277,000 users are logins on Facebook, 6 million views
are realized on the website. About 320 new accounts open on Twitter in one minute and
users send about 100,000 tweeter messages. The number o f networked devices is equal to
the world population now (as o f 2012) and will be double o f the global population by
2015.7
A website further notes that “60 new Blog account, 1500 new Blog post; 70
domain name registered in one minute.” 8 A news indicate that “6150 hours o f Skype
conversation, 11 million having online chat, 2 million watch pornography, 12 website
hacked am ong416 attempt in 60 seconds.” 9 Thus, it is very much complicated, difficult
for nation states to control this huge size o f image, data, record, link etc., though not all
o f them may concern them.
Looking at the blocking practices o f TUrkiye in the view of this enormous size of
the internet, it can be seen that there is huge gaps between the number o f available
undesired websites on the internet and the number of similar websites blocked by Turkish
authorities, particularly the TIB. The most internet blocking cases in the country based on

5 Maurice Kunder, "The S ize o f the W orld W ide W eb (the Internet)," w w w .w o rld w id ew eb size.co m /.
6 Kevin K elly, "We Are the Web," Wired, A ugust 2 005.
7 Intel Corporation, "What Happens in an Internet Minute?" h ttp://w w w .intel.com /content/w w w /us/en
/com m unications/internet-m inute-infographic.htm l.
8 G O -G lobe, "60 Seconds - Things That Happen on Internet Every S ix ty Seconds [Infographic],”
h ttp ://w w w .go-gulf.com /b log/60-second s/.
9 "intemette 60 Saniyede N eler Oluyor?" Timeturk, 24 March 2 0 1 2 .

185

the law no: 5651 are seen against pornographic and obscenity. As cited in Atamer,
pornographic and obscene websites on the Internet was estimated about 4-5 million
which constituted 12% o f the total websites of the internet.10 In 2003, it was estimated
that such kinds of websites were about 1.3 million and web pages were about 260
•

•

I

I

million.

However, as o f March 2012, total blocked websites were about 16 thousands.

| ^

Considering the size o f these kinds of websites on the internet with the ones that are
blocked by the TIB shows a lot about ineffectiveness of internet access blocking. Nor the
size of the internet activities makes impossible to trace or prosecute every perpetrator
involved cybercrime, as for an example stressed by Edwards in child pornography
incidents on the internet.13
The unique structure of the internet is another challenge either for regulation or
prosecution. The internet is a global network o f networks which make it naturally
transnational. It exceeds national borders and does not belong to any authority. An online
internet user is a citizen o f cyberspace and can share whatever she wants with anyone
online from anywhere on this platform. Having an internet access makes an individual to
have a chance to amplify his voice to the world, to access foreign agents or institutions
without travelling and a valid passport, or to have shopping in a foreign retailer.
The innovation mentality o f the internet was essentially founded on a risk o f a
nuclear attack and ensuring communication when one or more central nodes are targeted.
This idea created the medium on a network structure in a mesh typology and this

10 llker Atamer, "5651 Sayili Yasa V e Eri$im E ngellem e Kararlari," In 2 0 0 8 B ilifim K on feran si. Ankara,
2008.
11 Safe Fam ilies, "Statistics on Pornography, Sexual A ddiction and O n lin e Perpetrators," http://w w w
.safefam i 1ies.org/sfStats. php.
12 "Engelli Web," E ngelliw eb.com . C hecked in March 2 0 1 2 , it reports the total blocked w eb sites as 15,596.
13 Susan Edwards, "Prosecuting 'Child Pornography': P ossession and Taking o f Indecent Photographs o f
Children," Jou rn al o f S o cia l W elfare a n d F am ily L aw 2 2 , no. 1 (2000): 1-21.
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structure force itself to ensure communication in a shortest and efficient way within the
available links o f the network. “The Internet was originally designed based on a
decentralized network architecture, resilient to failure and disruption, the Internet is
resistant to external attempts at control.” 14 Thus, this unique structure is not very well
appropriate for filtering or internet access blocking. And through any node which is weak
and appropriate for misuse, it is open to criminality and manipulation.
Another important challenge for traditional approach and state policing is the
constantly changing nature o f the internet and internet technology. The internet today is
totally different from the internet in the 1990s. While the internet was only World Wide
Web, and email was the primary option in those years, today we have many other internet
applications like VoIP, Instant Messengers, Blogging, TV, radio, and we have many
other innovations today running over the internet like smart phones, 3G/4G
technologies.15
The technologic developments and changes occur very often before authorities to
respond and before it is widely being used by people. Law comes after technology and
the diffusion o f the technology use. Once authorities decide to act, they may become late
or it becomes very much expensive for them to control, regulate and prosecute the
problems with the use of internet or new internet applications.
Rather than authorities try to force the internet to be bordered, regulated,
nationalized, or territorialized, they need to adapt their traditional state mechanisms and
tools in accordance with the realities of the internet. The Internet requires a different legal
mentally, administrative approach, political perspective.
14 Cormac Callanan, Marco Gercke, Estelle D e Marco, and Hein Dries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking:
Balancing Cybercrim e R esponses in D em ocratic Societies," Open S o ciety Institute, 2 0 0 9 .
15 Timothy S. Wu, "Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System ," H a rv a rd J o u rn a l
o f L aw & T echnology 10, no. 3 (1997 ).
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WEAKNESS OF THE STUDY: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS
The internet has both negative and positive sides for users as well as for national
authorities. This study focuses on negative sides and problematic dimensions o f internet
use for authorities. Referring the negative situations in the two issue areas explored here,
it is not possible to come a conclusion that authorities are powerless in controlling the
internet. Still, many dimensions from user side as well as authority side need to be
explored to see the complete picture about many questions arisen with the use o f internet.
The test o f internet blocking and pay-passing methods conducted for this study is
not performed in a lab environment by technical experts. It is performed by the author of
this study who had no professional training or education on blocking or fileting
technology on the internet. This fact, however, is considered not a major issue to change
the results o f findings in this section in a significant degree. Even, this fact can be
considered as positive effect on the results since the study aims to see the real situation
for ordinary internet users who are using the internet in their daily life with medium level
computer knowledge and skills.
This section o f the study does not cover people perceptions about the internet
blocking and their reactions to such measures. It is important for future studies to
research sociological aspects o f internet blocking, their tendency to use bypass methods,
and reasons for using such methods. Making similar studies in other countries with
different regime type and technical capacity will make significant contribution to
understand the questions explored in this study.
New terms emerged with the internet like social media, citizen journalism have
become very influential terms today. The uses o f specific internet applications like
Facebook, Twitter have significant socio political consequences around the globe. With
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the use o f smart phones and 3G technology, people access to the internet becomes easier
and questions emerged with the internet use has gained new dimensions to be explored in
future studies.
For the second dimension o f the study, it is an advantage o f the author to have
worked before in an official department which was also dealing with child pornography
investigation in the national Interpol department. This section is not a unit which is
directly conducting such investigations but an intermediary unit between foreign and
national expert units. This may have no or little effects on findings and conclusions o f
this section. However, making such a study based on data and files o f a first unit which is
directly conducting such investigations will better explain the reasons behind the
unsolved investigations.
The internet is relatively a new technologic phenomenon. It is very often a
surprise both for people as well as authorities to see a new innovation compatible with
the internet. Law and preventive measures by authorities comes after the uses o f such
innovations are diffused among people, and after having face to their problems in legal
and socio-political realm. Looking at the spread, type, and effective use o f the internet in
the past two decades and considering the capacity of this new phenomenon, show that the
internet will have a bold signature in a variety o f fields in this century and bears a huge
area o f immature research potential for future studies.

189

CHAPTER VIII

POLICY IMPLICATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND CONCLUSION

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Despite such kinds o f technical ineffectiveness, states tend to try to control this
global network o f networks with its traditional power tools, and they should do so.
However, while these traditional tools are being considered for use in administering and
legalizing, authorities should be aware o f the unique structure of this medium. For
instance, a court order called for termination of all the activities of the offending website.
This is not possible, as Minister Binali Yildirim explains, because Turkish law is valid
within Turkish borders not in other countries.
Having shifting from the industry age to the information age, the Internet seems to
be the engine o f the new century. It has merged communication, media and information
on the same platform, which are the essential constituents o f the modem life. As a nation
state, Turkiye should understand this new medium well and try to develop policies to
maximize its benefit from. Rather than blocking, filtering, monitoring or the like, the
country should focus on developing a better Internet infrastructure and service standards,
promoting enrichment of national Internet contents, encouraging the use o f Internet in
better serving to its people, and finding alternative ways to ensure its contribution to the
economic development.
On the other hand, if regulation and law making is necessary in this field,
applicability o f the law should be prioritized. Ignoring enforcement aspects o f the each
provision will have negative impacts on the effectiveness o f the law as seen in the case of
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Turkiye.1 At this point, adaptation o f technocracy into all levels of public administration
seems to be inevitable.
The Internet itself, its infrastructure, and all kinds o f hardware, and software that
runs the Internet, are very much technical and require technical expertise. Bringing and
adapting technical perspective to these fields will minimize unforeseen complications,
possible gaps, failures and maximize the effectiveness o f public services. While for some
managerial, administrative and auditing departments and positions in this filed should
handed over to technocracy; investigating units like police and even prosecutors should
be specialized. Proficient police units and prosecutors who have expertise should deal
with cybercrime investigations. Like the technocracy in these executive departments and
specialization in investigative bodies, technical expertise should be invited to the law
making committees and their hearings.
A special institution regarding cybercrime was finally founded in 2011 under the
National Police Organization, General Directorate o f Police. Separated from “Department
o f Struggling against Smuggling and Organized Crimes” under “General Directorate o f
Police”, a new department was established as “Department o f Struggling against
Information System Crimes.” The same department has changed its name as “Department
of Struggling against Cyber-crimes” in 20013.2 The department is relatively a new
department and should immediately develop its personnel regime, their training, and if
necessary, should open hiring civilian experts in computer science and information
systems. It should establish national standards for sections in cities and should
immediately support these sections to achieve national standards in terms o f technical and

1 For applicability challenges o f criminal law s on cybercrim es, see D eb Shinder, "What M akes Cybercrim e
Laws So D ifficult to Enforce," T echR epu blic, 2 6 January 2 0 1 1.
2 "Siber Su?Iarla MQcadele Daire Ba§kanligi Hakkimizda," w w w .siber.pol.tr/Sayfalar/hakkim izda.aspx.
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personnel capacity.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The main functions of a state are ensuring security, safety and justice within the
country. For ensuring security and safety, state officials first implement preventive
measures, tactics and policies in order to stop criminality. If a crime is already
committed, the primary duty o f state policing and prosecuting units is to identify
perpetrator(s), collect forensic evidences against them, bring them before judicial
authorities, and ensure they are being prosecuted and charged if found guilty. In a broader
context, this is the policing functions o f any governing state.
As Murray notes, “It is extremely difficult and costly to enforce traditional legal
and regulatory control systems within cyberspace, due to a variety o f factors including a
relative degree o f anonymity, lack of physicality, digitalization of content, environmental
plasticity, and international or cross border nature o f the network.” 3 The example o f
Turkiye in this study confirms this perspective that traditional response tools o f the
government to control the Internet suffer significant gaps, complications, and
insufficiency. These situations can be observed in the two main functions o f the country,
both in preventing and in prosecution aspects.
In terms o f blocking, for instance, the operation and network structure o f the
Internet make blocking and filtering attempts problematic, and enable users to bypass
these barriers through variety o f methods and ways. At this point, it is better to remember
the famous saying o f John Gilmore: “The net interprets censorship as damage, and routes

3 Andrew D. Murray, The R egulation o f C yb ersp a ce: C o n tro l in the O nline E nvironm ent, (O xon: R outledge
and C avendish, 2007), 205.
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around it.”4

In terms o f prosecution, for instance, uncertainty o f identity and location
complicate law enforcement.5 Most of the time, criminals use different tactics, methods
to hide their IP,6 manipulate their location, or “manipulate the bits and bytes, making it
harder for law enforcement to trace.”7 As seen in this study, many investigations o f
Internet child pornography reached no results either by Turkish authorities or by foreign
authorities. In some cases, IP numbers were not enough for Turkish authorities to identify
and find the location(s) of perpetrator(s).
Beside these technical challenges at home, the global and transnational network
structure o f the Internet make the situation further complicated with political challenges.
For instance, a blocked website and its content can easily find a server and hosting
abroad. Criminals may shift or direct their illegal activities to the countries where
technical and legal capacity are relatively low.8 Keeping in mind that cybercrimes are
very much transnational and that law enforcement agencies are having serious challenges
at home, they will face more challenges when these crimes are committed abroad.
Callanan et al. stress that formal requirements and slow responses for legal
assistance among states very often block investigations. This is one o f the important
reasons for states to develop their own controlling instruments, like Internet blocking.9
The Internet Service Providers Association in Europe also notes that Internet blocking is
4 Jack L. G oldsm ith and Tim Wu, Who C on trols the Internet?: Illusions o f a B o rd erless W orld, (N e w York,
N Y : O xford U niversity Press, 2006), 3.
5 Shinder, ibid.
6 Marcia Hoffm an, "Why IP A ddresses Atone D o n ’t Identify C rim in a ls," Electronic Frontier Foundation, 24
A ugust 2 011.
7 John D ouglas, Ann W. Burgess, Allen G. Burgess, and Robert K. R essler, eds, C rim e C la ssifica tio n
M anual: A S ta n d a rd S ystem fo r In vestigating a n d C la ssifyin g Violent C rim e, (H oboken, N e w Jersey: John
W iley & Sons Inc., 2 0 1 3 ), 409.
8 Linda Reid, "Expert Opinion," Jou rn al o f Inform ation P riv a cy & S ecu rity I, no. 4 (2 0 0 5 ): 5 3 -5 9 .
9 Cormac Callanan, M arco Gercke, Estelle D e M arco, and Hein D ries-Ziekenheiner, "Internet Blocking:
Balancing Cybercrim e R esponses in D em ocratic Societies," Open S ociety Institute, 2 0 0 9 .
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claimed to decrease “political pressure" within the state to seek for international
cooperation.10
As seen in section VI.B regarding investigations o f Interpol cases on child
pornography, many cases reached no results because o f formal requirements among
states. Judicial authorities tend not to prefer this non-routine way since preparing a formal
letter, called a “Rogatory Commission”, its translation, and sending through diplomatic
channels are very time consuming, also require further expertise. Even after these are
fulfilled, it is no guarantee that the case will be admitted to be prosecuted by judicial
authorities of the requested country. Last but not least, whether the case will be
developed, criminals will be identified or arrested is not clear, very often not likely.
Comparing to other issue areas in international relations, which the literature very
often compares to maritime and airspace to evaluate international cooperation,
cyberspace is a new and immature issue area in terms of international law and
international conventions. A quick search on the UN Convention database for the key
words o f each area as maritime, aviation and cyber reveals that while there are 357
international conventions about maritime and 392 conventions about aviation, only two
conventions came into force about cyberspace. 11
States need to change this situation and develop effective ways o f international
cooperation since many issues on the Internet are transnational. Beside technological
10 EurolSPA, "Faq Internet Blocking," w w w .eu roispa.org/n ew s/70-faq-ln tem et-b lock in g.
11 United N ations Treaty C ollection, http://treaties.un.org/P ages/U N T SO nline.aspx?id=2. Separate checks
for each word (maritime, aviation, and cyber) reveals the follow in g: Maritime: T itle search (op tion s for
match any o f these w ords and for any treaty type -b ilateral, open multilateral etc.), record count 3 5 7 (the
oldest m ultinational con ven tion ’s conclusion date seen on database 12 Ssep tem b erl923; A viation: T itle
search (options for match any o f these words and for any treaty type -bilateral, open m ultilateral etc.),
record count 392 (the old est multinational -o p e n - convention is Interim Agreem ent on International C ivil
Aviation, entry force date 06 June 1945; Cyber: Title search (options for match any o f these w ords and for
any treaty type -bilateral, open multilateral etc.), record count 2 (both multilateral; one entry into force on
07 January 2 004, the other on 3 January 2 006. A search for the word “cyberspace” reveals no results. A
search for the word “cyber” reveals 2 results. A search for the word “airspace” reveals 8 results.
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barriers, inability and complications either seen during the administrative stage or during
the judicial stage, states should not exacerbate problems with physical borders. Despite
different political and legal approaches to administering and controlling the Internet
among states, they should try to find issue areas to have consensus on.
Especially for judicial prosecution o f cybercrimes, as seen in this study for child
pornography investigations, states need to minimize and standardize formalities in legal
assistance requests among each other. And they should take measures to accelerate
procedures in these investigation requests. The Interpol General Secretariat should
explore alternative ways to increase effectiveness o f international investigations about
cybercrimes and child pornography, either at police level or judicial level, and should
strongly recommend member states to follow these advices.
The General Secretariat should develop standard form(s) for cybercrimes e.g. that
can be used for child pornography investigations. Well organized, comprehensible and
standard form(s) should include what technical details are necessary, in which format as
well as other important information and requirements for an effective investigation that
can be conducted in any country. States requesting legal assistance, their competent
authorities can fill this standard form with available information and can send it to the
related country through Interpol Bureaus.
Another important issue regarding criminal investigations about cybercrimes is
the anonymous feature o f Internet use. Users can hide who they are and often where they
are in their Internet activities in a number o f different ways. The IP number is the primary
clue that investigators utilize to reach the Internet subscriber, if the user did not use
alternative ways to manipulate its IP number. Very often, as seen in child pornography
investigations in this study, an IP number belongs to a public network, like a commercial
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Internet cafe which is open to public for their temporary use.
As seen in section IV o f this study about the numbers of Internet cafes, there are
thousands o f cafes (excluding other places open to commercial public use) spread all
cities and provinces o f the country. Although these places have positive effects in
spreading the Internet use to every part o f the country, increasing the Internet use and
minimizing the effects o f the digital divide within the country; these places should not be
a center for criminal activities. Therefore, the regulations of Internet commercial use in
public places should be revised and tightened. Likewise, their supervision and controlling
should be more systematic and effective in order to prevent these places from being
misused by criminals.
In order to increase effective controlling functions on the Internet to some degree,
nation-states should explore more the ways of international cooperation on the subject of
the Internet which has started to erode their sovereignty, and has become an inducing
center for criminals. They should take measures to ensure that cooperation is faster and
operating effectively since it is relatively more difficult to have traces o f Internet
activities and criminals when authorities do not react in time. Other than cooperation,
states will be alone to handle all the transnational externalities of the Internet along with
other technical barriers either for prevention or prosecution.

CONCLUSION
One o f the fundamental values o f democratic states is the rule o f law and this
value is also a must for a Turkish Republic that defines itself in its Constitution as
democratic, secular and social state of law. The country's political, economic and legal
transformation, partly thanks to the influence o f European Union, has developed the
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standards o f democracy and human rights, and further institutionalized the law in recent
years.
However, Internet blocking has negatively affected these positive developments
and progress in these fields, and received serious critics both from home and abroad
against the country. Despite significant questions about the technical gaps and apparent
doubts about the effectiveness o f blocking, insisting on such policies; receiving such
critics at home or abroad and being classified within the countries o f censorship by
independent unions and NGOs, all harm these democratic developments and the
country’s image outside the world.
The issue o f Internet blocking was not a subject of criticism in annual reports of
EU access negotiations with Turkiye, for instance for the years of 2007 and 2008.
However, it was later started to be criticized in the report o f 2009 under the title o f
“freedom o f expression”, and in the report of 2010 under the title o f “civil and political
rights”. 12
The country accepts its citizens to apply the European Court o f Human Rights
(ECHR) under certain conditions and some individuals applied to the court against such
kinds o f blocking verdicts by different authorities for certain websites like LastFm.com.
and some Google sites.13 Likewise, an international NGO that monitors press and Internet
freedom in the world, the RSF, classified Turkiye within the second category as
“countries under surveillance” along with 16 countries like Russia and Australia. 14 Thus,

12 See European C om m ission Progress Reports (W orking D ocum ents) for TOrkiye, for 2 0 0 7 ,2 0 0 8 , 2 0 0 9 ,
2010), "European C om m ission > Enlargement > Countries > Strategy and Progress Reports," http://ec
.europa.eu/enlargem ent/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm .
' ’ European Court o f Human Rights, "Bianet: Turkey Inquired About Internet C ensorship," C y b erRights. Org. TR. 10 March 2 0 11.
14 Reporters without Borders, "Countries under Surveillance. Turkey," http://en.rsf.org/surveillanceTQrkiye,39758.htm l.
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the issue o f internet blocking has opened up a new issue area for critics aboard, either in
the EU or other international NGOs.
Reports prepared for The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe) by Akdeniz indicates that the number o f blocked websites are increasing
dramatically and blockings which were rationalized with moral, cultural reasons are now
seen with other reasons such as political, and religious. Moreover, he claimed that the
transparency o f judicial and administrative decisions tends to be weakening.15
The examples o f internet access blocking and how such policies are implemented
clearly violates a fundamental democratic value o f “freedom o f speech” in the country,16
and endangers other important freedoms like freedom o f communication and freedom of
press.17 Today, even some countries including Estonia, Finland and Spain have admitted
•

•

that access to the Internet is a fundamental human right for their citizens.

18

Thus,

maintaining such policies bears significant political risks for the country to be misused by
any national or international actor.
Being a lawyer specialized on Constitution, Gedik admits that it is necessary to
take legal measures against crimes on the Internet like child pornography, violence and
inducing crimes on the Internet, but he insists that there needs to be principles o f limits
and proportionality while taking these measures. Once these measures exceed the purpose

15 "OSCE Representative on Freedom o f the M edia Report on the Turkish Internet Law," O rganization for
Security and C o-operation in Europe, w w w .o sce .o r g /fo m /4 1091.
16 Batu Kinikoglu, "Evaluating the Regulation o f A ccess to Online C ontent in Turkey in the C ontext o f
Freedom o f Speech," Jou rn al o f In ternational C o m m ercia l Law a n d T echnology 9, no. 1 (January 2 0 1 4 ).
17 5651 Y asasi, "Eri$im Engeilem enin Adi: intem ete Sanstir," h ttp ://5651-yasasi.gyazilim .com /htm ldocs
/icerik_goster/240/Internete_sansur/251.html.
18 International Telecom m unication U nion (IT U ), "World Telecom m unication/IC T D evelopm ent Report
2010. M onitoring the W SIS Targets. A M id-Term R eview ," 2010.

198

o f these principles, then blocking measures becom e censorship, which is unacceptable. 19

The situation reminds us what Callanan et al. stress in their study:
“The inevitable circumvention possibilities, under-blocking, over-blocking,
mission creep, conflicts o f laws and the problem that blocking leaves material
online all mean that the issue at stake is not simply ‘to block or not to block’ but
rather what blocking measures can be introduced that are proportionate and
acceptable in a democratic society. As a result, it is crucial to review the legal and
democratic challenges that Internet blocking raises.” 20
Showing examples o f YouTube and Geocities.com, Yaman Akdeniz notes that in
some of blocking practices, particularly the ones which are taken directly and
independently (ex-officio) by prosecutors, judges, courts or Telekomunikasyon ileti§im
.

•

Ba§kanhgi (the TIB), it is not always possible to understand the reason for blocking.

21

Google Transparency Report indicates global statistics of content removal
requests from national governments and Turkiye is the first country both with 9,610 items
requested for removal by court orders and with 2,552 items by executive, police
authorities between January and June 2013. While the second country in terms o f items
removal requests by court orders is the United States with 3,415, it is India for item
removal requests by executive, police authorities with 672 in the same period.

22

Criticizing the law no. 5651 on the Internet, Gedik notes that “this law does not
struggle against crimes but struggle against the Internet.” 23 Likewise, TUSIAD, the
Turkish Industry and Business Association, one o f the most influential associations in the
country, criticizes blocking policies as legal but not legitimate (i.e. applicable under

19 Omer Gedik, "Kitle Ileti§im Ozgurlugunun Y eni Boyutu “ Internet Ozgurliigii” V e 5 6 5 1 Sayili “ Internet
Ortaminda Yapilan Yayinlarin D uzenienm esi V e Bu Y ayinlar Y olu yla I§lenen S i^ larla M licadele Edilm esi
Hakkinda Kanun'a Bir Ele§tiri," In XII. "Turkiye 'de in te r n e t" K onferansi. Ankara, 2 0 0 7 .
20 Callanan et al., ibid.
21 "Herkes Kendi G tlvenligini Kendi Saglamali!" N TVM SN B C, 24 June 2 0 0 8 .
22 G oogle, "Transparency Report," 2014.
23 Gedik, ibid., 123.
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current law but not appropriate under ideals o f universal law ).24

Koc and Kaynak also indicates the dilemma in the law that, Article 4 finds
content providers as responsible under some conditions for the links given within the
websites. However, they believe that it is very much difficult always to follow up and
monitor whether all these links are addressing a legal websites due to fast and constantly
changing nature o f the Internet. They believe that this is because that the Internet is not
exactly understood by policy makers. Likewise, lawyer Atamer stresses a similar
difficulty that the second generation websites are open to instant messages and posts
which puts content providers in a difficult situation constantly to detect each o f these
inputs. This difficult situation can be misused by bad intendant users. It can cause one
website to close for the purpose of unfair competition.
The law no. 5651 proposes to ensure a safe and secure Internet, and to protect
physical and moral healthiness o f children. Because of filtering and blocking policies
known by the public can lead families to leave children unattended with computer online
or lead families not to use any personal filtering program. As Assoc. Prof. Leyla Keser
stresses, the most effective prevention on the Internet is the user herself, “No public
institution or organization can protect persons’ rights and benefits better than
themselves.”25
Analyzing filtering software like AOL Parental Controls, Cyber Patrol, Cyber
Sentinel etc.; children's ISPs like Planet Kids and Kidz.Net.; filtered search engines Alta
Vista, UK Plus, Yahoo; and filter functions of Internet browsers Internet Explorer, and
Netscape Navigator, a web based research by which.net reveals that although these kinds

24 " tQ sIA D : TQrkiye'deki internet Y asagi Hukuk'a Aykiridir," HaberlOOO, 4 March 2 0 1 1 .
25 "Herkes Kendi Gtlvenligini Kendi Saglam ali!", ibid.
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o f filtering system are effective to some degree, parental guidance and supervision should
not be ignored to protect children from “the net nasties.”26
Moreover, measures such as blocking and censorship are believed to be increasing
individuals interests in such censored objects. Karaca and Beyaznar give an example o f
two social networking websites used by gays and lesbians. Being hosted abroad, these
websites were directly blocked by the TIB. The owners o f websites opened a lawsuit
against the TIB and were able to revoke the blocking measure. The number o f members
of the websites increased significantly just after they were online ag ain .27
The TIB is generally on the public agenda with its polemical filtering, and
blocking policies. Rather, the organization should give priority on how the Internet and
Internet contents within the country can be enriched and developed further, how the
numbers o f Internet use can further be increased. A study shows that the number o f
websites registered within the country is just above the half of the ones in Greece with a
population five times less than Turkiye.

The TIB should organize meetings, and

community-based workings to enlighten public. It should initiate projects and programs
to develop contributions o f the Internet within the economic development and the like.
Dealing with blocking and filtering should not be the issue or policy o f a
democratic state like Turkiye. Such measures can be an “exception” within democratic
principles, but should not become a systematic, un-proportional “policy”. These issues
can be left to the preference o f individuals, the private sector and o f course judicial
authorities. State organizations can give priority more on other kinds o f education and

26 Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (U K ), "Internet Filters Don't Safeguard Children against Pornography
and Other N et N asties," h ttp://w w w .cyber-rights.org/new s/2000.htm .
27 Ay§e Karaca and Bahar Beyaznar, "intem ette M ustehcenlik: N erede Ba§lar V e N ered e Biter?” In
Akadem ik Bilitjim K o n fera m i 2 0 / 0 , (M ugla, 2010).
28 Ramazan Acun, "Bilim, B ilgi T eknolojisi V e Turkiye," M illi K u ltiirler v e K u reselle$m e, (1 9 9 8 ): 83-92.
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preventive activities and supervision. The default legal and political mentality should be
liberty and freedom on the Internet rather than blocking, restriction or censorship.
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